import type { ConnectionOwnership } from "@opengeni/contracts";
import { type AccessGrantAuthorization } from "@opengeni/core";
/** A verified external actor must not enter a native callback that has no
 * corresponding key/identity reauthorization proof. Remove at an entry point
 * only when that provider's signed continuation and commit fence are wired. */
export declare function requireLegacyOAuthActor(access: AccessGrantAuthorization): void;
/** True only for an exact authenticated managed human. Unknown provenance fails closed. */
export declare function isPersonalConnectionOwnerPrincipal(access: AccessGrantAuthorization): boolean;
/** Rejects an OpenGeni-minted machine subject; see the namespace list's rationale. */
export declare function isPersonalConnectionOwnerSubject(subjectId: string): boolean;
export declare const PERSONAL_CONNECTION_PRINCIPAL_MESSAGE: string;
/** Personal-only connectors cannot degrade to workspace ownership, so they say so exactly. */
export declare function personalOnlyConnectionPrincipalMessage(label: string): string;
/**
 * Rejects a non-human principal before a personal Connection is created.
 * `label` names a personal-only connector, whose message must not suggest a
 * workspace-owned alternative that its provider profile forbids.
 *
 * This shares that helper's core caller-integrity checks, then additionally
 * rejects every reserved machine-subject namespace as defence-in-depth. The
 * sibling guards a self-service authority surface where the caller claims to
 * *be* the owner (403 "not you"), while this one rejects an ownership *value*
 * that is unavailable to the caller, alongside `assertOwnershipAllowed`'s
 * existing 422 convention.
 */
export declare function assertPersonalConnectionOwnerPrincipal(access: AccessGrantAuthorization, label?: string): void;
/** The same fence expressed for a flow that resolves ownership after admission. */
export declare function assertConnectionOwnershipAllowedForPrincipal(ownership: ConnectionOwnership, personalOwnershipAllowed: boolean): void;
/**
 * The claim a start path mints into its HMAC-signed OAuth state when it has
 * verified the live principal may own a personal Connection.
 *
 * An OAuth callback carries signed state, not a live principal, so it cannot
 * re-evaluate `principalKind`. Requiring this claim makes the callback enforce
 * exactly what the start path decided with the full signal, instead of guessing
 * from the subject's shape. A state minted before this claim existed simply
 * lacks it and fails closed for personal ownership - which is precisely the
 * in-flight rolling-deploy window these fences exist to close.
 */
export declare const PERSONAL_OWNER_VERIFIED_STATE_CLAIM: "personalOwnerVerified";
/** True only for an explicit boolean `true` claim; absent or malformed fails closed. */
export declare function personalOwnerVerifiedInState(payload: Record<string, unknown>): boolean;
/**
 * Callback-side fence for every path that persists a personal owner. Requires
 * both the signed start-time verification and a non-machine subject.
 */
export declare function personalOwnerStateAccepted(state: {
    ownership: ConnectionOwnership;
    subjectId: string;
    personalOwnerVerified: boolean;
}): boolean;