{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/protocol/identity.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Enclave identity and consent primitives for Personal Servers.\n *\n * Owner/Web -> Gateway -> Agent(CVM): derive wallet and quote\n * Web verifies evidence; Account authenticates and encrypts the EIP-191 master\n * signature to the enclave key; Gateway relays it blind; Agent decrypts/seals.\n *\n * @category Protocol\n */\n\nimport * as secp256k1 from \"@noble/secp256k1\";\nimport {\n concat,\n encodePacked,\n fromHex,\n getAddress,\n isAddressEqual,\n keccak256,\n recoverPublicKey,\n toBytes,\n toHex,\n type Address,\n type Hex,\n} from \"viem\";\nimport { publicKeyToAddress } from \"viem/accounts\";\nimport { serializeECIES, type ECIESProvider } from \"../crypto/ecies/interface\";\nimport { deriveMasterKey, recoverServerOwner } from \"../crypto/keys/derive\";\nimport type { ServerRegistrationMessage } from \"./eip712\";\n\nexport const ENCLAVE_IDENTITY_EVIDENCE_VERSION = 1;\nexport const USER_PS_ID_DOMAIN = \"vana.ps-enclave.v1\";\nexport const ENCLAVE_WALLET_PURPOSE = \"vana.ps-enclave.wallet.v1\";\nexport const MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_VERSION = \"vana.ps-enclave.delivery.v1\";\n/** Agent rejects deliveries when `|now - issuedAt|` exceeds this value. */\nexport const MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_MAX_AGE_SECONDS = 600;\nexport const SEALED_ENVELOPE_VERSION = 1;\n\nconst VANA_MAINNET_CHAIN_ID = 1480;\nconst MOKSHA_CHAIN_ID = 14800;\nconst KMS_ISSUED_PREFIX = \"dstack-kms-issued\";\nconst PREIMAGE_SEPARATOR = \":\";\nconst UNCOMPRESSED_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES = 65;\nconst UNCOMPRESSED_PUBLIC_KEY_PREFIX = \"04\";\nconst EMPTY_HEX = \"0x\";\n\n/** `keccak256(encodePacked([string,uint256,address], [USER_PS_ID_DOMAIN,chainId,owner]))`. */\nexport type UserPsId = Hex;\n\n/** Attested identity evidence returned by the enclave agent. */\nexport interface EnclaveIdentityEvidence {\n v: typeof ENCLAVE_IDENTITY_EVIDENCE_VERSION;\n userPsId: UserPsId;\n chainId: number;\n ownerAddress: Address;\n /** Path suffix `users/{id}/wallet/ethereum/secp256k1/v{epoch}`. */\n epoch: number;\n address: Address;\n /** 65-byte uncompressed `0x04..`; `publicKeyToAddress(publicKey) == address`. */\n publicKey: Hex;\n /** 20-byte dstack `app_id`. */\n appId: Hex;\n /** 32-byte compose hash. */\n composeHash: Hex;\n /** Omitted when the OS does not expose its image hash. */\n osImageHash?: Hex;\n /** Must equal `ENCLAVE_WALLET_PURPOSE`. */\n purpose: string;\n /** `[appRoot over link 0, kmsRoot over link 1]`; see `appRootPreimage` and `kmsIssuedPreimage`. */\n signatureChain: [Hex, Hex];\n /** Raw TDX quote with report_data `keccak256(userPsId || address)`; not parsed. */\n quote: Hex;\n eventLog?: string;\n /** `keccak256` of the uncompressed KMS root public key. */\n kmsRootFingerprint: Hex;\n}\n\n/** Identity values the caller expects the evidence to bind. */\nexport interface ExpectedIdentity {\n ownerAddress: Address;\n chainId: number;\n epoch: number;\n}\n\n/** Request for an owner-scoped enclave identity. */\nexport interface IdentityRequest {\n ownerAddress: Address;\n chainId: number;\n}\n\n/** Lifecycle state of an enclave identity. */\nexport type IdentityState = \"prepared\" | \"registered\" | \"sealed\" | \"retired\";\n\n/** Gateway response containing enclave identity state and registration data. */\nexport interface IdentityResponse {\n identity: EnclaveIdentityEvidence;\n