# Example compose for the AI Desktop recipe. Copy this next to the Dockerfile
# and custom-cont-init.d/, adjust the marked values, then:
#
#   docker compose up -d --build
#
# First start creates an EMPTY browser profile under ./config — no logins,
# no history, nothing carried over from anywhere else. Expect a self-signed
# certificate warning on the HTTPS port on first connect: normal for a
# loopback-only service, and safe to trust locally.
services:
  ai-desktop:
    build: .
    image: ai-desktop:local
    container_name: ai-desktop
    restart: unless-stopped

    environment:
      - PUID=1000
      - PGID=1000
      - TZ=Etc/UTC                    # set your own timezone
      - TITLE=AI Desktop
      # GUI login: without a password, anyone who reaches the port gets a
      # terminal with passwordless sudo INSIDE the container. Create your own
      # ./.gui_password file (mode 600, one line, no trailing newline needed)
      # before the first start — do not put the password in this file.
      - CUSTOM_USER=admin              # set your own login name
      - FILE__PASSWORD=/run/gui_password

    volumes:
      - ./config:/config
      - ./.gui_password:/run/gui_password:ro
      - ./custom-cont-init.d:/custom-cont-init.d:ro

    # Loopback only, like everything else in NexusCrew: reach this from
    # elsewhere through an SSH tunnel or VPN you control, never by publishing
    # these ports beyond 127.0.0.1.
    # 6900 = http, 6901 = https. The https port is the one worth using day to
    # day — full desktop features (clipboard, audio/video codecs) need it.
    ports:
      - "127.0.0.1:6900:3000"
      - "127.0.0.1:6901:3001"
      # CDP of the Chromium running on the desktop: the channel a Playwright
      # MCP client attaches to (see SKILL.md). Same browser you see and use
      # over the desktop, so same logins.
      - "127.0.0.1:9222:9223"

    # Chromium crashes on tab open without adequate /dev/shm.
    shm_size: "1gb"
    mem_limit: 4g               # tune to your machine
    mem_reservation: 1g
    cpus: 2.0

    # KEEP THIS. The container is the boundary that holds here, and this line
    # is part of it. The browser inside runs with --no-sandbox — that is not
    # an accident, it is the trade this image makes: giving Chromium its own
    # sandbox would require handing the container CAP_SYS_ADMIN or
    # seccomp=unconfined, weakening the one boundary that is actually doing
    # the work in order to add one inside it.
    #
    # Measured, not assumed: with this line set, launching the browser without
    # --no-sandbox aborts — the setuid helper cannot elevate (PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS)
    # and the namespace sandbox is denied ("failed to move to new namespace:
    # Operation not permitted"). See ../SKILL.md, "Where the boundary is".
    #
    # The consequence is real and you should plan for it: a renderer exploit
    # lands in this container. Treat what the browser can reach — its profile,
    # its sessions, anything you mount — as being inside the blast radius.
    security_opt:
      - no-new-privileges:true

    logging:
      driver: json-file
      options:
        max-size: "10m"
        max-file: "3"