import type { AgentToken } from '../protocol.js';
/**
 * Result of looking up a presented token. The `expired` reason is
 * returned by the verify path when the token's record exists but its
 * hard-expiry has passed; `unknown` covers both "no record" and
 * "wrong hash" so a probe-by-hash leak surface is uniform.
 */
export type VerifyResult = {
    kind: 'ok';
    tid: string;
} | {
    kind: 'invalid';
    reason: 'malformed' | 'unknown' | 'expired';
};
/**
 * Mint an opaque random bearer token + the SHA-256 hash the server
 * stores as a lookup key. Tokens are 32 bytes of CSPRNG entropy (256
 * bits) base64url-encoded with the `agt_` prefix — total ~48 chars.
 * The prefix is intentionally generic so LLM clients don't mistake the
 * token format for a hint about which MCP tool namespace to use.
 *
 * The token itself never persists; only the hash does. A leaked store
 * therefore does not compromise live tokens, since the bearer secret
 * isn't recoverable from the hash. This matches the standard "session
 * cookie / API key" pattern.
 *
 * The opaque form is the only token format the server understands as
 * of 0.0.35. The previous HMAC-signed JWT format is gone; clients
 * carrying old tokens will fail with `unknown` on first call and need
 * to remint. See CHANGELOG.
 */
export declare function mintToken(): Promise<{
    token: AgentToken;
    tokenHash: string;
}>;
/**
 * Compute the SHA-256 hash of a presented bearer token. Returns `null`
 * when the prefix is missing — the verify path uses that to fail-fast
 * on garbage-shaped Authorization headers without a crypto round-trip.
 * Hash is hex-encoded for portability across stores (Postgres `text`,
 * KV string, etc.).
 */
export declare function tokenHashOf(token: string): Promise<string | null>;
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