/** * PBKDF (RFC 2898). Can be used to create a key from password and salt. * @module */ import { hmac } from './hmac.ts'; // prettier-ignore import { ahash, anumber, asyncLoop, checkOpts, clean, createView, kdfInputToBytes, type CHash, type Hash, type KDFInput, type TArg, type TRet } from './utils.ts'; /** * PBKDF2 options: * * c: iterations, should probably be higher than 100_000 * * dkLen: desired length of derived key in bytes, must be `>= 1` per RFC 8018 §5.2 * * asyncTick: max time in ms for which async function can block execution */ export type Pbkdf2Opt = { /** Iteration count. Higher values increase CPU cost. */ c: number; /** Desired derived key length in bytes, must be `>= 1` per RFC 8018 §5.2. */ dkLen?: number; /** Max scheduler block time in milliseconds for the async variant. */ asyncTick?: number; }; // Common validation and per-call state setup for sync/async functions. function pbkdf2Init( hash: TArg, _password: TArg, _salt: TArg, _opts: Pbkdf2Opt ) { ahash(hash); const opts = checkOpts({ dkLen: 32, asyncTick: 10 }, _opts); const { c, dkLen, asyncTick } = opts; anumber(c, 'c'); anumber(dkLen, 'dkLen'); anumber(asyncTick, 'asyncTick'); if (c < 1) throw new Error('"c" (iterations) must be >= 1'); // RFC 8018 §5.2 defines `dkLen` as "a positive integer". if (dkLen < 1) throw new Error('"dkLen" must be >= 1'); // RFC 8018 §5.2 step 1 requires rejecting oversize `dkLen` // before allocating the destination buffer. if (dkLen > (2 ** 32 - 1) * hash.outputLen) throw new Error('derived key too long'); const p = kdfInputToBytes(_password, 'password'); const s = kdfInputToBytes(_salt, 'salt'); // DK = PBKDF2(PRF, Password, Salt, c, dkLen); const DK = new Uint8Array(dkLen); const { iHash, oHash, outputLen } = hmac.create(hash, p); // Drive keyed hashes directly; the wrapper is only needed to initialize their HMAC midstates. const u = new Uint8Array(outputLen); const eng = pbkdf2Engine(iHash, oHash, s, u); return { c, dkLen, asyncTick, DK, outputLen, eng }; } // Per-call PRF driver writes U1 into both `u` and `Ti`, then later digests into `u`; // shared by the sync and async variants. function pbkdf2Engine( iHash: TArg>, oHash: TArg>, salt: TArg, u: TArg ) { const counter = new Uint8Array(4); const view = createView(counter); // Full clones retain tree/config state; absorb salt before async yields without cloning input. const salted = iHash._cloneInto().update(salt); // u1() overwrites the worker before reading it. Seed from the outer midstate so a long salt // cannot pre-populate a tree stack that the first reset would abandon without wiping. const work = oHash._cloneInto(); const iClone = iHash._cloneInto; // Capture before mixed feedback can materialize state tuples. const oClone = oHash._cloneInto; return { u1: (ti: number, Ti: TArg) => { view.setInt32(0, ti, false); salted._cloneInto(work).update(counter).digestInto(u); oHash._cloneInto(work).update(u).digestInto(u); Ti.set(u.subarray(0, Ti.length)); }, // Whole `F` inner loop for the sync variant: one optimized function owns the hot loop. rounds: (c: number, Ti: TArg) => { for (let ui = 1; ui < c; ui++) { iClone.call(iHash, work).update(u).digestInto(u); oClone.call(oHash, work).update(u).digestInto(u); for (let i = 0; i < Ti.length; i++) Ti[i] ^= u[i]; } }, output: (DK: TArg): TRet => { // Keyed templates and derived worker states are secret material. iHash.destroy(); oHash.destroy(); salted.destroy(); work.destroy(); // Shared sync/async cleanup point: wipe transient PRF state // while preserving the derived key buffer. clean(u); return