state: IdentityState;\n created: boolean;\n /** Exact `ServerRegistration.serverUrl` the owner signs. */\n serverUrl: string;\n serverId?: Hex;\n serverStatus?:\n | \"pending\"\n | \"submitting\"\n | \"confirmed\"\n | \"finalized\"\n | \"failed\";\n sealed: boolean;\n}\n\n/** Versioned server-registration request for an enclave identity. */\nexport type IdentityRegistrationRequest =\n | { version: \"v2\"; message: ServerRegistrationMessage }\n | {\n version: \"v3\";\n message: ServerRegistrationMessage & { nonce: string; deadline: string };\n };\n\n/** Accepted identity-registration response. */\nexport interface IdentityRegistrationResponse {\n serverId: Hex;\n state: \"registered\";\n serverStatus: \"pending\";\n}\n\n/** Inner plaintext of the ECIES box. */\nexport interface MasterSignatureDelivery {\n v: typeof MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_VERSION;\n userPsId: UserPsId;\n epoch: number;\n enclaveAddress: Address;\n ownerAddress: Address;\n /** 65-byte EIP-191 signature over `MASTER_KEY_MESSAGE`. */\n masterSignature: Hex;\n /** Unix seconds; see `MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_MAX_AGE_SECONDS`. */\n issuedAt: number;\n}\n\n/** Enclave-bound ciphertext submitted for sealing. */\nexport interface SealedSecretSubmission {\n userPsId: UserPsId;\n epoch: number;\n enclaveAddress: Address;\n /** `iv(16) || ephemPub(65) || ct || mac(32)` to `evidence.publicKey`. */\n ciphertext: Hex;\n}\n\n/** Confirmation that the enclave sealed a submitted secret. */\nexport interface SealedSecretResponse {\n sealed: true;\n /** `sha256(ciphertext)`. */\n secretHash: Hex;\n sealedAt: string;\n}\n\n/** AES-GCM fields encoded as base64 strings. */\nexport interface AesGcmBox {\n /** Base64 initialization vector. */\n iv: string;\n /** Base64 ciphertext. */\n ciphertext: string;\n /** Base64 authentication tag. */\n tag: string;\n}\n\n/** Persisted enclave envelope; the Gateway treats it as opaque text. */\nexport interface SealedEnvelope extends AesGcmBox {\n v: typeof SEALED_ENVELOPE_VERSION;\n wrappedContentKey: AesGcmBox;\n}\n\n/** Fleet-pinned KMS root and allowed dstack application IDs. */\nexport interface EnclaveTrustAnchors {\n kmsRootPubkey: Hex;\n appIds: readonly Hex[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Mainnet fleet anchors, harvested from the prod9 fleet on 2026-09-15.\n *\n * `kmsRootPubkey` is byte-identical to Moksha's: both fleets run under the same\n * Phala KMS, so the key-provider root does NOT separate them. `appIds` is what\n * does — it lists the mainnet worker app only, and must never contain a Moksha\n * app id. The controller is absent by design: it derives no owner keys.\n */\nconst MAINNET_ANCHOR: Readonly = Object.freeze({\n kmsRootPubkey:\n \"0x0434c76e0c3f52ec64cbf9bbf5c910c272330166fd656c0a86bb330963e46910e1a0e6fa51bec74be2f9129342707636060d85856d102cee8290185409ecf7422f\",\n appIds: Object.freeze([\n \"0x01bb1b6dcaf1ea170f1480c5e53b093f384d939a\",\n ] as Hex[]),\n});\n\n/** Fleet-provisioned trust anchors keyed by Vana chain ID. */\nexport const ENCLAVE_TRUST_ANCHORS: Readonly<\n Record>\n> = Object.freeze({\n [VANA_MAINNET_CHAIN_ID]: MAINNET_ANCHOR,\n // Moksha workers share this dstack app and KMS root; the controller does not derive owner keys.\n [MOKSHA_CHAIN_ID]: Object.freeze({\n kmsRootPubkey:\n \"0x0434c76e0c3f52ec64cbf9bbf5c910c272330166fd656c0a86bb330963e46910e1a0e6fa51bec74be2f9129342707636060d85856d102cee8290185409ecf7422f\",\n appIds: Object.freeze([\n \"0xec9a39de98c760e1ded9f1e97016dc5f0e357cf2\" as Hex,\n ]),\n }),\n});\n\n/**\n * Derives the deterministic Personal Server ID used by enclave paths.