{"version":3,"file":"ssrf-SNnTDaSK.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/security/ssrf.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * SSRF protection for import URLs.\n *\n * Validates that URLs don't target internal/private network addresses.\n * Applied before any fetch() call in the import pipeline.\n */\n\nconst IPV4_MAPPED_IPV6_DOTTED_PATTERN = /^::ffff:(\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+)$/i;\nconst IPV4_MAPPED_IPV6_HEX_PATTERN = /^::ffff:([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i;\nconst IPV4_TRANSLATED_HEX_PATTERN = /^::ffff:0:([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i;\nconst IPV6_EXPANDED_MAPPED_PATTERN =\n\t/^0{0,4}:0{0,4}:0{0,4}:0{0,4}:0{0,4}:ffff:([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i;\n\n/**\n * IPv4-compatible (deprecated) addresses: ::XXXX:XXXX\n *\n * The WHATWG URL parser normalizes [::127.0.0.1] to [::7f00:1] (no ffff prefix).\n * These are deprecated but still parsed, and bypass the ffff-based checks.\n */\nconst IPV4_COMPATIBLE_HEX_PATTERN = /^::([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i;\n\n/**\n * NAT64 prefix (RFC 6052): 64:ff9b::XXXX:XXXX\n *\n * Used by NAT64 gateways to embed IPv4 addresses in IPv6.\n * [64:ff9b::127.0.0.1] normalizes to [64:ff9b::7f00:1].\n */\nconst NAT64_HEX_PATTERN = /^64:ff9b::([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i;\n\nconst IPV6_BRACKET_PATTERN = /^\\[|\\]$/g;\n\n/** Match fc00::/7 ULA — first byte 0xfc or 0xfd followed by any byte. */\nconst IPV6_ULA_FC_PATTERN = /^fc[0-9a-f]{2}:/;\nconst IPV6_ULA_FD_PATTERN = /^fd[0-9a-f]{2}:/;\n\n/** Strip trailing dots from an FQDN-form hostname (\"localhost.\" -> \"localhost\"). */\nconst TRAILING_DOT_PATTERN = /\\.+$/;\n\n/**\n * Private and reserved IP ranges that should never be fetched.\n *\n * Includes:\n * - Loopback (127.0.0.0/8)\n * - Private (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16)\n * - Link-local (169.254.0.0/16)\n * - Cloud metadata (169.254.169.254 — AWS/GCP/Azure)\n * - IPv6 loopback and link-local\n */\nconst BLOCKED_PATTERNS: Array<{ start: number; end: number }> = [\n\t// 127.0.0.0/8 — loopback\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(127, 0, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(127, 255, 255, 255) },\n\t// 10.0.0.0/8 — private\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(10, 0, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(10, 255, 255, 255) },\n\t// 172.16.0.0/12 — private\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(172, 16, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(172, 31, 255, 255) },\n\t// 192.168.0.0/16 — private\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(192, 168, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(192, 168, 255, 255) },\n\t// 169.254.0.0/16 — link-local (includes cloud metadata endpoint)\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(169, 254, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(169, 254, 255, 255) },\n\t// 0.0.0.0/8 — current network\n\t{ start: ip4ToNum(0, 0, 0, 0), end: ip4ToNum(0, 255, 255, 255) },\n];\n\n// Bracket-stripped form is used for lookups (validateExternalUrl strips\n// brackets from parsed.hostname before checking), so \"::1\" appears here\n// without brackets. The \"::1\" case is already covered by isPrivateIp, but\n// keeping it here makes the intent explicit and gives a clearer error\n// message for the common `http://[::1]/` form.\nconst BLOCKED_HOSTNAMES = new Set([\n\t\"localhost\",\n\t\"metadata.google.internal\",\n\t\"metadata.google\",\n\t\"::1\",\n]);\n\n/**\n * Wildcard DNS services that publicly resolve arbitrary IPs embedded in the\n * hostname. Commonly used in local dev and by SSRF exploit tooling to bypass\n * hostname-only blocklists (e.g. 127.0.0.1.nip.io -> 127.0.0.1).\n *\n * Matched case-insensitively as a suffix, so both the apex and any subdomain\n * are blocked.