/**
 * TPM 2.0 quote verifier — the core judgment function this package
 * exports.
 *
 * Flow (matches the TCG verification recipe for TPM2_Quote, plus the
 * motebit-specific identity-key binding step):
 *
 *   1. Split the receipt into (tpmsAttestBase64, signatureBase64,
 *      akCertDerBase64, intermediateCertsDerBase64Joined).
 *   2. Parse the TPMS_ATTEST bytes. Assert magic = TPM_GENERATED_VALUE
 *      and type = TPM_ST_ATTEST_QUOTE.
 *   3. Parse the AK leaf + any intermediates as X.509. Walk the chain
 *      from AK leaf → intermediate → vendor root. Every non-leaf must
 *      carry `basicConstraints.cA === true`. Every signature must
 *      verify under its issuer's public key. Every validity window
 *      must include `now`. The terminal cert's DER must byte-equal
 *      ONE of the pinned vendor roots.
 *   4. Verify the AK signature over SHA-256(TPMS_ATTEST_BYTES) using
 *      the AK certificate's public key.
 *   5. Re-derive `extraData` from the JCS-canonical body
 *      {attested_at, device_id, identity_public_key, motebit_id,
 *      platform: "tpm", version: "1"} — SHA-256 of the canonical body
 *      — and byte-compare against the transmitted `extraData`. This is
 *      the cross-stack binding — without it every other step would
 *      prove only that *some* TPM-enrolled device did something, not
 *      that the Ed25519 key the credential subject claims is bound
 *      to that device.
 *
 * The TPM's own EK certificate provisioning path is NOT verified here
 * — that would require contacting the vendor's EK provisioning service
 * and is out of scope for v1. The outer chain + extraData binding is
 * enough for third-party self-verification of TPM-attested identity.
 */
import type { HardwareAttestationClaim } from "@motebit/protocol";
export interface TpmVerifyOptions {
    /**
     * Ed25519 identity key (lowercase hex) the motebit VC claims. The
     * TPM quote's extraData MUST bind this key.
     */
    readonly expectedIdentityPublicKeyHex: string;
    /**
     * motebit_id from the credential subject. Participates in the JCS
     * body the Rust bridge hashes into extraData; re-derived here and
     * byte-compared against the transmitted extraData so a malicious
     * native client cannot substitute a different body.
     */
    readonly expectedMotebitId?: string;
    /**
     * device_id from the credential subject. Same binding role as
     * `expectedMotebitId`.
     */
    readonly expectedDeviceId?: string;
    /**
     * `attested_at` (unix ms) from the credential subject. Same binding
     * role as `expectedMotebitId`.
     */
    readonly expectedAttestedAt?: number;
    /**
     * Override the pinned vendor roots. Tests fabricate their own root
     * so chain verification exercises the same code path without needing
     * real vendor-signed leaves. Defaults to `DEFAULT_PINNED_TPM_ROOTS`.
     */
    readonly rootPems?: readonly string[];
    /**
     * Clock for chain-validity checks. Defaults to `Date.now`. Tests
     * inject a fixed clock to keep certificate validity windows
     * deterministic.
     */
    readonly now?: () => number;
}
export interface TpmVerifyError {
    readonly message: string;
}
export interface TpmVerifyResult {
    readonly valid: boolean;
    readonly cert_chain_valid: boolean;
    readonly quote_signature_valid: boolean;
    readonly quote_shape_valid: boolean;
    readonly identity_bound: boolean;
    readonly errors: readonly TpmVerifyError[];
}
/**
 * TPM 2.0 quote verifier.
 *
 * Pure. No network. No filesystem. Deterministic given `now()`.
 *
 * `claim` is the `HardwareAttestationClaim` as carried inside the
 * motebit AgentTrustCredential. For TPM, the `attestation_receipt`
 * field is expected to be four base64url segments separated by `.`:
 *
 *   `{tpmsAttestB64}.{signatureB64}.{akCertDerB64}.{intermediatesJoinedB64}`
 *
 * `intermediatesJoinedB64` may itself be an empty segment (`""`) when
 * the AK cert chains directly to a pinned root, or a `,`-joined
 * concatenation of base64url-encoded DER intermediates in leaf-
 * proximal-first order otherwise.
 */
export declare function verifyTpmQuote(claim: HardwareAttestationClaim, opts: TpmVerifyOptions): Promise<TpmVerifyResult>;
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