import { t as McpFetchHandler } from "./mcp-resource-server-C4RxIuQl.mjs";
import { McpHandlerRequestOptions } from "@modelcontextprotocol/server";
//#region src/security/mcp-http-security.d.ts
declare const MCP_DEFAULT_MAX_BODY_BYTES = 1048576;
declare const MCP_CORS_METHODS: readonly string[];
/**
 * Request headers the 2026-07-28 revision requires browser clients to send.
 * `Mcp-Method`/`Mcp-Name` make every modern MCP POST CORS-preflighted.
 */
declare const MCP_CORS_ALLOWED_HEADERS: readonly string[];
declare const MCP_CORS_EXPOSED_HEADERS: readonly string[];
interface McpCorsOptions {
  /**
   * Allows cookies/credentialed requests. Cookie-authenticated MCP endpoints
   * are CSRF-able; leave off unless required. When enabled, `allowedOrigins`
   * is mandatory and the grant matches the full origin exactly — never a bare
   * hostname — so a compromised sibling scheme or port cannot inherit it.
   */
  readonly credentials?: boolean;
  /**
   * Full browser origins (e.g. `https://app.example.com`) permitted to make
   * credentialed requests. Required when `credentials` is true; ignored
   * otherwise (non-credentialed CORS reflects any origin the allowlist admits).
   */
  readonly allowedOrigins?: readonly string[];
  readonly maxAgeSeconds?: number;
  readonly additionalAllowedHeaders?: readonly string[];
  readonly additionalExposedHeaders?: readonly string[];
}
interface McpHttpSecurityOptions {
  /** Host-header allowlist (hostnames only). Defaults to off: proxies rewrite `Host`, and the Origin rung already blocks DNS rebinding. */
  readonly allowedHostnames?: readonly string[] | false;
  /**
   * Origin-header allowlist (hostnames only). Defaults to localhost-class
   * origins, so routable browser origins are denied until configured.
   * Requests without an `Origin` header always pass. `false` disables the check.
   */
  readonly allowedOriginHostnames?: readonly string[] | false;
  /** CORS handling for allowed origins. Defaults to on whenever origin validation is on. */
  readonly cors?: McpCorsOptions | boolean;
  /** Request-body byte cap. Defaults to 1 MiB; `false` disables the cap. */
  readonly maxBodyBytes?: number | false;
}
interface ResolvedCorsPolicy {
  readonly credentials: boolean;
  readonly maxAgeSeconds: number;
  readonly allowedHeaders: string;
  readonly allowedHeaderSet: ReadonlySet<string>;
  readonly exposedHeaders: string;
  readonly methods: string;
  /** Exact-origin allowlist enforced only in credentialed mode. */
  readonly allowedOrigins: ReadonlySet<string> | undefined;
}
/** Reports a pre-dispatch rejection (status ≥ 400) to an outer observer. */
interface McpHardenHooks {
  readonly onRejected?: (status: number) => void;
}
interface McpHttpSecurityPolicy {
  readonly resolved: true;
  readonly allowedHostnames: readonly string[] | undefined;
  readonly allowedOriginHostnames: readonly string[] | undefined;
  readonly cors: ResolvedCorsPolicy | undefined;
  readonly maxBodyBytes: number | undefined;
}
/** Resolves and validates the declarative options into a frozen policy. */
declare function resolveMcpHttpSecurity(options?: McpHttpSecurityOptions): McpHttpSecurityPolicy;
declare function isMcpHttpSecurityPolicy(value: unknown): value is McpHttpSecurityPolicy;
/**
 * The pre-dispatch gate: Host validation, then Origin validation, then CORS
 * preflight. Returns a short-circuit `Response`, or `undefined` to proceed.
 * A preflight from a rejected origin gets the 403 with no CORS headers.
 */
declare function mcpHttpSecurityRejection(request: Request, policy: McpHttpSecurityPolicy): Response | undefined;
/**
 * Decorates a response with CORS headers when the request carries an allowed
 * Origin. Rebuilds the response without buffering so streamed SSE bodies keep
 * streaming; a response that already carries an ACAO header is left untouched.
 */
declare function applyMcpCorsHeaders(request: Request, response: Response, policy: McpHttpSecurityPolicy): Response;
/**
 * Enforces the body cap. Returns the request (re-wrapped when the stream had
 * to be counted) or a `413` response. Already-limited requests pass through
 * untouched so double wrapping never buffers twice.
 */
declare function limitMcpRequestBody(request: Request, policy: McpHttpSecurityPolicy): Promise<Request | Response>;
/**
 * Wraps any fetch-shaped handler with the full gate → cap → CORS pipeline.
 * The forwarded request is marked as secured so the runtime's *implicit*
 * default gate defers to this explicit layer (an outer override can loosen as
 * well as tighten). Explicit hardened layers still run — the mark suppresses
 * only the runtime's built-in default, never another constructed facade — so
 * composed policies intersect.
 */
declare function hardenMcpFetch(handler: {
  fetch(request: Request, options?: McpHandlerRequestOptions): Promise<Response>;
}, policy: McpHttpSecurityPolicy, hooks?: McpHardenHooks): {
  fetch(request: Request, options?: McpHandlerRequestOptions): Promise<Response>;
};
/** Hardened facade preserving the full `McpFetchHandler` face, like `McpValidatedServer`. */
declare class McpHardenedServer implements McpFetchHandler {
  #private;
  readonly notify: McpFetchHandler["notify"];
  readonly bus: McpFetchHandler["bus"];
  constructor(handler: McpFetchHandler, options?: McpHttpSecurityOptions | McpHttpSecurityPolicy, hooks?: McpHardenHooks);
  get policy(): McpHttpSecurityPolicy;
  fetch(request: Request, options?: McpHandlerRequestOptions): Promise<Response>;
  close(): Promise<void>;
}
/**
 * The origin to echo in `Access-Control-Allow-Origin`, or `undefined` to omit.
 * Credentialed mode requires an exact full-origin match; non-credentialed mode
 * reflects any origin the hostname allowlist admits.
 */
declare function corsAllowedOrigin(request: Request, policy: McpHttpSecurityPolicy): string | undefined;
//#endregion
export { McpCorsOptions as a, McpHttpSecurityOptions as c, corsAllowedOrigin as d, hardenMcpFetch as f, resolveMcpHttpSecurity as g, mcpHttpSecurityRejection as h, MCP_DEFAULT_MAX_BODY_BYTES as i, McpHttpSecurityPolicy as l, limitMcpRequestBody as m, MCP_CORS_EXPOSED_HEADERS as n, McpHardenHooks as o, isMcpHttpSecurityPolicy as p, MCP_CORS_METHODS as r, McpHardenedServer as s, MCP_CORS_ALLOWED_HEADERS as t, applyMcpCorsHeaders as u };
//# sourceMappingURL=mcp-http-security-BXpPP1E-.d.mts.map