\n */\nconst BLOCKED_HOSTNAME_SUFFIXES = [\n\t\"nip.io\",\n\t\"sslip.io\",\n\t\"xip.io\",\n\t\"traefik.me\",\n\t\"lvh.me\",\n\t\"localtest.me\",\n];\n\n/** Blocked URL schemes */\nconst ALLOWED_SCHEMES = new Set([\"http:\", \"https:\"]);\n\nfunction ip4ToNum(a: number, b: number, c: number, d: number): number {\n\treturn ((a << 24) | (b << 16) | (c << 8) | d) >>> 0;\n}\n\nfunction parseIpv4(ip: string): number | null {\n\tconst parts = ip.split(\".\");\n\tif (parts.length !== 4) return null;\n\n\tconst nums = parts.map(Number);\n\tif (nums.some((n) => isNaN(n) || n < 0 || n > 255)) return null;\n\n\treturn ip4ToNum(nums[0], nums[1], nums[2], nums[3]);\n}\n\n/**\n * Convert IPv4-mapped/translated IPv6 addresses from hex form back to IPv4.\n *\n * The WHATWG URL parser normalizes dotted-decimal to hex:\n *   [::ffff:127.0.0.1] -> [::ffff:7f00:1]\n *   [::ffff:169.254.169.254] -> [::ffff:a9fe:a9fe]\n *\n * Without this conversion, the hex forms bypass isPrivateIp() regex checks.\n */\nexport function normalizeIPv6MappedToIPv4(ip: string): string | null {\n\t// Match hex-form IPv4-mapped IPv6: ::ffff:XXXX:XXXX\n\tlet match = ip.match(IPV4_MAPPED_IPV6_HEX_PATTERN);\n\tif (!match) {\n\t\t// Match IPv4-translated (RFC 6052): ::ffff:0:XXXX:XXXX\n\t\tmatch = ip.match(IPV4_TRANSLATED_HEX_PATTERN);\n\t}\n\tif (!match) {\n\t\t// Match fully expanded form: 0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:ffff:XXXX:XXXX\n\t\tmatch = ip.match(IPV6_EXPANDED_MAPPED_PATTERN);\n\t}\n\tif (!match) {\n\t\t// Match IPv4-compatible (deprecated) form: ::XXXX:XXXX (no ffff prefix)\n\t\tmatch = ip.match(IPV4_COMPATIBLE_HEX_PATTERN);\n\t}\n\tif (!match) {\n\t\t// Match NAT64 prefix (RFC 6052): 64:ff9b::XXXX:XXXX\n\t\tmatch = ip.match(NAT64_HEX_PATTERN);\n\t}\n\tif (match) {\n\t\tconst high = parseInt(match[1] ?? \"\", 16);\n\t\tconst low = parseInt(match[2] ?? \"\", 16);\n\t\treturn `${(high >> 8) & 0xff}.${high & 0xff}.${(low >> 8) & 0xff}.${low & 0xff}`;\n\t}\n\treturn null;\n}\n\nfunction isPrivateIp(ip: string): boolean {\n\t// Normalize IPv6 strings to lowercase. `new URL().hostname` already\n\t// lowercases, but resolver output (from DoH or an injected resolver) may\n\t// not. Without this, \"FE80::1\" bypasses the link-local check.\n\tconst normalized = ip.toLowerCase();\n\n\t// Handle IPv6 loopback\n\tif (normalized === \"::1\" || normalized === \"::ffff:127.0.0.1\") return true;\n\n\t// Handle IPv4-mapped IPv6 in hex form (WHATWG URL parser normalizes to this)\n\t// e.g. ::ffff:7f00:1 -> 127.0.0.1, ::ffff:a9fe:a9fe -> 169.254.169.254\n\tconst hexIpv4 = normalizeIPv6MappedToIPv4(normalized);\n\tif (hexIpv4) return isPrivateIp(hexIpv4);\n\n\t// Handle IPv4-mapped IPv6 in dotted-decimal form\n\tconst v4Match = normalized.match(IPV4_MAPPED_IPV6_DOTTED_PATTERN);\n\tconst ipv4 = v4Match ? v4Match[1] : normalized;\n\n\tconst num = parseIpv4(ipv4);\n\tif (num === null) {\n\t\t// If we can't parse it, block IPv6 addresses that look internal.\n\t\t// fc00::/7 is Unique Local (first byte 0xfc or 0xfd), fe80::/10 is\n\t\t// link-local. Only match when followed by hex digit + colon to avoid\n\t\t// collisions with hypothetical non-address strings.\n\t\treturn (\n\t\t\tnormalized.startsWith(\"fe80:\") ||\n\t\t\tIPV6_ULA_FC_PATTERN.test(normalized) ||\n\t\t\tIPV6_ULA_FD_PATTERN.test(normalized)\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\n\treturn BLOCKED_PATTERNS.some((range) => num >= range.start && num <= range.end);\n}\n\n/**\n * Error thrown when SSRF protection blocks a URL.\n */\nexport class SsrfError extends Error {\n\tcode = \"SSRF_BLOCKED\" as const;\n\n\tconstructor(message: string) {\n\t\tsuper(message);\n\t\tthis.name = \"SsrfError\";\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate that a URL is safe to fetch (not targeting internal networks).\n *\n * Checks:\n * 1. URL is well-formed with http/https scheme\n * 2. Hostname is not a known internal name (localhost, metadata endpoints)\n * 3. If hostname is an IP literal, it's not in a private range\n *\n * Note: DNS rebinding attacks are not fully mitigated (hostname could resolve\n * to a private IP). Full protection requires resolving DNS and checking the IP\n * before connecting, which needs a custom fetch implementation. This covers\n * the most common SSRF vectors.