/**
 * One-shot execution of an ALREADY-CLAIMED device Automation run.
 *
 * The daemon's poll loop claims and executes in one process. A native bridge
 * cannot: the Owletto Mac app has to keep its own poll loop for the platform
 * connectors only it can serve (HealthKit, Photos, Screen Time, computer use),
 * and a poll claims whatever the server hands back — including automation runs
 * pinned to that device. Splitting the claim across two pollers on one device
 * row is what this avoids: the bridge stays the single claimer and hands the
 * verbatim poll envelope here, so `executeAutomationRun` remains the single
 * implementation of prompt building, MCP wiring, subprocess supervision, exit
 * reporting and the finalize/resume loop.
 *
 * Ownership contract, which the caller depends on:
 *   - returns normally → this call owns the run's outcome. It either delivered
 *     an exit report to `/complete-automation`, or deliberately left the run
 *     claimed for the server's heartbeat sweep (`dispatchAutomationResumeLoop`
 *     does this when the report is undeliverable). The caller must NOT report.
 *   - throws → nothing was reported and the run is untouched on the server. The
 *     caller still owns it and must report the failure itself, or the run sits
 *     `running` until the sweeper reclaims it.
 */
import type { AgentKind } from '@lobu/core/contracts/worker/device-automation';
export interface ExecuteClaimedRunOptions {
    /** Gateway base URL, e.g. `https://app.lobu.ai`. */
    apiUrl: string;
    /**
     * The worker id that CLAIMED this run. `/complete-automation` authorizes on
     * `runs.claimed_by` (`authorizeRunForWorker`), so a worker id that did not
     * claim it is refused with a 403 — which the arm classifies as non-retriable
     * and reports as an undelivered exit report, NOT as a run failure. The run
     * then sits `running` until the heartbeat sweep reclaims it, and this call
     * still returns without an error. So a wrong value here is lost silently:
     * pass the claiming poller's own id, never a fresh one.
     */
    workerId: string;
    /** Bearer the claiming poller authenticated with. */
    authToken: string;
    /** Verbatim `/api/workers/poll` response body for the claimed run. */
    job: unknown;
    timeoutMs?: number;
    heartbeatIntervalMs?: number;
    /**
     * Agent to use when the Automation names no `agent_kind`. A native bridge
     * passes the machine's own default here (the Mac app's menubar pick).
     */
    defaultAgentKind?: AgentKind;
    /** Explicit per-agent binary paths (else PATH lookup). Test injection seam. */
    binaryOverrides?: Partial<Record<AgentKind, string>>;
    debug?: boolean;
}
/**
 * A refusal raised BEFORE any server contact, so the caller knows its run is
 * still unreported. Carries `exitCode` so the CLI surfaces it as a non-zero
 * exit — the signal a native bridge keys its own fallback report off.
 */
export declare class UnexecutableRunError extends Error {
    readonly exitCode = 1;
    constructor(message: string);
}
/**
 * Execute one already-claimed automation run and report its outcome.
 *
 * Deliberately does NOT require the durable `owl_pat_` token `startDaemonCommand`
 * insists on. That check exists because a daemon runs for weeks off one
 * snapshotted bearer, so a 24h OAuth session token would leave it polling 401
 * forever. This call lives and dies inside a single run (600s by default) using
 * the bearer its caller just polled with successfully, so the same rule would
 * only reject working credentials.
 */
export declare function executeClaimedAutomationRun(opts: ExecuteClaimedRunOptions): Promise<{
    itemsCollected: number;
    error?: string;
}>;
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