/**
 * Ledger repair: remove usage that was never this repository's, and collapse
 * coverage that is counted twice.
 *
 * Two passes, both driven by evidence already in the ledger rather than by a
 * heuristic, and both going through `rewriteLedger` so a crash leaves either the
 * old file or the new one.
 *
 * **Foreign purge** (turn-scoped-cost/AC-34, AC-43). An entry's `cursor` is the
 * transcript uuid it was extracted from, so provenance is checkable. Measured on
 * this repo: 711 entries / 262.5M tokens came from an unrelated project —
 * `interactive-cli-menu` overstated by $131.67 and the whole of
 * `release-blog-tag-deadlock`'s $58.42 was another repo's work. Only entries
 * *positively shown* to be foreign are removed; `ambiguous` and `unknown` are
 * kept, because under-recovering is the safe direction when the alternative is
 * deleting real cost history.
 *
 * **Containment collapse** (turn-scoped-cost/AC-42). `applyPrecedence` reduces an
 * entry's weight only by coverage of a *higher* fidelity rank, so two entries of
 * the same session and fidelity where one window contains the other both keep
 * weight 1. A bulk `metered` sweep that recorded a whole transcript therefore
 * double-counts any narrower entry for the same session: verified minimally as
 * counted 1100 against a truth of 1000. This is why the purge cannot simply
 * delete foreign rows and stop — a nested entry for the surviving session waits in
 * `unattributed.ndjson`, and recovering it would take the repaired $354.32 straight
 * back up to $380.10.
 *
 * Requirements: turn-scoped-cost/AC-34, AC-42, AC-43, AC-45, AC-9
 * Design: design.md Part 0 (D0.2, D0.6, D0.7, D0.8)
 */
import type { CostEntry } from './types.js';
import { type ProvenanceIndex } from './provenance.js';
import type { ProviderEnv } from './providers/provider.js';
export interface PurgeReport {
    /** Entries removed as positively foreign, per ledger. */
    foreignRemoved: Record<string, number>;
    /** Entries removed as redundant same-session same-fidelity containment. */
    containedRemoved: Record<string, number>;
    /** Entries left alone because provenance was ambiguous or unknown. */
    keptUnprovable: number;
    /** Token totals before and after, so the delta is reported rather than asserted. */
    tokensBefore: number;
    tokensAfter: number;
}
/**
 * Entries whose coverage is fully contained by another entry of the same session,
 * fidelity and model — and strictly narrower, so the pair is never mutually
 * eliminating.
 *
 * Model is part of the key on purpose. `capturePass` buckets per model, so two
 * entries of one session can share a window while describing genuinely different
 * tokens; collapsing those would delete real usage. Measured: 0 same-model
 * containment pairs currently sit inside any ledger, so this pass is a guard
 * against recovery reintroducing one rather than a cleanup of existing rows.
 */
export declare function containedEntries(entries: CostEntry[]): Set<number>;
/**
 * Repair every ledger in the project.
 *
 * Idempotent by construction, and idempotent against a subsequent
 * `aidlc cost sync` only because repo scoping landed first — without it, sync
 * re-adds exactly what this removes (AC-45).
 */
export declare function purgeLedgers(projectRoot: string, env?: ProviderEnv, index?: ProvenanceIndex): PurgeReport;
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