/**
 * Tier-aware operation gate — Phase 2 of the workspace policy.
 *
 * `enforceEnvironmentPolicy` (Phase 1) answers "may scai touch this
 * environment at all". `authorizeOperation` answers the Phase 2
 * question: "may *this caller* perform a *write* / *destructive* /
 * *mint* operation here". See docs/policy-and-guardrails.md.
 */
import { type CallerContext } from "./caller.js";
import { type RiskTier } from "./types.js";
export interface AuthorizeOperationParams {
    envName: string;
    /**
     * Directory holding the resolved `sitecoreai.cli.json`. Optional —
     * when absent, the repo-policy narrowing layer is skipped (the
     * user-global policy still applies).
     */
    configRootDir?: string;
    /** Risk tier of the operation being attempted. */
    tier: RiskTier;
    /** Override the detected caller context — for tests. */
    caller?: CallerContext;
    /**
     * ISO timestamp the deploy token was last minted (`deployTokenLastUpdated`
     * on the env profile). Drives the Phase 3 step-up freshness check on
     * `destructive` / `mint` operations; ignored when the policy sets no
     * step-up window.
     */
    tokenLastUpdated?: string;
}
/**
 * Throws `POLICY_DENIED` when the workspace policy does not permit the
 * current caller to run a `tier` operation against `envName`. A no-op
 * for the `read` tier and in unmanaged mode (no `~/.sitecoreai/policy.json`).
 */
export declare const authorizeOperation: (params: AuthorizeOperationParams) => void;