/**
 * Shared evidence sanitizer for durable pain signal storage.
 *
 * Used by:
 * - pain-signal-observability.ts (core package)
 * - message-sanitize.ts (openclaw-plugin package)
 *
 * Design contract (EP-08 Security Boundary Placement):
 * - Sanitization happens at the PERSISTENCE boundary, not at evaluation boundary
 * - Enforcement input (raw params, error text) stays available for gate/score computation
 * - All strings are token-redacted and bounded before durable storage
 * - Unknown-first: never throws on malformed input; returns {} or bounded preview
 * - Recursive with depth/key/array limits to prevent infinite traversal
 *
 * ERR checklist:
 * - ERR-001: no `as` casts — input is `unknown`, narrowed with typeof guards
 * - ERR-055: ANY-segment sensitive field matching, not ALL-segment
 * - ERR-056: token redaction runs on ALL strings, not just truncation
 * - ERR-051: redaction is at persistence output path, not evaluation input path
 * - EP-08: platform-agnostic path basename — uses split on both `\\` and `/`,
 *   never relies on nodePath.basename which only splits on the host OS separator.
 */
export declare const MAX_EVIDENCE_VALUE_CHARS = 200;
/**
 * PRI-825: bound for execute-command evidence (`command` / string `args`).
 *
 * RuleCode anchor semantics (e.g. baseline-anchor gates) scan durable command
 * history for evidence keywords; head-only truncation at the generic evidence
 * bound systematically hid anchors placed late in long one-liner commands.
 * A command-specific bound preserves head AND tail.
 *
 * Sizing: DEFAULT_HISTORY_LIMIT of 20 calls × 2KB ≤ 40KB worst-case evidence
 * window per evaluation — 1/8 of the trajectory blob inline threshold
 * (16KB) already accepted per result preview. Bounded, never unbounded.
 */
export declare const MAX_COMMAND_PREVIEW_CHARS = 2000;
/**
 * Converges a single absolute path to a safe representation.
 * - Under workspaceDir → repo-relative
 * - Other absolute → basename only (platform-agnostic)
 * - Relative paths → kept as-is
 */
export declare function convergePath(value: string, workspaceDir?: string): string;
/**
 * Sanitize a single string value (PD tags, tokens, embedded paths) WITHOUT
 * applying any length bound. Bounds are applied by the callers so each
 * evidence face can pick its own bounded shape (head-only vs head+tail).
 */
export declare function sanitizeStringUnbounded(value: string, workspaceDir?: string): string;
/**
 * Sanitize a single string value:
 * 1. Strip internal PD tags
 * 2. Redact token-like patterns
 * 3. Replace absolute paths embedded in the string
 * 4. Bound length (head-only — generic evidence face)
 */
export declare function sanitizeString(value: string, workspaceDir?: string): string;
/**
 * Recursively sanitize any value for durable evidence storage.
 * - Primitives: string → redact+bound; number/boolean → pass-through
 * - Objects: recurse with key limit
 * - Arrays: recurse with item limit
 * - Depth limit prevents infinite traversal
 *
 * ERR-001: input is `unknown`, narrowed with typeof guards (no `as` casts)
 */
export declare function sanitizeValue(value: unknown, depth?: number, workspaceDir?: string): unknown;
/**
 * Sanitize tool-call params for evidence/trajectory storage.
 *
 * ERR-001: accepts `unknown`, not `Record<string, unknown>`. Runtime guards only.
 * ERR-055: ANY-segment sensitive field matching.
 * ERR-056: token redaction runs on ALL strings via recursive sanitizeValue.
 * PRI-825: string `command`/`args` keep a larger head+tail bounded preview so
 * RuleCode anchor evidence survives the durable round-trip.
 */
export declare function sanitizeToolParams(params: unknown, workspaceDir?: string): Record<string, unknown>;
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