{"version":3,"file":"rate-limit-DeoYsS0_.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../src/auth/rate-limit.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Database-backed rate limiter for unauthenticated endpoints.\n *\n * Uses a `_emdash_rate_limits` table with composite primary key (key, window).\n * Each call to `checkRateLimit` atomically upserts a counter and returns\n * whether the request is within the allowed limit.\n *\n * Key format: `{ip}:{endpoint}` — limits are per-IP, per-endpoint.\n * Window format: ISO timestamp truncated to the window size.\n */\n\nimport type { Kysely } from \"kysely\";\nimport { sql } from \"kysely\";\n\nimport { apiError } from \"../api/error.js\";\nimport type { Database } from \"../database/types.js\";\n\n/** Loose validation for IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. */\nconst IP_PATTERN = /^[\\da-fA-F.:]+$/;\n\n/**\n * Result of a rate limit check.\n */\nexport interface RateLimitResult {\n\t/** Whether the request is allowed (within limit). */\n\tallowed: boolean;\n\t/** Current request count in this window. */\n\tcount: number;\n\t/** Maximum requests allowed in this window. */\n\tlimit: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Check (and increment) the rate limit for a given IP + endpoint.\n *\n * If `ip` is null (no trusted IP available), rate limiting is skipped\n * and the request is allowed. There's no meaningful key to rate limit\n * on when the IP is unknown.\n *\n * Returns whether the request is allowed. The counter is always\n * incremented — even when the limit is exceeded — so that repeated\n * abuse doesn't reset the window.\n *\n * Piggybacks cleanup of expired entries with a 1% probability\n * to prevent unbounded table growth.\n */\nexport async function checkRateLimit(\n\tdb: Kysely<Database>,\n\tip: string | null,\n\tendpoint: string,\n\tmaxRequests: number,\n\twindowSeconds: number,\n): Promise<RateLimitResult> {\n\t// No trusted IP — skip rate limiting entirely\n\tif (!ip) {\n\t\treturn { allowed: true, count: 0, limit: maxRequests };\n\t}\n\n\tconst windowStart = new Date(\n\t\tMath.floor(Date.now() / (windowSeconds * 1000)) * windowSeconds * 1000,\n\t).toISOString();\n\tconst key = `${ip}:${endpoint}`;\n\n\t// Atomic upsert: insert or increment, return current count\n\tconst result = await sql<{ count: number }>`\n\t\tINSERT INTO _emdash_rate_limits (key, \"window\", count)\n\t\tVALUES (${key}, ${windowStart}, 1)\n\t\tON CONFLICT (key, \"window\")\n\t\tDO UPDATE SET count = _emdash_rate_limits.count + 1\n\t\tRETURNING count\n\t`.execute(db);\n\n\tconst count = result.rows[0]?.count ?? 1;\n\n\t// Piggyback cleanup: 1% chance per request to clean expired entries\n\tif (Math.random() < 0.01) {\n\t\tcleanupExpiredRateLimits(db).catch(() => {\n\t\t\t// Swallow errors — cleanup is best-effort\n\t\t});\n\t}\n\n\treturn {\n\t\tallowed: count <= maxRequests,\n\t\tcount,\n\t\tlimit: maxRequests,\n\t};\n}\n\n/**\n * Build a 429 Too Many Requests response with standard headers.\n */\nexport function rateLimitResponse(retryAfterSeconds: number): Response {\n\tconst response = apiError(\"RATE_LIMITED\", \"Too many requests. Please try again later.\", 429);\n\tresponse.headers.set(\"Retry-After\", String(retryAfterSeconds));\n\treturn response;\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract client IP from a Request.\n *\n * Resolution order:\n * 1. `CF-Connecting-IP` — trusted only when the Cloudflare `cf` object is\n *    present. CF edge overwrites any client-supplied value, so this is the\n *    cryptographically trustworthy path on Workers. Operator-declared\n *    trusted headers cannot override it.\n * 2. `X-Forwarded-For` (first entry) — trusted only when the `cf` object\n *    is present (CF sets this reliably).\n * 3. Operator-declared trusted proxy headers (ordered list) — used as a\n *    fallback for non-CF deployments behind a reverse proxy the operator\n *    controls. Also applies as a fill-in on CF when the CF headers are\n *    absent (e.g. internal cron handlers).\n * 4. `null` — no trusted IP available. Callers must handle this gracefully\n *    (e.g. skip rate limiting).\n *\n * Pass `trustedHeaders` from `getTrustedProxyHeaders(emdash.config)` so\n * self-hosted non-CF deployments can opt into reading a specific header.\n *\n * Aligned with `extractRequestMeta` in `plugins/request-meta.ts`.