/**
 * Library core — thin wrapper over `@motebit/crypto`'s unified `verify()`
 * dispatcher with file-reading + human-rendering helpers. No state, no
 * side effects beyond filesystem reads you requested.
 *
 * Supported artifact kinds (auto-detected by `@motebit/crypto`):
 *   - `identity`    — `motebit.md` identity file with YAML frontmatter
 *   - `receipt`     — signed `ExecutionReceipt` JSON
 *   - `credential`  — W3C-style `VerifiableCredential` JSON
 *   - `presentation`— `VerifiablePresentation` JSON
 *   - `skill`       — directory containing `SKILL.md` + `skill-envelope.json`
 *                     plus any auxiliary `files[]` declared in the envelope
 *
 * Error handling: file I/O errors throw (caller decides how to surface).
 * Parse / signature errors are returned as `valid: false` results so the
 * caller can render a structured reason instead of catching exceptions.
 */
import { type ArtifactType, type HardwareAttestationVerifiers, type SkillVerifyResult, type VerifyResult } from "@motebit/crypto";
/**
 * A {@link VerifyResult} augmented with the binding rung for receipts. The
 * `sovereign` flag is computed offline from the receipt alone — `motebit_id`
 * IS the commitment to `public_key` (`deriveSovereignMotebitId`), so the CLI
 * reports the strongest binding with no relay and no identity file, matching
 * receipt.computer's `sovereign` rung. Absent for non-receipt artifacts.
 */
export type VerifyResultWithBinding = VerifyResult & {
    readonly sovereign?: boolean;
};
export interface VerifyFileOptions {
    /**
     * Pin the expected artifact type. When set, detection must match or
     * the result is `valid: false` with an explanatory error. Useful in
     * CI where you want to reject a credential passed into a
     * receipt-verification step.
     */
    readonly expectedType?: ArtifactType;
    /**
     * Clock skew allowance (seconds) for credential / presentation
     * time-bounded fields (`issuanceDate`, `expirationDate`, etc.).
     * Forwarded to `@motebit/crypto`. Defaults to the crypto package's
     * default.
     */
    readonly clockSkewSeconds?: number;
    /**
     * Optional platform-specific hardware-attestation verifiers. Forwarded
     * through to `@motebit/crypto::verify` so credentials carrying a
     * `hardware_attestation` claim for `device_check` / `tpm` /
     * `play_integrity` / `webauthn` can be verified end-to-end. Leaving
     * this unset keeps the permissive-floor path fail-closed —
     * hardware-attested credentials still verify their Ed25519 proof, but the
     * `hardware_attestation` channel reports `adapter not yet shipped`
     * (the expected permissive-floor-only behavior). The BSL companion CLI
     * `@motebit/verify` wires all four leaves automatically.
     */
    readonly hardwareAttestation?: HardwareAttestationVerifiers;
    /**
     * When `true`, additionally verify an `ExecutionReceipt`'s `result_hash`
     * equals `hex(SHA-256(UTF-8(result)))` (the spec formula). A valid signature
     * proves the bytes are authentic but NOT that `result_hash` binds the
     * `result` field; strict mode rejects a self-inconsistent receipt — one whose
     * committed hash a third party can't reproduce from its own `result`.
     * Forwarded to `@motebit/crypto::verify`. Default `false`.
     */
    readonly strictHashBinding?: boolean;
}
/**
 * Verify an artifact read from disk. Auto-detects type via content
 * inspection in `@motebit/crypto`.
 *
 * Path-shape dispatch:
 *   - Directory → routed to `verifySkillDirectory` (a skill ships as
 *     `<dir>/SKILL.md` + `<dir>/skill-envelope.json` plus any auxiliary
 *     files declared in `envelope.files[]`). The full envelope-sig +
 *     body-hash + per-file-hash cross-check runs on disk.
 *   - File → read as bytes and routed through `verifyArtifact`, which
 *     calls `@motebit/crypto`'s detector.
 */
export declare function verifyFile(path: string, opts?: VerifyFileOptions): Promise<VerifyResultWithBinding>;
/**
 * Verify a skill directory end-to-end: envelope signature + body hash
 * + every declared file hash. Reads `<dir>/skill-envelope.json` and
 * `<dir>/SKILL.md`, plus each file in `envelope.files[]` from the
 * directory tree, then composes the unified `SkillVerifyResult`.
 *
 * Faithful to `services/relay/CLAUDE.md` rule 6 ("relay is a
 * convenience layer, not a trust root") at the ecosystem layer: an
 * agentskills.io user with a skill they downloaded from anywhere can
 * run `motebit-verify <path-to-skill-dir>` and answer "is this signed
 * AND do the bytes match the signature?" without trusting any motebit
 * service.
 *
 * I/O failures (missing envelope, missing SKILL.md, unreadable
 * directory) return `valid: false` with named errors rather than
 * throwing, so the CLI's structured-output path can surface them
 * uniformly with signature/hash failures.
 */
export declare function verifySkillDirectory(dir: string, opts?: VerifyFileOptions): Promise<SkillVerifyResult>;
/**
 * Verify an already-loaded artifact. Accepts a JSON string, an
 * already-parsed object, or a `motebit.md` identity string.
 */
export declare function verifyArtifact(content: string | object, opts?: VerifyFileOptions): Promise<VerifyResultWithBinding>;
/**
 * Render a `VerifyResult` as the CLI's default human-readable block.
 * `--json` bypasses this and prints the raw result directly.
 *
 * Layout:
 *   ```
 *   VALID (receipt)
 *     signer: did:motebit:...
 *     id:     rcpt_01JZN...
 *   ```
 * or
 *   ```
 *   INVALID (credential)
 *     - credentialSubject.id missing
 *     - signature mismatch
 *   ```
 */
export declare function formatHuman(result: VerifyResultWithBinding): string;
//# sourceMappingURL=lib.d.ts.map