/**
 * App Attest receipt verifier — the core judgment function this
 * package exports.
 *
 * Flow (matches Apple's published verification recipe for App Attest,
 * plus the motebit-specific identity-key binding step):
 *
 *   1. Split the receipt into (attestationObjectBase64,
 *      keyIdBase64, clientDataHashBase64).
 *   2. CBOR-decode the attestation object to {fmt, attStmt:{x5c,
 *      receipt}, authData}. Assert fmt === "apple-appattest".
 *   3. Parse leaf + intermediate as X.509. Walk the chain from leaf to
 *      a self-signed root and verify every signature, every CA bit,
 *      every validity window. The terminal cert's DER must equal the
 *      pinned Apple App Attest root.
 *   4. Extract OID `1.2.840.113635.100.8.2` from the leaf's
 *      extensions. Assert its payload equals SHA256(authData ||
 *      clientDataHash) where clientDataHash is the transmitted hash.
 *      (In App Attest parlance: the "nonce" binding.)
 *   5. Parse authData (WebAuthn format). First 32 bytes is
 *      `rpIdHash`; assert it equals SHA256(bundleId). (The "bundle"
 *      binding.)
 *   6. Reconstruct the JCS-canonical attestation body from
 *      (motebit_id, device_id, identity_public_key, attested_at) the
 *      caller supplies, SHA-256 it, and byte-compare against the
 *      transmitted `clientDataHash`. This is the cross-stack binding
 *      — without it, every other step would prove only that *some*
 *      Apple-attested iOS device did something, not that the Ed25519
 *      key the credential subject claims is actually on that device.
 *
 * Apple's own inner `receipt` field is NOT verified here — that
 * requires Apple's server-side refresh endpoint and is out of scope
 * for v1. The outer chain + nonce binding + bundle binding + motebit
 * identity binding is enough for third-party self-verification of
 * device-attested identity.
 */
import type { HardwareAttestationClaim } from "@motebit/protocol";
export interface AppAttestVerifyOptions {
    /** iOS bundle identifier that minted the attestation (e.g. "com.motebit.app"). */
    readonly expectedBundleId: string;
    /**
     * Ed25519 identity key (lowercase hex) the motebit VC claims. The
     * attested body MUST name this key.
     */
    readonly expectedIdentityPublicKeyHex: string;
    /**
     * motebit_id from the credential subject. Part of the canonical
     * attestation body the Swift mint path signs; re-derived here and
     * byte-compared against the transmitted clientDataHash so a
     * malicious native client cannot substitute a different body.
     */
    readonly expectedMotebitId?: string;
    /**
     * device_id from the credential subject. Same binding role as
     * `expectedMotebitId`.
     */
    readonly expectedDeviceId?: string;
    /**
     * `attested_at` (unix ms) from the credential subject. Same binding
     * role as `expectedMotebitId`.
     */
    readonly expectedAttestedAt?: number;
    /**
     * Override the pinned Apple root — tests fabricate their own root so
     * chain verification exercises the same code path without needing
     * real Apple-signed leaves. Defaults to the pinned
     * `APPLE_APPATTEST_ROOT_PEM`.
     */
    readonly rootPem?: string;
    /**
     * Clock for chain-validity checks. Defaults to `Date.now`. Tests inject
     * a fixed clock to keep certificate validity windows deterministic.
     */
    readonly now?: () => number;
    /**
     * Override the attestation format check. Defaults to `"apple-appattest"`
     * — the value Apple emits. Exposed only so test fabrications that
     * exercise chain-validation edge cases can still reach the code path.
     */
    readonly expectedFmt?: string;
}
export interface AppAttestVerifyError {
    readonly message: string;
}
export interface AppAttestVerifyResult {
    readonly valid: boolean;
    readonly cert_chain_valid: boolean;
    readonly nonce_bound: boolean;
    readonly bundle_bound: boolean;
    readonly identity_bound: boolean;
    readonly errors: readonly AppAttestVerifyError[];
}
/**
 * Apple App Attest attestation verifier.
 *
 * Pure. No network. No filesystem. Deterministic given `now()`.
 *
 * `claim` is the `HardwareAttestationClaim` as carried inside the
 * motebit AgentTrustCredential. For App Attest, the
 * `attestation_receipt` field is expected to be three base64url
 * segments separated by `.`:
 *
 *   `{attestationObjectB64}.{keyIdB64}.{clientDataHashB64}`
 *
 * The mobile mint path constructs this shape; see
 * `apps/mobile/src/mint-hardware-credential.ts`.
 */
export declare function verifyAppAttestReceipt(claim: HardwareAttestationClaim, opts: AppAttestVerifyOptions): Promise<AppAttestVerifyResult>;
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