\n *\n * @throws SsrfError if the URL targets an internal address\n */\n/** Maximum number of redirects to follow in ssrfSafeFetch */\nconst MAX_REDIRECTS = 5;\n\nexport function validateExternalUrl(url: string): URL {\n\tlet parsed: URL;\n\ttry {\n\t\tparsed = new URL(url);\n\t} catch {\n\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"Invalid URL\");\n\t}\n\n\t// Only allow http/https\n\tif (!ALLOWED_SCHEMES.has(parsed.protocol)) {\n\t\tthrow new SsrfError(`Scheme '${parsed.protocol}' is not allowed`);\n\t}\n\n\t// Strip brackets from IPv6 hostname\n\tconst hostname = parsed.hostname.replace(IPV6_BRACKET_PATTERN, \"\");\n\n\t// Normalize the hostname for blocklist matching: lowercase + strip any\n\t// trailing dots. WHATWG preserves trailing dots on .hostname, so without\n\t// this normalization \"localhost.\" and \"nip.io.\" bypass the checks.\n\tconst normalizedHost = hostname.toLowerCase().replace(TRAILING_DOT_PATTERN, \"\");\n\n\t// Check against known internal hostnames\n\tif (BLOCKED_HOSTNAMES.has(normalizedHost)) {\n\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"URLs targeting internal hosts are not allowed\");\n\t}\n\n\t// Check against wildcard DNS services used by SSRF tooling to bypass\n\t// hostname-only checks. Match the apex and any subdomain.\n\tfor (const suffix of BLOCKED_HOSTNAME_SUFFIXES) {\n\t\tif (normalizedHost === suffix || normalizedHost.endsWith(`.${suffix}`)) {\n\t\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"URLs targeting wildcard DNS services are not allowed\");\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Check if hostname is an IP address in a private range. Use the\n\t// normalized form so \"127.0.0.1..\" and friends don't bypass parseIpv4\n\t// (which rejects extra trailing dots).\n\tif (isPrivateIp(normalizedHost)) {\n\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"URLs targeting private IP addresses are not allowed\");\n\t}\n\n\treturn parsed;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// DNS-aware validation\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * A resolver that maps a hostname to a list of IPv4/IPv6 addresses.\n * Injectable so callers can swap in OS-level DNS on Node, stub it in tests,\n * or point to a different DoH endpoint.\n */\nexport type DnsResolver = (hostname: string) => Promise<string[]>;\n\n/**\n * Module-level default resolver. Tests can swap this with a stub so fetch\n * mocks don't see unexpected DoH round-trips. Production code should leave\n * it alone.\n */\nlet defaultResolver: DnsResolver | null = null;\n\n/** Override the default DNS resolver. Returns the previous value. */\nexport function setDefaultDnsResolver(resolver: DnsResolver | null): DnsResolver | null {\n\tconst previous = defaultResolver;\n\tdefaultResolver = resolver;\n\treturn previous;\n}\n\n/** Timeout for a single DoH request, in milliseconds. */\nconst DOH_TIMEOUT_MS = 3000;\n\n/** Default DoH endpoint — Cloudflare's public resolver. */\nconst DEFAULT_DOH_URL = \"https://cloudflare-dns.com/dns-query\";\n\ninterface DohAnswer {\n\tdata: string;\n}\n\ninterface DohResponse {\n\tStatus: number;\n\tAnswer: DohAnswer[];\n}\n\nfunction hasProperty<K extends string>(obj: unknown, key: K): obj is Record<K, unknown> {\n\treturn typeof obj === \"object\" && obj !== null && key in obj;\n}\n\n/**\n * Narrow an unknown JSON body to a DohResponse shape we can read safely.\n * Throws if the body doesn't look like a DoH response — a malformed body is\n * indistinguishable from a failure and must not be silently treated as empty.\n */\nfunction parseDohResponse(raw: unknown): DohResponse {\n\tif (!hasProperty(raw, \"Status\") || typeof raw.Status !== \"number\") {\n\t\tthrow new Error(\"DoH response missing Status field\");\n\t}\n\tconst answers: DohAnswer[] = [];\n\tif (hasProperty(raw, \"Answer\") && Array.isArray(raw.Answer)) {\n\t\tfor (const entry of raw.Answer) {\n\t\t\tif (hasProperty(entry, \"data\") && typeof entry.data === \"string\") {\n\t\t\t\tanswers.push({ data: entry.data });\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn { Status: raw.Status, Answer: answers };\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve a hostname via DNS over HTTPS (Cloudflare). Returns all A and AAAA\n * records. Works in both Workers and Node without requiring node:dns.