/**
 * Target-profile aware filename sanitizer.
 *
 * Pure string in / string out. No filesystem access, no I/O. Use this
 * at the boundary where a user-supplied filename meets a storage
 * destination — local FS, ZIP archive, S3 key, URL path, SMB share —
 * to defuse the canonical 14-class footgun before it reaches that
 * destination.
 *
 * ## Threat model
 *
 *   1. Path injection — `..`, NUL bytes, `\` on POSIX, absolute paths.
 *   2. Windows reserved names — `CON`, `PRN`, `AUX`, `NUL`,
 *      `COM1-9`, `LPT1-9`, with or without an extension.
 *   3. Windows reserved chars — `< > : " / \ | ? *` plus ASCII 0-31.
 *   4. Trailing `.` and ` ` on Windows / SMB.
 *   5. Unicode normalization drift — same display, different bytes →
 *      "two files with the same name" sync ghosts.
 *   6. Bidi override spoofing — U+202E reversing `harmless.exe.txt`
 *      into `harmless.txt.exe`.
 *   7. URL `+` ambiguity in S3 presigned URLs.
 *   8. ZIP general-purpose-flag bit 11 (UTF-8 filename) optional in
 *      pre-2006 readers.
 *   9-14. Length caps, leading/trailing whitespace + controls,
 *      `.DS_Store`-style hidden noise, etc.
 *
 * ## Always-on transforms (every profile)
 *
 *   - NFC normalize (`String.prototype.normalize('NFC')`).
 *   - Reject NUL — hard fail, not strip. Silent strip enables a
 *     classic truncation bypass (`safe.txt\0.exe` → `safe.txt`).
 *   - Strip bidi overrides (`U+202A..U+202E`, `U+2066..U+2069`).
 *   - Trim leading/trailing whitespace and ASCII control chars.
 *
 * ## Non-goals (i18n boundary policy, )
 *
 *   - No transliteration.
 *   - No locale-aware slugging.
 *   - No script-specific segmentation.
 *
 * @module
 */
/**
 * One of seven storage destinations the sanitizer knows how to defang
 * for. Pick the most restrictive that covers your write site:
 * `'macos-smb'` is the safe default for "I don't know where these
 * files end up but they're going to a real filesystem somewhere."
 */
export type FilenameProfile = 'posix' | 'windows' | 'macos-smb' | 'zip' | 'url-path' | 's3-key' | 'opaque';
export interface SanitizeFilenameOptions {
    /** Target-destination profile. */
    readonly profile: FilenameProfile;
    /**
     * Override the per-profile length cap. Useful when leaving headroom
     * for a collision suffix — e.g. `maxBytes: 240` on a `posix` write
     * site that wants 15 bytes of slack for `-1`, `-2`, …
     */
    readonly maxBytes?: number;
    /**
     * Required when `profile === 'opaque'`. The opaque profile replaces
     * the entire input with `${opaqueId}.${ext}` (extension preserved
     * from the input when present).
     */
    readonly opaqueId?: string;
}
/**
 * Sanitize a filename for a target-destination profile. Pure: same
 * input + options always returns the same output, no I/O.
 *
 * Returns the sanitized name. Throws {@link FilenameSanitizationError}
 * when the input cannot be made safe at all (NUL byte, empty after
 * normalization, missing `opaqueId` for the opaque profile,
 * `..` segment that would fall out of any reasonable target).
 */
export declare function sanitizeFilename(name: string, opts: SanitizeFilenameOptions): string;