import { SkillSignatureVerificationResult } from "./types.js";

//#region src/supply-chain/signature.d.ts

/**
 * Strategy hook used by tests so the unit suite never fetches a real
 * `well-known` URL.
 *
 * @experimental
 */
type PublicKeyFetcher = (url: string, signal?: AbortSignal) => Promise<string>;
/**
 * Override the public-key fetcher. Used by the test suite.
 *
 * @experimental
 */
declare function _setPublicKeyFetcherForTesting(fetcher: PublicKeyFetcher | null): void;
/**
 * Strategy hook used by tests so the Sigstore branch can be exercised
 * without a real Fulcio + Rekor round-trip.
 *
 * @experimental
 */
type SigstoreVerifier = (args: {
  readonly identity: string;
  readonly issuer: string;
  readonly signature: string;
}, signal?: AbortSignal) => Promise<{
  readonly publicKeyPem: string;
  readonly fingerprint: string;
}>;
/**
 * Override the Sigstore verifier. Sigstore support is opt-in; the
 * framework keeps the surface dormant until a verifier is installed.
 *
 * @experimental
 */
declare function _setSigstoreVerifierForTesting(verifier: SigstoreVerifier | null): void;
/**
 * Options accepted by `verifySkillSignature`.
 *
 * @stable
 */
interface VerifySkillSignatureOptions {
  /** Raw SKILL.md content (UTF-8 string). */
  readonly skillMd: string;
  /**
   * When supplied, overrides the `publicKeyRef` block discovered in
   * the frontmatter. Useful for offline verification with a pinned
   * publisher key.
   */
  readonly publicKeySource?: {
    readonly publicKeyPem: string;
    readonly publisher?: string;
  };
  /**
   * Operator trust root. When supplied, the RESOLVED
   * signing key must match the trust root or verification fails
   * `valid: false` with `reason: 'untrusted-key'` - a self-signed skill
   * whose inline key is not in the root can no longer verify green. The
   * root is checked AFTER the ed25519 signature itself is valid, so the
   * result distinguishes a bad signature from an untrusted signer.
   */
  readonly trustRoot?: SkillTrustRoot;
  /** Cancellation. */
  readonly signal?: AbortSignal;
  /** Optional pre-installed strategy registry override. */
  readonly publicKeyFetcher?: PublicKeyFetcher;
  readonly sigstoreVerifier?: SigstoreVerifier;
}
/**
 * Verify the ed25519 signature embedded in `skillMd`. Returns a
 * structured result instead of throwing for the validation outcome -
 * callers branch on `valid`. Parser-level errors (missing block,
 * malformed YAML) are still thrown via the supply-chain error
 * hierarchy.
 *
 * @stable
 */
declare function verifySkillSignature(options: VerifySkillSignatureOptions): Promise<SkillSignatureVerificationResult>;
/**
 * Operator trust root for skill signatures. At least
 * one leg must be non-empty to trust anything. `allowSigstore` (default
 * `true`) exempts sigstore-resolved keys (their identity/issuer were
 * already checked by the verifier).
 *
 * The `publishers` leg counts ONLY for keys resolved through the
 * `well-known` channel, whose URL host is verified to be the publisher's
 * domain (or a subdomain). The frontmatter `publisher` string is NOT
 * covered by the signature - anyone can claim any publisher - so an
 * inline key can never satisfy this leg (self-sign + claim
 * `publisher: trusted.example.com` used to pass). Inline keys require
 * the `fingerprints` leg.
 *
 * @stable
 */
interface SkillTrustRoot {
  /** Trusted key fingerprints (`sha256:<hex>`; matching is fold-normalised). */
  readonly fingerprints?: ReadonlyArray<string>;
  /**
   * Trusted publisher DNS names. Satisfied only by `well-known`-resolved
   * keys whose URL host equals the publisher (or is its subdomain) -
   * control of the HTTPS endpoint on the publisher's domain is the one
   * channel that can vouch for the unsigned `publisher` string.
   */
  readonly publishers?: ReadonlyArray<string>;
  /** Trust sigstore-resolved keys without a fingerprint/publisher entry. Default `true`. */
  readonly allowSigstore?: boolean;
}
//#endregion
export { PublicKeyFetcher, SigstoreVerifier, SkillTrustRoot, VerifySkillSignatureOptions, _setPublicKeyFetcherForTesting, _setSigstoreVerifierForTesting, verifySkillSignature };
//# sourceMappingURL=signature.d.ts.map