import { SQL } from "drizzle-orm";
import { SecurityRule } from "@rebasepro/types";
import { REBASE_USER_ROLE } from "@rebasepro/common";
/**
 * Unified RLS enforcement — the "user context vs server context" model.
 *
 * Every operation runs in one of two contexts:
 *
 *  - **User context** — a request authenticated (or anonymous) via
 *    `driver.withAuth(user)`. Runs as the restricted `rebase_user` role: a
 *    non-owner, NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS role, so Postgres RLS binds *every*
 *    statement (SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE). The collection's
 *    `securityRules` are the whole authorization model; app-layer callbacks
 *    are validation/side-effects, not a security boundary.
 *
 *  - **Server context** — the base (owner) connection: auth flows, migrations,
 *    and raw `rebase.sql`. As table owner it bypasses RLS. This is the trusted
 *    plane, equivalent to Supabase's `service_role`.
 *
 *    `rebase.dataAsAdmin` is **not** in it, despite the name. `init.ts` scopes
 *    that driver with `withAuth(SERVICE_IDENTITY)`, so it arrives as user
 *    context above — `rebase_user`, `app.uid = 'service'`, policies evaluated —
 *    and clears the default policies through their admin arm rather than the
 *    `rebase.uid() IS NULL` one.
 *
 * This module provides the three pieces:
 *
 *  1. {@link detectConnectionPosture} — is the connection subject to RLS at
 *     all? (superuser / BYPASSRLS / table owner ⇒ no)
 *  2. {@link ensureAppRole} — idempotently provision `rebase_user` with
 *     SELECT/INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE grants (+ default privileges so future
 *     tables stay covered).
 *  3. {@link applyAuthContext} — per-transaction: set the `app.*` GUCs the
 *     policies read (`rebase.uid()` etc.) and `SET LOCAL ROLE rebase_user` so
 *     RLS binds. Transaction-scoped, so it composes with poolers.
 *
 * Provisioning runs from the framework's own bootstrap/migrate (which already
 * self-creates the `auth` schema and functions) — enforcement is default-on,
 * not an operator opt-in.
 */
/**
 * The restricted role every authenticated (user-context) request runs as.
 *
 * Re-exported, not re-declared: the same name is needed by
 * `@rebasepro/common`'s internal-table revokes, and two spellings of a role name
 * fail as a silent no-op rather than an error.
 */
export { REBASE_USER_ROLE };
/** Minimal SQL runner so callers can adapt drizzle or pg.Client. */
export type RawSqlRunner = (sqlText: string) => Promise<Record<string, unknown>[]>;
/** Minimal transaction surface needed by {@link applyAuthContext}. */
export interface SqlTx {
    execute(query: SQL): Promise<unknown>;
}
export interface ConnectionPosture {
    /** The connection's `current_user`. */
    role: string;
    superuser: boolean;
    bypassRLS: boolean;
    /** Owns at least one user table — owners bypass non-FORCE RLS. */
    ownsTables: boolean;
    /** True when RLS would NOT constrain this connection. */
    privileged: boolean;
}
export interface AuthContext {
    uid: string;
    /** Raw roles as carried on the user (strings or `{ id }` objects). */
    roles: unknown[];
}
/**
 * Warn when the connection role shares its name with an existing schema.
 *
 * Postgres resolves unqualified names through `search_path`, which defaults to
 * `"$user", public` — and `$user` is the connection ROLE. When a schema of that
 * name exists it sits ahead of `public`, so every unqualified statement
 * silently operates on it instead:
 *
 *     CREATE TABLE posts (...);   -- you meant public.posts; you got <role>.posts
 *
 * Nothing errors. You get a second table of the same name in the wrong schema,
 * and reads that pin `public` cannot see it — which reads as "missing table" and
 * sends people to re-run a push that creates a *third* copy. The bootstrapper
 * has a whole branch dedicated to recognising the symptom after the fact.
 *
 * Rebase shipped straight into this: it creates a schema named `rebase` while
 * every template named the database role `rebase` too. The scaffold uses
 * `rebase_app` now, and every pool Rebase opens pins `search_path=public`
 * (`pinSearchPath`), which covers the paths the framework controls. This covers
 * the ones it does not — `psql`, `pg_dump`, drizzle-kit, a colleague's script,
 * a hand-written migration — because the hazard is a property of the two NAMES,
 * not of any one connection.
 *
 * A warning rather than a boot failure: the database works, the framework's own
 * traffic is pinned, and refusing to start over a naming choice a user may have
 * inherited would be worse than the risk.
 */
export declare function warnOnRoleSchemaCollision(run: RawSqlRunner): Promise<void>;
export declare function detectConnectionPosture(run: RawSqlRunner): Promise<ConnectionPosture>;
/**
 * Human-actionable instructions for when the connection cannot provision the
 * user role itself (no CREATEROLE and role not pre-created by the platform).
