/**
 * Security Scanner — evidence-tier severity resolution (SMI-5876)
 * @module @skillsmith/core/security/scanner/SecurityScanner.evidence
 *
 * Turns a pattern's `EvidenceType` (classified in
 * `patterns.jailbreak.evidence.ts`'s `EVIDENCE_TYPE_BY_PATTERN`, SMI-5881)
 * plus documentation context into a severity/confidence pair, and provides
 * the corroboration escalation that lifts a `mention`-tier finding when it
 * co-occurs with a genuinely dangerous non-documentation signal elsewhere in
 * the same scan.
 */
import type { EvidenceType, SecurityFinding, SecuritySeverity, FindingConfidence } from './types.js';
/**
 * Classify a pattern's evidence tier by object identity. Unmapped patterns
 * (i.e. a pattern added to JAILBREAK_PATTERNS/AI_DEFENCE_PATTERNS without an
 * `EVIDENCE_TYPE_BY_PATTERN` entry) default to `imperative_instruction` —
 * fail-closed: forgetting to classify a new pattern makes it the STRONGEST
 * tier, never the weakest, so a missed classification can never silently
 * soften detection.
 */
export declare function classifyEvidence(p: RegExp): EvidenceType;
/**
 * Relative strength ordering used by the merge-loop in
 * `SecurityScanner.helpers.ts` to pick the strongest evidence per line across
 * both the multi-line and single-line scan passes. `imperative_instruction`,
 * `instruction_override`, and `state_assertion` are equal rank — the
 * severity table below treats them identically, and none needs to out-rank
 * the others. `state_assertion` (SMI-5876 design-pass follow-up) is a
 * distinct machine-readable REASON CODE for a declarative jailbroken-state
 * assertion ("Jailbreak activated") rather than a directive aimed at the
 * model — same severity tuple, different diagnostic label.
 */
export declare const EVIDENCE_RANK: Record<EvidenceType, number>;
/** The highest rank in `EVIDENCE_RANK` — once reached, no later pattern on the same line can beat it. */
export declare const MAX_EVIDENCE_RANK = 2;
/**
 * Severity/confidence decision table (SMI-5876 design §4.1). Doc-context
 * confidence for the directive tiers is `medium`, not `low` — `low` would be
 * self-contradictory next to a still-failing severity (it would also cut the
 * risk-score weight to 0.3x, which is not the intent for a directive payload
 * that merely happens to sit inside a fenced example).
 */
export declare const EVIDENCE_SEVERITY_TABLE: Record<EvidenceType, {
    doc: {
        severity: SecuritySeverity;
        confidence: FindingConfidence;
    };
    nonDoc: {
        severity: SecuritySeverity;
        confidence: FindingConfidence;
    };
}>;
/** Resolve the severity/confidence pair for an evidence tier + documentation context. */
export declare function resolveEvidenceSeverity(tier: EvidenceType, inDocumentationContext: boolean): {
    severity: SecuritySeverity;
    confidence: FindingConfidence;
};
/**
 * Escalate a `mention`-tier finding when an ALLOWLISTED non-documentation
 * high/critical finding is ALSO present within `MAX_CORROBORATION_LINE_DISTANCE`
 * lines in the same scan (SMI-5876 design §4.3, corrected post-implementation —
 * see `CORROBORATING_SIGNALS`' doc comment for the denylist->allowlist fix and
 * the locality-window rationale). Mutates findings in place, mirroring
 * `escalateCodeExecution`'s mutation style (SecurityScanner.exec.ts).
 *
 * MUST run after `escalateCodeExecution` (SecurityScanner.ts's `scan()`) so a
 * freshly-critical `code_execution` finding can itself serve as a
 * corroborator. No feedback loop the other way: `CODE_EXECUTION_CO_OCCURRENCE`
 * (SecurityScanner.exec.ts) contains only `data_exfiltration`,
 * `privilege_escalation`, `sensitive_path`, and `obfuscated_directive` — never
 * `jailbreak` or `ai_defence` — so lifting a mention here can never
 * retroactively change `escalateCodeExecution`'s own decision (verified by
 * reading SecurityScanner.exec.ts directly, SMI-5876 implementation).
 */
export declare function escalateCorroboratedMentions(findings: SecurityFinding[]): void;
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