\n *\n * Fails closed: any network error, non-2xx response, or DNS rcode != 0\n * causes a rejected promise so the calling validator treats it as a block.\n */\nexport const cloudflareDohResolver: DnsResolver = async (hostname) => {\n\tasync function query(type: \"A\" | \"AAAA\"): Promise<string[]> {\n\t\tconst params = new URLSearchParams({ name: hostname, type });\n\t\tconst controller = new AbortController();\n\t\tconst timeout = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), DOH_TIMEOUT_MS);\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tconst response = await globalThis.fetch(`${DEFAULT_DOH_URL}?${params.toString()}`, {\n\t\t\t\theaders: { Accept: \"application/dns-json\" },\n\t\t\t\tsignal: controller.signal,\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tif (!response.ok) {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(`DoH lookup failed: ${response.status}`);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst raw = await response.json();\n\t\t\tconst body = parseDohResponse(raw);\n\t\t\t// NXDOMAIN (3) is a legitimate \"does not exist\" — treat as empty.\n\t\t\t// Any other non-zero status (SERVFAIL=2, REFUSED=5, etc.) is\n\t\t\t// ambiguous and could be a split-view attacker hiding records\n\t\t\t// from our resolver. Fail closed.\n\t\t\tif (body.Status === 3) return [];\n\t\t\tif (body.Status !== 0) {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(`DoH ${type} lookup failed: rcode=${body.Status}`);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// DoH Answer arrays often include CNAME records alongside A/AAAA\n\t\t\t// records. Their `data` is a hostname, not an IP. Filter to just\n\t\t\t// IP literals so isPrivateIp sees real addresses.\n\t\t\treturn body.Answer.map((a) => a.data).filter(isIpLiteral);\n\t\t} finally {\n\t\t\tclearTimeout(timeout);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tconst [a, aaaa] = await Promise.all([query(\"A\"), query(\"AAAA\")]);\n\treturn [...a, ...aaaa];\n};\n\n/**\n * Validate a URL and resolve its hostname to check the actual IPs against\n * the private-range blocklist. This catches DNS rebinding attacks using\n * attacker-controlled domains that publicly resolve to private addresses,\n * and wildcard DNS services like nip.io used by exploit tooling.\n *\n * Runs `validateExternalUrl` first for cheap pre-flight checks (scheme,\n * literal IP, known-bad hostnames). Then resolves the hostname and rejects\n * if ANY returned address is private.\n *\n * Fails closed: if resolution fails or returns no records, throws SsrfError.\n *\n * **Caveats.** This does NOT fully close the TOCTOU between check and\n * connect. Attacks that still work against this layer include:\n *\n * - TTL=0 rebind: authoritative server returns public IP to the check, then\n *   private IP to the subsequent fetch() a few milliseconds later.\n * - Split-view via EDNS Client Subnet or source-IP inspection: the\n *   authoritative server returns public IP to Cloudflare's DoH resolver and\n *   private IP to the victim's own resolver (used by fetch()).\n * - Host-file overrides or split-horizon corporate DNS on self-hosted Node.\n * - Attacker-controlled rebinding services the caller has allowlisted.\n *\n * The only complete defense is a network-layer egress firewall. On\n * Cloudflare Workers, the platform fetch pipeline provides most of that.\n * On self-hosted Node, operators must restrict egress themselves.\n */\nexport async function resolveAndValidateExternalUrl(\n\turl: string,\n\toptions?: { resolver?: DnsResolver },\n): Promise<URL> {\n\treturn (await resolveAndValidateExternalUrlTarget(url, options)).url;\n}\n\nexport interface ResolvedExternalUrlTarget {\n\turl: URL;\n\taddresses: readonly string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate a URL and return the exact public addresses approved for the\n * subsequent connection.