\n */\nexport function getClientIp(request: Request, trustedHeaders: string[] = []): string | null {\n\tconst headers = request.headers;\n\t// eslint-disable-next-line typescript/no-unsafe-type-assertion -- CF Workers runtime shape\n\tconst cf = (request as unknown as { cf?: Record<string, unknown> }).cf;\n\n\t// On Cloudflare, prefer the cryptographically trustworthy headers. An\n\t// attacker can't spoof these — the CF edge strips/overwrites them.\n\tif (cf) {\n\t\tconst cfIp = headers.get(\"cf-connecting-ip\")?.trim();\n\t\tif (cfIp && IP_PATTERN.test(cfIp)) {\n\t\t\treturn cfIp;\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst xff = headers.get(\"x-forwarded-for\");\n\t\tif (xff) {\n\t\t\tconst first = xff.split(\",\")[0]?.trim();\n\t\t\tif (first && IP_PATTERN.test(first)) {\n\t\t\t\treturn first;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Fall through to operator-declared trusted headers. On CF this fills\n\t// in when the CF headers are absent; off-CF it's the primary source.\n\tfor (const name of trustedHeaders) {\n\t\tconst value = readIpFromHeader(headers, name);\n\t\tif (value) return value;\n\t}\n\n\treturn null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Read an IP from an operator-declared trusted header. XFF-style headers\n * are parsed as comma-separated lists and the first entry is used.\n */\nfunction readIpFromHeader(headers: Headers, name: string): string | null {\n\tconst value = headers.get(name);\n\tif (!value) return null;\n\tif (name.toLowerCase().endsWith(\"forwarded-for\")) {\n\t\tconst first = value.split(\",\")[0]?.trim();\n\t\tif (!first) return null;\n\t\treturn IP_PATTERN.test(first) ? first : null;\n\t}\n\tconst trimmed = value.trim();\n\tif (!trimmed) return null;\n\treturn IP_PATTERN.test(trimmed) ? trimmed : null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Delete expired rate limit entries.\n *\n * Entries with a window timestamp older than `maxAgeSeconds` are removed.\n * Safe to call periodically (e.g., from cron cleanup or on-request piggyback).\n */\nexport async function cleanupExpiredRateLimits(\n\tdb: Kysely<Database>,\n\tmaxAgeSeconds = 3600,\n): Promise<number> {\n\tconst cutoff = new Date(Date.now() - maxAgeSeconds * 1000).toISOString();\n\n\tconst result = await sql`\n\t\tDELETE FROM _emdash_rate_limits WHERE \"window\" < ${cutoff}\n\t`.execute(db);\n\n\treturn Number(result.numAffectedRows ?? 0);\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;AAkBA,MAAM,aAAa;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA4BnB,eAAsB,eACrB,IACA,IACA,UACA,aACA,eAC2B;AAE3B,KAAI,CAAC,GACJ,QAAO;EAAE,SAAS;EAAM,OAAO;EAAG,OAAO;EAAa;CAGvD,MAAM,+BAAc,IAAI,KACvB,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI,gBAAgB,KAAM,GAAG,gBAAgB,IAClE,EAAC,aAAa;CAYf,MAAM,SARS,MAAM,GAAsB;;YAH/B,GAAG,GAAG,GAAG,WAKN,IAAI,YAAY;;;;GAI7B,QAAQ,GAAG,EAEQ,KAAK,IAAI,SAAS;AAGvC,KAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,GAAG,IACnB,0BAAyB,GAAG,CAAC,YAAY,GAEvC;AAGH,QAAO;EACN,SAAS,SAAS;EAClB;EACA,OAAO;EACP;;;;;AAMF,SAAgB,kBAAkB,mBAAqC;CACtE,MAAM,WAAW,SAAS,gBAAgB,8CAA8C,IAAI;AAC5F,UAAS,QAAQ,IAAI,eAAe,OAAO,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAC9D,QAAO;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAyBR,SAAgB,YAAY,SAAkB,iBAA2B,EAAE,EAAiB;CAC3F,MAAM,UAAU,QAAQ;AAMxB,KAJY,QAAwD,IAI5D;EACP,MAAM,OAAO,QAAQ,IAAI,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM;AACpD,MAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,KAAK,KAAK,CAChC,QAAO;EAGR,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,kBAAkB;AAC1C,MAAI,KAAK;GACR,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,MAAM;AACvC,OAAI,SAAS,WAAW,KAAK,MAAM,CAClC,QAAO;;;AAOV,MAAK,MAAM,QAAQ,gBAAgB;EAClC,MAAM,QAAQ,iBAAiB,SAAS,KAAK;AAC7C,MAAI,MAAO,QAAO;;AAGnB,QAAO;;;;;;AAOR,SAAS,iBAAiB,SAAkB,MAA6B;CACxE,MAAM,QAAQ,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK;AAC/B,KAAI,CAAC,MAAO,QAAO;AACnB,KAAI,KAAK,aAAa,CAAC,SAAS,gBAAgB,EAAE;EACjD,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,MAAM;AACzC,MAAI,CAAC,MAAO,QAAO;AACnB,SAAO,WAAW,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG,QAAQ;;CAEzC,MAAM,UAAU,MAAM,MAAM;AAC5B,KAAI,CAAC,QAAS,QAAO;AACrB,QAAO,WAAW,KAAK,QAAQ,GAAG,UAAU;;;;;;;;AAS7C,eAAsB,yBACrB,IACA,gBAAgB,MACE;CAGlB,MAAM,SAAS,MAAM,GAAG;sEAFT,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,KAAK,GAAG,gBAAgB,IAAK,EAAC,aAAa,CAGb;GACzD,QAAQ,GAAG;AAEb,QAAO,OAAO,OAAO,mBAAmB,EAAE"}