import { type AgentMessageSender, type AgentPrecedingMessage } from "@mono-agent/agent-contracts";
/**
 * Defuse the reserved tokens by swapping the leading `<` for the look-alike `‹`,
 * so nothing inside untrusted content can open or close a fence this module
 * owns. Applied to preceding bodies, rendered labels, and the PROMPT COPY of the
 * user's own text -- a group member must not be able to append a forged block
 * after their message. The persisted copy is deliberately left untouched.
 */
export declare function neutralizeSpeakerMarkup(value: string): string;
/**
 * The single model-visible rendering of a sender, used for the prompt's speaker
 * line, the persisted `HistoryMessage.name`, and the memory capture label.
 *
 * Returns `undefined` -- NEVER an empty string -- when there is no usable
 * identity. An empty `name` would make `normalizeOptionalInlineString` throw
 * `invalid_history` on the NEXT turn's context build, long after this turn
 * succeeded.
 *
 * `sender.id` is deliberately absent: it is an actionable delivery target, and
 * the memory label in particular becomes durable model-visible content on every
 * future recall, so an id there would be a permanent leak rather than a
 * transient one.
 */
export declare function senderLabel(sender: AgentMessageSender | undefined): string | undefined;
/**
 * Wraps the user's message with the current speaker and any messages that
 * arrived since the agent's last turn.
 *
 * Returns `userMessage` BY IDENTITY when there is neither -- that byte-identity
 * guarantee is the backwards-compatibility contract for DM, TUI, cron, and
 * webhook turns.
 */
export declare function composeUserMessageWithSpeakerContext(userMessage: string, sender: AgentMessageSender | undefined, preceding: readonly AgentPrecedingMessage[] | undefined): string;
/** Counts and byte size for the `turn_context` event. Never the content itself. */
export declare function speakerTurnContextFields(sender: AgentMessageSender | undefined, preceding: readonly AgentPrecedingMessage[] | undefined): {
    readonly speaker?: string;
    readonly precedingCount?: number;
    readonly precedingRendered?: number;
    readonly precedingBytes?: number;
};
/**
 * Collapses a user-controlled name to one safe inline token. Structural controls
 * become visible single-character glyphs rather than transcript lines, matching
 * how the interaction bridge renders untrusted answers.
 *
 * Exported because a surface name (a Slack channel name, a Telegram chat title)
 * is user-controlled in exactly the same way a display name is, and the Session
 * block must neutralize it identically rather than grow a second dialect.
 */
export declare function sanitizeLabelPart(value: string | undefined): string | undefined;
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