/**
 * Byte budgets for every untrusted input injected into the system prompt or
 * tool definitions (fx-pattern). Skills, MCP tool descriptions and promoted
 * MCP schemas are attacker-controllable content a hostile skill file or MCP
 * server can bloat without limit; these caps bound both per-request token cost
 * and the prompt-injection surface. All values are user-tunable via the
 * `contextLimits` setting.
 */
export interface ContextLimits {
    /** One skill's `description` as listed in the prompt / skill tool. */
    skillDescriptionBytes: number;
    /** Whole rendered skills list (prompt section + skill tool description). */
    skillCatalogBytes: number;
    /** One MCP tool's `description` while it sits in the deferred catalog. */
    mcpToolDescriptionBytes: number;
    /** A promoted MCP tool's serialized input schema. Oversized = refused. */
    mcpToolSchemaBytes: number;
    /** Combined project instruction files (AGENTS.md etc.) — Codex default. */
    projectContextBytes: number;
    /** Emergency ceiling on the fully assembled system prompt. */
    systemPromptCeilingBytes: number;
}
export declare const CONTEXT_LIMITS: ContextLimits;
export declare function resolveContextLimits(overrides?: Partial<ContextLimits>): ContextLimits;
export interface ClampedText {
    text: string;
    truncated: boolean;
    originalBytes: number;
}
/**
 * Cut `text` to at most `maxBytes` of UTF-8 on a codepoint boundary (never
 * splits a surrogate pair), appending an ellipsis when truncation happened.
 */
export declare function clampToBytes(text: string, maxBytes: number): ClampedText;
//# sourceMappingURL=context-limits.d.ts.map