export { AUDIT_LOG_PREFIX } from './constants.js';
export declare const AUDIT_FIELD_MAX_CHARS = 4096;
export type AuditField = string | number | boolean | undefined;
export declare function auditSha256(value: string): string;
/**
 * Cuts at the last whitespace inside the budget rather than mid-token, so a secret is never split
 * in half before the patterns get a look at it — half a token matches nothing and would survive.
 */
export declare function truncateAuditField(value: string): string;
/**
 * Redact an input payload (code, request body, tool arguments) down to something loggable.
 * Truncation runs first so the patterns only ever see whole tokens, and so the 14 regexes run
 * over at most `AUDIT_FIELD_MAX_CHARS` instead of a multi-megabyte body.
 */
export declare function auditInput(value: string, injectedSecretValues?: readonly string[]): string;
/**
 * Outputs are never recorded — an upstream response or tool result can hold credentials nobody
 * can pattern-match. The digest still lets a replayed run be compared against the original.
 */
export declare function auditOutputDigest(value: string): {
    sha256: string;
    bytes: number;
};
/**
 * Header values never reach the log. Redacting a fixed list of sensitive names would not be
 * enough — sandbox code picks its own header names, so any allow-list leaks the creative ones.
 */
export declare function auditHeaderNames(headers: Record<string, string> | undefined): string;
/** Full URL with its query string, credential-shaped parameter values replaced. */
export declare function auditUrl(rawUrl: string, injectedSecretValues?: readonly string[]): string;
/**
 * Values are JSON-encoded so a multi-line payload (submitted code, an assembled prompt) stays on
 * one log line, which is what makes one record one Grafana row.
 */
export declare function logAuditRecord(action: string, fields: Record<string, AuditField>): void;
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