 */
export declare function appRoleSetupInstructions(connectionRole: string, schemas: string[]): string;
/**
 * Idempotently provision the `rebase_user` role, membership for the current
 * connection role, and DML grants (+ default privileges for future tables)
 * on every existing schema in `schemas`.
 *
 * Split into privilege tiers so it works both when the connection is a
 * superuser (creates everything) and when the platform pre-created the role
 * and membership (e.g. CNPG `postInitApplicationSQL`) and the connection is
 * merely the table owner — owners can always run the grant tier themselves.
 *
 * RLS still filters every row: these grants only make the tables *reachable*
 * by the role; the policies decide which rows/commands actually pass.
 *
 * Throws with precise setup instructions when the role is missing and the
 * connection cannot create it.
 */
export declare function ensureAppRole(run: RawSqlRunner, schemas: string[]): Promise<void>;
/**
 * Apply the authenticated context to a transaction: the `app.*` GUCs that RLS
 * policies read via `rebase.uid()` / `rebase.roles()` / `rebase.jwt()`, and — when
 * `userRole` is set — `SET LOCAL ROLE` so RLS binds every statement in this
 * transaction (reads *and* writes).
 *
 * GUCs are set with `is_local = true` and the role switch is `LOCAL`: both
 * reset at commit/rollback, so pooled connections are never polluted.
 *
 * Fails closed by construction: if the role switch errors, the transaction
 * aborts instead of proceeding privileged.
 *
 * SECURITY: this function is only ever called on the **user** path (the server
 * context uses the base/owner driver and never calls it). The default policies
 * treat `rebase.uid() IS NULL` as the trusted server context, and `rebase.uid()`
 * is `NULLIF(current_setting('app.uid'), '')` — so an EMPTY user id would
 * be read as NULL and silently escalate a user request to server privileges.
 * Coerce empty/blank ids to `ANONYMOUS_USER_ID` here, at the single chokepoint,
 * rather than trusting every caller (e.g. realtime subscription auth) to do it.
 * That sentinel is exported from `@rebasepro/types` because it leaks into rule
 * semantics: it is why `rebase.uid() IS NOT NULL` is true for anonymous requests.
 */
export declare function applyAuthContext(tx: SqlTx, auth: AuthContext, userRole?: string): Promise<void>;
/**
 * Warn about rules that read as "signed-in users only" but admit anonymous
 * callers — `rebase.uid() IS NOT NULL`, or a comparison against another
 * platform's magic user id such as `'anon'`.
 *
 * The sibling of {@link validatePolicyPgRoles}, for the more dangerous spelling
 * of the same habit. A foreign `pgRoles` value makes a policy unreachable and
 * the table reads empty — loud, and that guard throws. These do the opposite:
 * the rule compiles to a grant, and nothing looks wrong until the data is
 * already public.
 *
 * Warns rather than throws. Unlike an unreachable `pgRoles`, these rules are
 * serving traffic today: refusing to boot would take an app offline to report a
 * problem it already has, and on the read path it would take it offline
 * *because* its data was exposed. Rewriting the author's SQL is not an option
 * either — this is the escape hatch whose whole promise is that it means what it
 * says. So: say so, loudly, and leave the rule alone.
 */
export declare function warnOnAnonymousGrants(collections: {
    slug?: string;
    securityRules?: readonly SecurityRule[];
}[]): void;
/**
 * Name the collections whose raw policy SQL still calls the pre-1.0 helpers.
 *
 * The compiler rewrites `auth.uid()` to `rebase.uid()` on the way into the
 * database, so nothing is broken and no policy is wrong — which is exactly why
 * this has to be said out loud. A silent rewrite that works forever is not a
 * migration, it is a second supported spelling nobody wrote down, and the next
 * person to read those rules will copy the old one.
 *
 * Only `raw` expressions can carry it. Structured rules (`policy.authUid()`,
 * `policy.rolesOverlap(...)`) compile from the model and were never affected.
 */
export declare function warnOnLegacyRlsFunctions(collections: {
    slug?: string;
    securityRules?: readonly SecurityRule[];
}[]): void;
/**
 * Reject `pgRoles` that this server can never satisfy.
 *
 * `pgRoles` sets the `TO` clause of a generated policy, so a policy naming a
 * role the request never runs as simply never applies — and RLS then filters
 * every row. The table reads as empty, which is indistinguishable from having
 * no data, so the mistake survives review and ships.
 *
 * Requests run as `rebase_user`, so a policy is only reachable if it targets
 * `public` or a role `rebase_user` holds. Anything else is a configuration
 * error worth failing the boot for.
 */
export declare function validatePolicyPgRoles(run: RawSqlRunner, collections: {
    slug?: string;
    securityRules?: readonly {
        name?: string;
        pgRoles?: readonly string[];
    }[];
}[], 
/** The role requests actually run as: `rebase_user` when the connection is
 *  privileged enough to switch, otherwise the connection role itself. */
requestRole?: string): Promise<void>;