/**
 * Security Scanner — encoded (base64) payload detect-decode-recursively-rescan
 * @module @skillsmith/core/security/scanner/SecurityScanner.encoding
 *
 * SMI-6033 Wave 2 (Gap 2): before this file, `base64 -d | sh` (the DECODE
 * INVOCATION syntax) was already caught by CODE_EXECUTION_PATTERNS, but an
 * inert base64 blob the agent is merely instructed to decode and run itself
 * scored zero.
 *
 * Rather than a parallel "this looks suspicious" heuristic (high FP risk —
 * base64 blobs are extremely common in legitimate skills: image data URIs,
 * git hashes, JWTs), this detector DECODES the candidate and recursively runs
 * the caller's full detector suite against the decoded text, reusing the
 * whole pattern arsenal instead of duplicating it. The escalation this gap
 * achieves is free: a decoded `curl|bash` natively trips `code_execution` at
 * ITS OWN severity, exactly as if the attacker had shipped it undecoded.
 *
 * Depth-1-only, STRUCTURALLY (not by convention). This module never scans
 * itself — `rescan`, the callback the caller supplies, is expected to be the
 * caller's OWN "run every detector" entry point with the encoded-payload
 * detector specifically disabled for that inner call (see
 * `SecurityScanner.ts`'s `runDetectors(content, lineContexts,
 * skipEncodedPayload)`, where the recursive callback always passes `true`).
 * The inner call therefore cannot reach this detector again no matter what
 * the decoded content contains — a base64 blob discovered INSIDE decoded
 * content is never itself decoded.
 *
 * Candidate detection: a contiguous base64-alphabet run,
 * `[A-Za-z0-9+/]{120,}={0,2}`. Deliberately EXCLUDES `-`/`_` (base64url), so
 * a JWT never becomes a candidate at all — that is the intentional mechanism
 * keeping JWTs out, not a separate check. Bounded/ReDoS-safe: a single
 * character-class quantifier has no catastrophic-backtracking surface, so
 * this intentionally does NOT route through `safeRegexTest`'s 10,000-char
 * truncation — a legitimate base64 blob routinely runs past that on one long
 * line, and truncating it would silently defeat detection.
 *
 * The wrapper finding (`encoded_payload`) is advisory-tier ONLY (weight 1.2 /
 * coefficient 0.04 — the sensitive_path/typosquat tier, NOT the 2.0/0.40 tier
 * the other three Wave 2 detectors use, see weights.ts): this detector is
 * pure observability/provenance-marking, not itself a strong signal. Every
 * finding folded in from the decoded content carries a NEW `decodedFrom`
 * field (types.ts) set to the OUTER document line the blob was found on —
 * the same provenance-marker role `filePath` already plays for a
 * sibling-file finding, just for a decoded-blob origin instead of a
 * different file.
 */
import type { SecurityFinding } from './types.js';
import type { LineContext } from './SecurityScanner.helpers.js';
/**
 * Callback the caller (`SecurityScanner`) supplies to run its OWN full
 * detector suite against decoded text, with the encoded-payload detector
 * itself disabled — the structural depth-1 guarantee (see module header).
 */
export type EncodedPayloadRescanner = (decodedContent: string) => SecurityFinding[];
export declare function scanEncodedPayload(content: string, lineContexts: LineContext[] | undefined, rescan: EncodedPayloadRescanner): SecurityFinding[];
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