/**
 * conflict-policy.ts, what to do about a Telegram 409, decided as pure data.
 *
 * ── The failure this exists to prevent ────────────────────────────────────
 *
 * Inbound Telegram went permanently dead on a live machine. Polling stopped
 * and stayed stopped until a human restarted the daemon; every message in
 * between was unread, with nothing but a log line to say so.
 *
 * Telegram answers `getUpdates` with 409 in two unrelated situations, a
 * registered webhook, and another process long-polling the same token, and
 * they used to be told apart by matching the error description against
 * "terminated by other getUpdates", with "webhook" as the fallback for
 * everything else. So a 409 whose description was missing, reworded, or
 * replaced by an intermediary's own error body was read as a webhook
 * conflict, and the webhook branch gave up after three attempts. A string
 * that has to be exhaustive in order to be safe is a guess, not a
 * classification.
 *
 * The machine's own evidence settled which case it actually was:
 * `getWebhookInfo` reported no webhook, the logs contained no `setWebhook`
 * call, and `deleteWebhook` ran three times without the 409 ever clearing.
 * **A conflict that survives a successful deleteWebhook is not a webhook
 * conflict.**
 *
 * ── The rules ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 *
 * 1. `getWebhookInfo` is the authority. The description corroborates and
 *    enriches what a person reads; it never decides on its own.
 * 2. `deleteWebhook` is idempotent and harmless, so it is attempted whenever a
 *    webhook is even plausible rather than only when it is proven.
 * 3. **Nothing here is ever terminal.** A stuck webhook can be removed by a
 *    person at any moment; a competing consumer is frequently transient, a
 *    test daemon, a second checkout, a stale process. Both must recover on
 *    their own, so the caller keeps polling either way.
 * 4. Crossing the escalation threshold changes only how LOUDLY it is said.
 *
 * Kept pure so every branch is provable without a socket, a fake server, or a
 * clock.
 */
/** How many conflicts to absorb quietly before escalating to an error. */
export declare const CONFLICT_ESCALATION_ATTEMPTS = 3;
/** What the supervisor should do about one 409. */
export type TelegramConflictAction = {
    /** A webhook is registered, or plausibly is. Clear it and poll again. */
    readonly kind: 'clear-webhook';
    /** True once this has gone on long enough that a person needs telling. */
    readonly escalate: boolean;
    /** Populated when escalating: what is wrong and what to do about it. */
    readonly reason: string | null;
    /** The url Telegram reported, when it reported one. */
    readonly webhookUrl: string | null;
} | {
    /** Another process holds this token. Report it, back off, poll again. */
    readonly kind: 'competing-consumer';
    readonly escalate: boolean;
    /** Always populated: a coordinator is told on every occurrence. */
    readonly reason: string;
    /** Whether a webhook was implicated first and ruled out by evidence. */
    readonly ruledOutWebhook: boolean;
};
export interface TelegramConflictInput {
    /** Telegram's `description`, or a synthesized `HTTP nnn` when it sent none. */
    readonly description: string;
    /** The url `getWebhookInfo` reported, or null when it reported none. */
    readonly webhookUrl: string | null;
    /** `cluster.enabled`, whether there is an election to defer to. */
    readonly clustered: boolean;
    /** 1-based count of consecutive conflicts. */
    readonly attempt: number;
}
/**
 * Decide what one 409 means and what to do about it.
 *
 * Never returns "give up", there is no such action, deliberately. See rule 3.
 */
export declare function classifyTelegramConflict(input: TelegramConflictInput): TelegramConflictAction;
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