/**
 * Publishing domain MCP tools — read-side + cancel only.
 *
 * Deliberately MINIMAL surface for the v1 ship:
 *
 *   - `publish_inspect` (read): `status` / `list-running` / `history`.
 *     No mutating fall-through; no scope-token mint (the operator
 *     mints scope tokens through the CLI dry-run flow, then passes
 *     them out-of-band — the agent never holds one).
 *
 *   - `publish_lifecycle` (write): `cancel` only. Cancel is the
 *     safety-improving op (stops a running publish); recoverable by
 *     resubmission.
 *
 * NOT exposed via MCP — by design:
 *
 *   - `submit_item` / `submit_all`: publishing pushes content to
 *     Experience Edge and is immediately visible to end users. The
 *     safety model (`feedback_destructive_ops_need_consent`) requires
 *     structured consent that only a human-driven CLI invocation
 *     mints. An MCP-callable submit would let an agent both prepare
 *     and execute, defeating the consent gate. Submission stays
 *     CLI-only until a proper MCP consent flow is designed.
 *
 *   - `unpublish`: same rationale. Even the reversible
 *     `never-publish` strategy modifies content state and triggers an
 *     Edge update; gated to CLI for now.
 */
import type { McpRegistry } from "../registry.js";
export declare const registerPublishingTools: (registry: McpRegistry) => void;