/**
 * DOM-tree sanitizer — the live-tree companion to the pure-string
 * `content/sanitizer/HTMLSanitizer`. Used where a whole fragment of
 * untrusted HTML becomes live DOM: today the snapshot viewer, which mounts
 * server-fetched snapshot HTML in the editor realm (PM session JWT).
 *
 * POLICY NOTE — this deliberately diverges from the inline `SAFE_TAGS`
 * allowlist (see PHASES.md Phase 4): a snapshot is a full captured page, so
 * structural elements (`div`/`p`/`h1`/`nav`/`table`/…) must survive for the
 * page to render at all. What is enforced instead:
 *   - executable/embedding elements are REMOVED outright
 *   - every `on*` handler attribute (and `srcdoc`) is dropped
 *   - URL-bearing attributes must pass `sanitizeUrl`
 *   - inline `style` keeps any property (layout fidelity) but value-level
 *     dangers are dropped via `sanitizeCssDeclarations`
 *
 * CONTINUOUS DEVELOPMENT: like SAFE_STYLE_PROPS, these sets grow (or
 * tighten) deliberately as real snapshots surface gaps — extend REMOVE_TAGS
 * rather than trusting a new embedding surface, add hostile cases to
 * sanitize-element.test.ts, and keep the WP/edge ports in sync if they ever
 * grow a snapshot feature.
 */
/**
 * Sanitize a live element tree in place (root included).
 */
export declare function sanitizeElement(root: Element): void;
/**
 * Best-effort sanitization of a copied `<style>` sheet's text: strips
 * `@import` (arbitrary stylesheet pull-in), neutralizes `url(...)`
 * references that resolve cross-origin (exfil beacons in a tampered
 * snapshot), and defuses legacy `expression(`. Same-origin, relative, and
 * `data:` URLs are kept so the snapshot still renders its images/fonts.
 * The primary defenses are element removal + attribute scrubbing in
 * `sanitizeElement`; this closes the stylesheet side channel.
 */
export declare function sanitizeStyleSheetText(css: string, baseHref: string): string;
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