\n */\nexport async function resolveAndValidateExternalUrlTarget(\n\turl: string,\n\toptions?: { resolver?: DnsResolver },\n): Promise<ResolvedExternalUrlTarget> {\n\tconst parsed = validateExternalUrl(url);\n\n\t// Strip brackets from IPv6 hostnames\n\tconst hostname = parsed.hostname.replace(IPV6_BRACKET_PATTERN, \"\");\n\n\t// If the hostname is already an IP literal, validateExternalUrl has\n\t// already checked it against the private-range list. Skip DNS.\n\tif (isIpLiteral(hostname)) {\n\t\treturn { url: parsed, addresses: [hostname] };\n\t}\n\n\tconst resolver = options?.resolver ?? defaultResolver ?? cloudflareDohResolver;\n\n\tlet addresses: string[];\n\ttry {\n\t\taddresses = await resolver(hostname);\n\t} catch (error) {\n\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\n\t\t\t`Could not resolve hostname: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`,\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\n\tif (addresses.length === 0) {\n\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"Hostname resolved to no addresses\");\n\t}\n\n\tfor (const ip of addresses) {\n\t\tif (!isIpLiteral(ip)) {\n\t\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"Hostname resolver returned a non-IP address\");\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (isPrivateIp(ip)) {\n\t\t\tthrow new SsrfError(\"Hostname resolves to a private IP address\");\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn { url: parsed, addresses };\n}\n\n/** True when a string looks like an IPv4 or IPv6 literal. */\nfunction isIpLiteral(host: string): boolean {\n\tif (parseIpv4(host) !== null) return true;\n\t// Very loose IPv6 heuristic — matches anything with a colon, which is\n\t// never valid in DNS hostnames, so this is safe.\n\treturn host.includes(\":\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Fetch a URL with SSRF protection on redirects.\n *\n * Uses `redirect: \"manual\"` to intercept redirects and re-validate each\n * redirect target against SSRF rules before following it. This prevents\n * an attacker from setting up an allowed external URL that redirects to\n * an internal IP (e.g. 169.254.169.254 for cloud metadata).\n *\n * @throws SsrfError if the initial URL or any redirect target is internal\n */\n/** Headers that must be stripped when a redirect crosses origins */\nconst CREDENTIAL_HEADERS = [\"authorization\", \"cookie\", \"proxy-authorization\"];\n\nexport async function ssrfSafeFetch(\n\turl: string,\n\tinit?: RequestInit,\n\toptions?: { resolver?: DnsResolver },\n): Promise<Response> {\n\tlet currentUrl = url;\n\tlet currentInit = init;\n\n\tfor (let i = 0; i <= MAX_REDIRECTS; i++) {\n\t\tawait resolveAndValidateExternalUrl(currentUrl, options);\n\n\t\tconst response = await globalThis.fetch(currentUrl, {\n\t\t\t...currentInit,\n\t\t\tredirect: \"manual\",\n\t\t});\n\n\t\t// Not a redirect -- return directly\n\t\tif (response.status < 300 || response.status >= 400) {\n\t\t\treturn response;\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Extract redirect target\n\t\tconst location = response.headers.get(\"Location\");\n\t\tif (!location) {\n\t\t\treturn response;\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Resolve relative redirects against the current URL\n\t\tconst previousOrigin = new URL(currentUrl).origin;\n\t\tcurrentUrl = new URL(location, currentUrl).href;\n\t\tconst nextOrigin = new URL(currentUrl).origin;\n\n\t\t// Strip credential headers on cross-origin redirects\n\t\tif (previousOrigin !== nextOrigin && currentInit) {\n\t\t\tcurrentInit = stripCredentialHeaders(currentInit);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tthrow new SsrfError(`Too many redirects (max ${MAX_REDIRECTS})`);\n}\n\n/**\n * Return a copy of init with credential headers removed.\n */\nexport function stripCredentialHeaders(init: RequestInit): RequestInit {\n\tif (!init.headers) return init;\n\n\tconst headers = new Headers(init.headers);\n\tfor (const name of CREDENTIAL_HEADERS) {\n\t\theaders.delete(name);\n\t}\n\n\treturn { ...init, headers 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