/**
 * checkout-reading-input.ts, accepting a checkout reading from the model.
 *
 * ══ Why the model reads the page ══════════════════════════════════════════
 *
 * Browser control is general. The model reads a page, decides, clicks and
 * types; a checkout is the same primitive as a signup form. A table of
 * per-merchant selectors would be scaffolding that thinks for the model, and it
 * is brittle in the way that matters most, merchants rewrite their markup
 * constantly, so a selector table is a permanent maintenance tax that buys
 * nothing the model cannot already do.
 *
 * So the model reports what it read as STRUCTURED VALUES, per-line label,
 * quantity and unit price, the tax line, each fee, each delivery option, the
 * currency, and the daemon does everything the model cannot be trusted to do
 * with them.
 *
 * ══ What "cannot be trusted" means here, precisely ════════════════════════
 *
 * Not that the model is adversarial. That the numbers came off a page, and a
 * page is written by whoever runs it. By the time a value reaches this module
 * it has been through a process that read attacker-chosen text, so it carries
 * that text's authority, which is none.
 *
 * The split that follows from it:
 *
 *   THE MODEL         finds the values on the page and reports them.
 *   THE DAEMON        parses them to integers with its own parser, checks the
 *                     cart against what the owner asked for, looks for a
 *                     recurring charge, applies the budget, renders the owner's
 *                     message from its own integers, runs the window, fills the
 *                     card and records the purchase.
 *
 * Every number the owner reads is one the daemon computed. A string the model
 * reported never reaches the owner's phone, and a number it reported never
 * reaches a budget comparison without being re-parsed here first.
 *
 * ══ Why these numbers are not taint-checked ═══════════════════════════════
 *
 * Deliberately, and taint-gate.ts already documents the reasoning: the price,
 * tax, fees and delivery costs are READ FROM THE MERCHANT by definition, so
 * taint-checking them would refuse every purchase, and a check that is
 * permanently tripped gets removed.
 *
 * Their defence is the BUDGET. A page that inflates a price hits the daily item
 * budget or the per-purchase ceiling and needs an approval, and that approval
 * shows our own re-rendered number beside the budget it would consume.
 *
 * What IS taint-checked stays taint-checked: the merchant, the checkout url,
 * the item and any stated limit come from the owner or the purchase is refused.
 * The owner names what they want and where from; the page only gets to say
 * what it costs, and only within a limit they set.
 */
import type { RawCheckoutReading } from './checkout-extraction.js';
export type ReadingInputResult = {
    readonly ok: true;
    readonly reading: RawCheckoutReading;
} | {
    readonly ok: false;
    readonly reason: string;
    readonly field: string;
};
/**
 * Validate a checkout reading supplied over the control plane.
 *
 * Shape and bounds only, this does not interpret a single value. Meaning is
 * `extractCheckout`'s job, and keeping the two apart is what lets the parser be
 * strict without this layer having to guess what a caller meant.
 */
export declare function readCheckoutReadingInput(params: Record<string, unknown>): ReadingInputResult;
//# sourceMappingURL=checkout-reading-input.d.ts.map