DK as TRet; }, }; } /** * PBKDF2-HMAC: RFC 8018 key derivation function. * @param hash - hash function that would be used e.g. sha256 * @param password - password from which a derived key is generated; * JS string inputs are UTF-8 encoded first * @param salt - cryptographic salt; JS string inputs are UTF-8 encoded first * @param opts - PBKDF2 work factor and output settings. `dkLen`, if provided, * must be `>= 1` per RFC 8018 §5.2. See {@link Pbkdf2Opt}. * @returns Derived key bytes. * @throws If the PBKDF2 iteration count or derived-key settings are invalid. {@link Error} * @example * PBKDF2-HMAC: RFC 2898 key derivation function. * ```ts * import { pbkdf2 } from '@noble/hashes/pbkdf2.js'; * import { sha256 } from '@noble/hashes/sha2.js'; * const key = pbkdf2(sha256, 'password', 'salt', { dkLen: 32, c: Math.pow(2, 18) }); * ``` */ export function pbkdf2( hash: TArg, password: TArg, salt: TArg, opts: Pbkdf2Opt ): TRet { const { c, dkLen, DK, outputLen, eng } = pbkdf2Init(hash, password, salt, opts); // DK = T1 + T2 + ⋯ + Tdklen/hlen for (let ti = 1, pos = 0; pos < dkLen; ti++, pos += outputLen) { // Ti = F(Password, Salt, c, i) // The last Ti view can be shorter than hLen, which applies // RFC 8018 §5.2 step 4's T_l<0..r-1> truncation without extra copies. const Ti = DK.subarray(pos, pos + outputLen); // F(Password, Salt, c, i) = U1 ^ U2 ^ ⋯ ^ Uc // U1 = PRF(Password, Salt + INT_32_BE(i)) eng.u1(ti, Ti); // Uc = PRF(Password, Uc−1); Ti ^= Uc eng.rounds(c, Ti); } return eng.output(DK); } /** * PBKDF2-HMAC: RFC 8018 key derivation function. Async version. * @param hash - hash function that would be used e.g. sha256 * @param password - password from which a derived key is generated; * JS string inputs are UTF-8 encoded first * @param salt - cryptographic salt; JS string inputs are UTF-8 encoded first * @param opts - PBKDF2 work factor and output settings. `dkLen`, if provided, * must be `>= 1` per RFC 8018 §5.2. `asyncTick` is only a local * scheduler-yield knob for this JS wrapper, not part of RFC 8018. * See {@link Pbkdf2Opt}. * @returns Promise resolving to derived key bytes. * @throws If the PBKDF2 iteration count or derived-key settings are invalid. {@link Error} * @example * PBKDF2-HMAC: RFC 2898 key derivation function. * ```ts * import { pbkdf2Async } from '@noble/hashes/pbkdf2.js'; * import { sha256 } from '@noble/hashes/sha2.js'; * const key = await pbkdf2Async(sha256, 'password', 'salt', { dkLen: 32, c: 500_000 }); * ``` * @example * Tune the async PBKDF2 scheduler for short UI tasks. * ```ts * import { pbkdf2Async } from '@noble/hashes/pbkdf2.js'; * import { sha256 } from '@noble/hashes/sha2.js'; * const key = await pbkdf2Async(sha256, 'password', 'salt', { * dkLen: 32, * c: 32, * asyncTick: 1, * }); * ``` */ export async function pbkdf2Async( hash: TArg, password: TArg, salt: TArg, opts: Pbkdf2Opt ): Promise> { const { c, dkLen, asyncTick, DK, outputLen, eng } = pbkdf2Init(hash, password, salt, opts); // DK = T1 + T2 + ⋯ + Tdklen/hlen for (let ti = 1, pos = 0; pos < dkLen; ti++, pos += outputLen) { // Ti = F(Password, Salt, c, i) // The last Ti view can be shorter than hLen, which applies // RFC 8018 §5.2 step 4's T_l<0..r-1> truncation without extra copies. const Ti = DK.subarray(pos, pos + outputLen); // F(Password, Salt, c, i) = U1 ^ U2 ^ ⋯ ^ Uc // U1 = PRF(Password, Salt + INT_32_BE(i)) eng.u1(ti, Ti); await asyncLoop(c - 1, asyncTick, () => { // Uc = PRF(Password, Uc−1) eng.rounds(2, Ti); // c=2 runs exactly one PRF iteration per callback. }); } return eng.output(DK); }