/**
 * Path A — input-side context redaction.
 *
 * Cross-session leaks happen because the LLM has the foreign
 * user's secret in its prompt context (history, system prompt,
 * MEMORY.md content, etc.). Output-side rewriting is
 * fundamentally leaky on Slack — ``chat.postMessage`` always
 * dispatches the original first and ``chat.update`` redacts a
 * second later, so notifications, lock-screens, and the first
 * ~500ms of the recipient's UI all show the secret.
 *
 * The architecturally correct fix: scrub every foreign-user
 * vault excerpt out of the prompt BEFORE it reaches the LLM.
 * The LLM physically cannot leak what isn't in its context.
 *
 * Hook used: ``before_prompt_build``. It IS async-aware AND
 * awaited by OpenClaw, and the event object exposes mutable
 * references to ``prompt``, ``systemPrompt``, and
 * ``messages[*]``. We mutate them in place — there's no
 * supported "return new prompt" shape, so in-place mutation is
 * how we actually affect the LLM's input.
 *
 * Performance: one HTTP GET per turn to fetch the foreign-
 * excerpts list (cached for ~5s). Replacement is a single
 * regex pass per text field. Net overhead < 50 ms on a warm
 * cache and < 200 ms on a cold one — well under the 15 s
 * before_prompt_build budget OpenClaw enforces.
 */
/**
 * Public entry point — call this from before_prompt_build with
 * the raw event object. Mutates ``event.prompt``,
 * ``event.systemPrompt``, and every message's content in
 * ``event.messages`` in place. Returns the count of fields
 * that actually changed (for logging only).
 *
 * The redaction strategy collects every text field the LLM is
 * about to see, sends them to the Lumin API in one batch,
 * receives back the redacted versions, and writes them back in
 * place. The server-side endpoint catches BOTH known foreign
 * vault entries AND structured-ID patterns that aren't in the
 * current user's own vault — the latter closes the gap where
 * a foreign secret was leaked before user_id propagation
 * started working, so it never landed in the vault but is
 * still in the LLM's conversation history.
 */
export declare function redactForeignUserSecrets(event: {
    prompt?: string;
    systemPrompt?: string;
    messages?: unknown[];
}, userId: string, host: string, project: string, log: {
    info?: (s: string) => void;
    warn?: (s: string) => void;
} | undefined, detectors?: {
    vault_exact?: boolean;
    structural_pattern?: boolean;
    presidio?: boolean;
}): Promise<number>;
export declare function __resetForeignExcerptsCacheForTest(): void;
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