import { t as McpFetchHandler } from "../mcp-resource-server-C4RxIuQl.mjs";
import { a as McpCorsOptions, c as McpHttpSecurityOptions, d as corsAllowedOrigin, f as hardenMcpFetch, g as resolveMcpHttpSecurity, h as mcpHttpSecurityRejection, i as MCP_DEFAULT_MAX_BODY_BYTES, l as McpHttpSecurityPolicy, m as limitMcpRequestBody, n as MCP_CORS_EXPOSED_HEADERS, o as McpHardenHooks, p as isMcpHttpSecurityPolicy, r as MCP_CORS_METHODS, s as McpHardenedServer, t as MCP_CORS_ALLOWED_HEADERS, u as applyMcpCorsHeaders } from "../mcp-http-security-BXpPP1E-.mjs";
import { NodeMcpRequestHandler } from "@modelcontextprotocol/node";
import { HostHeaderValidationResult, McpHandlerRequestOptions, OriginValidationResult, hostHeaderValidationResponse, localhostAllowedHostnames, localhostAllowedOrigins, originValidationResponse, validateHostHeader, validateOriginHeader } from "@modelcontextprotocol/server";
//#region src/security/mcp-request-validation.d.ts
interface McpRequestValidationOptions {
  /** Hostnames only; do not include ports or schemes. */
  readonly allowedHostnames: readonly string[];
  /** Origin hostnames only. A missing Origin header is accepted by the official validator. */
  readonly allowedOriginHostnames: readonly string[];
  /** CORS handling for admitted origins; defaults to on (origin validation is always on here). */
  readonly cors?: McpCorsOptions | boolean;
  /** Request-body byte cap; defaults to 1 MiB, matching the runtime. `false` disables it. */
  readonly maxBodyBytes?: number | false;
}
/**
 * Explicit Host and Origin validation ahead of an MCP fetch handler. This
 * facade owns the full pre-dispatch posture — host/origin validation, the body
 * cap, and CORS decoration — so composing it never silently drops the runtime's
 * default protections for the requests it admits.
 */
declare class McpValidatedServer implements McpFetchHandler {
  #private;
  readonly notify: McpFetchHandler["notify"];
  readonly bus: McpFetchHandler["bus"];
  constructor(handler: McpFetchHandler, options: McpRequestValidationOptions);
  get policy(): McpHttpSecurityPolicy;
  fetch(request: Request, options?: McpHandlerRequestOptions): Promise<Response>;
  close(): Promise<void>;
}
//#endregion
//#region src/security/mcp-node-body-limit.d.ts
type McpNodeBodyLimit = number | McpHttpSecurityPolicy | undefined;
/**
 * Caps the raw Node request body before the SDK's `toWebRequest` buffers it
 * unbounded. Skips requests the platform already parsed and bodyless methods.
 * On overflow it answers `413` (with CORS headers when a policy is supplied)
 * and never invokes the wrapped handler; on success the buffered bytes are
 * replayed through the request's own async iterator so `req.auth` and other
 * platform decorations survive.
 *
 * Stream errors during the read (e.g. a peer aborting mid-upload) are captured
 * and re-thrown from the replay iterator, so the wrapped SDK adapter keeps
 * ownership of them through its own `try/catch → onerror → 500` path rather
 * than rejecting the returned promise (which would be an unhandled rejection
 * on fire-and-forget mounts).
 */
declare function withMcpNodeBodyLimit(handler: NodeMcpRequestHandler, limit: McpNodeBodyLimit, hooks?: McpHardenHooks): NodeMcpRequestHandler;
//#endregion
export { type HostHeaderValidationResult, MCP_CORS_ALLOWED_HEADERS, MCP_CORS_EXPOSED_HEADERS, MCP_CORS_METHODS, MCP_DEFAULT_MAX_BODY_BYTES, type McpCorsOptions, type McpHardenHooks, McpHardenedServer, type McpHttpSecurityOptions, type McpHttpSecurityPolicy, type McpNodeBodyLimit, type McpRequestValidationOptions, McpValidatedServer, type OriginValidationResult, applyMcpCorsHeaders, corsAllowedOrigin, hardenMcpFetch, hostHeaderValidationResponse, isMcpHttpSecurityPolicy, limitMcpRequestBody, localhostAllowedHostnames, localhostAllowedOrigins, mcpHttpSecurityRejection, originValidationResponse, resolveMcpHttpSecurity, validateHostHeader, validateOriginHeader, withMcpNodeBodyLimit };
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