/**
 * Regression lock for Sentry hq-cli 7711917661.
 *
 * A one-shot company push driven straight from hq-cli (`hq skill create` ->
 * defaultSyncFile -> share()) never ran the sync-runner's transport selection,
 * so `createPushRunContext` still vended STS write credentials for the `cmp_`
 * vault. When a member's ACL grant set overflowed the STS session-policy budget,
 * hq-pro refused the vend with HTTP 422 `POLICY_WRITE_SCOPE_TRUNCATED`, which
 * share() turned into a thrown `VaultCredentialScopeError` — aborting the push
 * with the file stamped locally but never uploaded.
 *
 * The fix routes the one-shot push through `ensureCompanyVaultTransport`, which
 * selects the presigned-URL transport for company vaults and tells
 * `resolveEntityContext` to SKIP the `cmp_` STS vend entirely. These tests drive
 * share() exactly as defaultSyncFile does and assert the company vend route is
 * never touched — so the recorded 422 can never be reached.
 *
 * The byte transport (`../s3.js`) is fully mocked: the assertion under test is
 * the credential-vend DECISION, not the upload itself.
 */
export {};
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