/**
 * design/99 — a SHORT, SECRET-SCRUBBED one-line summary of a tool call's arguments, for an OPERATOR-FACING
 * display (the MF-W workflow monitor's `Read(path)` / `Bash(grep …)` activity line; the MF-24 permission-denial
 * ledger's denied-tool input). Shared so both the activity sink and the denial record scrub identically — a
 * single audited boundary. NOT `redactHostLeaks` (that is for untrusted-LLM egress and over-redacts the very
 * path the trusted owner-scoped monitor wants to show). codex-reviewed (3 BLOCKER + 5 MAJOR closed).
 */
export declare function scrubSecrets(s: string): string;
/** A SHORT, SECRET-SCRUBBED primary-arg summary. Abbreviation REDUCES the surface; a final {@link scrubSecrets}
 *  pass is the leak boundary (the value is PERSISTED + SSE-forwarded and may be read by a platform operator in a
 *  multi-tenant deployment — codex F-10). Rules (codex-reviewed):
 *   • command → the command NAME (skip leading `VAR=val` env-prefixes; bail to `undefined` on a quoted assignment
 *     or a lone assignment; basename a path-form command; `+ …` if it had args).
 *   • file path → BASENAME only (no host directory layout).
 *   • url → `new URL` origin+pathname (strips `user:pass@` userinfo + query/fragment).
 *   • else → pattern/query/description, else the first NON-sensitively-named string field.
 *  Then scrub-secrets + code-point-truncate. */
export declare function primaryActivityArg(args: unknown): string | undefined;
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