import type { DirectoryDiagnostic, DirectorySlot } from './types.js';
export interface ScannedFile {
    readonly path: string;
    readonly relativePath: string;
    readonly id: string;
}
export interface ScanResult {
    readonly files: readonly ScannedFile[];
    readonly diagnostics: readonly DirectoryDiagnostic[];
}
/**
 * List the code files directly inside one slot directory.
 *
 * **Symlinks are refused, not followed.** A directory handed to this loader is
 * caller-supplied, and a link inside it pointing anywhere else is the
 * link-following weakness (CWE-59) with the loader as the vehicle: the file
 * that gets imported is not the file that was listed. The estate already
 * decided this for its filesystem tools; the same rule applies to a directory
 * whose author may not be the host.
 *
 * That is stricter than the SDK's own `discoverSkills`, and deliberately so —
 * that function walks a host's own trusted tree, where following a link is a
 * convenience rather than a hole. Reusing it here would have inherited a
 * threat model chosen for a different caller.
 *
 * Only the top level is read. A nested directory is reported so an author
 * learns their file was not picked up, except when its name starts with `.`
 * or `_`, which is the conventional way to say "not for you" and is honoured
 * silently.
 */
export declare function scanSlot(root: string, slot: DirectorySlot, dirName: string): Promise<ScanResult>;
/** Canonical absolute root, or undefined when the directory does not exist. */
export declare function canonicalRoot(dir: string): Promise<string | undefined>;
/** Posix-normalised, for a `relativePath` that reads the same on every platform. */
export declare function toPosix(value: string): string;
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