\n *\n * @param chainId - Vana chain ID.\n * @param ownerAddress - Checksummed owner address.\n * @returns The path-compatible keccak256 digest.\n */\nexport function userPsId(chainId: number, ownerAddress: Address): UserPsId {\n const packed = encodePacked(\n [\"string\", \"uint256\", \"address\"],\n [USER_PS_ID_DOMAIN, BigInt(chainId), getAddress(ownerAddress)],\n );\n\n return keccak256(packed);\n}\n\nfunction compressPublicKey(publicKey: Hex): Uint8Array {\n return secp256k1.ProjectivePoint.fromHex(\n fromHex(publicKey, \"bytes\"),\n ).toRawBytes(true);\n}\n\nfunction sameKey(a: Hex, b: Hex): boolean {\n return toHex(compressPublicKey(a)) === toHex(compressPublicKey(b));\n}\n\nfunction assertUncompressedKey(publicKey: Hex): void {\n const hex = publicKey.slice(2);\n if (\n hex.length !== UNCOMPRESSED_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES * 2 ||\n !hex.startsWith(UNCOMPRESSED_PUBLIC_KEY_PREFIX) ||\n !/^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/.test(hex)\n ) {\n throw new Error(\"Public key must be a 65-byte uncompressed secp256k1 key\");\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * Builds keccak256(utf8(purpose || \":\" || lowercase hex(compressed pubkey))).\n *\n * Matches `dstack/guest-agent/src/rpc_service.rs:612-628`.\n */\nexport function appRootPreimage(purpose: string, publicKey: Hex): Hex {\n const keyHex = toHex(compressPublicKey(publicKey)).slice(2);\n return keccak256(toBytes(`${purpose}${PREIMAGE_SEPARATOR}${keyHex}`));\n}\n\n/**\n * Hashes the KMS prefix, raw app ID bytes, and compressed app-root public key.\n *\n * Matches `dstack/kms/src/crypto.rs:23-40`; there is no separator between the\n * raw 20-byte app ID and the compressed key.\n */\nexport function kmsIssuedPreimage(appId: Hex, appRootPublicKey: Hex): Hex {\n const prefix = concat([\n toBytes(`${KMS_ISSUED_PREFIX}${PREIMAGE_SEPARATOR}`),\n fromHex(appId, \"bytes\"),\n ]);\n const compressed = compressPublicKey(appRootPublicKey);\n\n return keccak256(concat([prefix, compressed]));\n}\n\nasync function recoverChainKey(\n hash: Hex,\n signature: Hex,\n link: number,\n): Promise {\n try {\n return (await recoverPublicKey({ hash, signature })).toLowerCase() as Hex;\n } catch {\n throw new Error(`Invalid enclave signature chain link ${link}`);\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * Verifies the enclave wallet binding against fleet-provisioned trust anchors.\n *\n * @param evidence - Identity evidence returned by the enclave agent.\n * @param anchors - Pinned KMS root and allowed dstack app IDs.\n * @param expected - Owner, chain, and epoch requested by the caller.\n *\n * @remarks\n * The dstack chain signs only `purpose || publicKey` and `appId || appRootPub`;\n * owner, chain and epoch are bound to the key by the TDX quote report_data\n * (`keccak256(userPsId || address)`), which v1 stores but does not verify\n * (DCAP is step 4). Until then the agent's derivation check is the backstop.\n * @throws When any identity binding or trust check fails.\n */\nexport async function verifyEnclaveIdentityEvidence(\n evidence: EnclaveIdentityEvidence,\n anchors: EnclaveTrustAnchors,\n expected: ExpectedIdentity,\n): Promise {\n if (evidence.v !== ENCLAVE_IDENTITY_EVIDENCE_VERSION) {\n throw new Error(\"Unsupported enclave identity evidence version\");\n }\n\n if (!Number.isInteger(evidence.epoch) || evidence.epoch < 1) {\n throw new Error(\"Invalid enclave identity epoch\");\n }\n\n if (evidence.chainId !