/**
 * Best-effort credential redaction for generated operational skills.
 *
 * Two rules, and the second matters as much as the first (AC-11):
 *
 * - Credential **values** are redacted. A generated skill is instructions an
 *   agent will later execute, and it is committed to the repo, so a pasted token
 *   would become a secret at rest (NFR-3).
 * - Credential **references** are preserved. `$GITHUB_TOKEN`,
 *   `op://vault/item/field`, `arn:aws:secretsmanager:...` are legitimate
 *   operational content; stripping them would produce a skill that cannot work.
 *
 * **This is explicitly best-effort and not a security guarantee.** Detection is
 * pattern- plus entropy-based, so novel credential formats will pass through. The
 * real control is the confirmation gate: redaction runs *before* the preview is
 * rendered (AC-44), so a human sees the redacted text and nothing reaches disk
 * without their approval. Callers must not present this as a guarantee to users.
 *
 * Requirements: AC-11, AC-44, NFR-3
 *
 * @module
 */
/** Placeholder substituted for a redacted value. */
export declare const REDACTION_PLACEHOLDER = "<REDACTED>";
/** Result of a redaction pass. */
export interface RedactionResult {
    /** Text with detected credential values replaced. */
    text: string;
    /**
     * Human-readable labels for what was redacted (never the values themselves —
     * echoing them back would defeat the purpose).
     */
    redacted: string[];
}
/**
 * Redact credential values from text, preserving credential references.
 *
 * @param text - Text that may contain credentials.
 * @returns The redacted text plus labels describing what was removed.
 */
export declare function redactSecrets(text: string): RedactionResult;
/**
 * Convenience: did this text contain anything that looked like a credential?
 *
 * @param text - Text to inspect.
 * @returns True when `redactSecrets` would change the text.
 */
export declare function containsSecrets(text: string): boolean;
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