== expected.chainId) {\n throw new Error(\n \"Enclave identity chain ID does not match expected chain ID\",\n );\n }\n\n if (!isAddressEqual(evidence.ownerAddress, expected.ownerAddress)) {\n throw new Error(\"Enclave identity owner does not match expected owner\");\n }\n\n if (evidence.epoch !== expected.epoch) {\n throw new Error(\"Enclave identity epoch does not match expected epoch\");\n }\n\n const expectedUserPsId = userPsId(expected.chainId, expected.ownerAddress);\n if (evidence.userPsId.toLowerCase() !== expectedUserPsId.toLowerCase()) {\n throw new Error(\"Enclave userPsId does not match expected identity\");\n }\n\n if (evidence.purpose !== ENCLAVE_WALLET_PURPOSE) {\n throw new Error(\"Unexpected enclave wallet purpose\");\n }\n\n if (anchors.kmsRootPubkey === EMPTY_HEX) {\n throw new Error(\"KMS root trust anchor is not provisioned\");\n }\n\n assertUncompressedKey(evidence.publicKey);\n const derivedAddress = publicKeyToAddress(evidence.publicKey);\n\n if (getAddress(derivedAddress) !== getAddress(evidence.address)) {\n throw new Error(\"Enclave public key does not match its address\");\n }\n\n const appRootPublicKey = await recoverChainKey(\n appRootPreimage(evidence.purpose, evidence.publicKey),\n evidence.signatureChain[0],\n 0,\n );\n const kmsRootPublicKey = await recoverChainKey(\n kmsIssuedPreimage(evidence.appId, appRootPublicKey),\n evidence.signatureChain[1],\n 1,\n );\n\n let matchesAnchor: boolean;\n try {\n matchesAnchor = sameKey(kmsRootPublicKey, anchors.kmsRootPubkey);\n } catch {\n throw new Error(\"KMS root trust anchor is malformed\");\n }\n\n if (!matchesAnchor) {\n throw new Error(\"KMS root public key does not match the trust anchor\");\n }\n\n if (\n keccak256(kmsRootPublicKey) !== evidence.kmsRootFingerprint.toLowerCase()\n ) {\n throw new Error(\"KMS root fingerprint does not match the evidence\");\n }\n\n const appId = evidence.appId.toLowerCase();\n if (\n !anchors.appIds.some((allowedAppId) => allowedAppId.toLowerCase() === appId)\n ) {\n throw new Error(\"Enclave app ID is not trusted\");\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * Builds the authenticated master-signature plaintext delivered to an enclave.\n *\n * @param evidence - Verified enclave identity evidence.\n * @param masterSignature - EIP-191 signature over the master-key message.\n * @param now - Issuance time in Unix seconds.\n * @returns The authenticated plaintext delivery object.\n * @throws When the signature is malformed or does not belong to the owner.\n */\nexport async function buildMasterSignatureDelivery(\n evidence: EnclaveIdentityEvidence,\n masterSignature: Hex,\n now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),\n): Promise {\n // Validate signature length and hex encoding before recovery.\n deriveMasterKey(masterSignature);\n const signerAddress = await recoverServerOwner(masterSignature);\n\n if (!isAddressEqual(signerAddress, evidence.ownerAddress)) {\n throw new Error(\"Master signature signer does not match evidence owner\");\n }\n\n return {\n v: MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_VERSION,\n userPsId: evidence.userPsId,\n epoch: evidence.epoch,\n enclaveAddress: evidence.address,\n ownerAddress: evidence.ownerAddress,\n masterSignature,\n issuedAt: now,\n };\n}\n\n/**\n * Encrypts a master-signature delivery in the SDK's ECIES wire format.\n *\n * @param delivery - 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