import type { JsonObject, JsonValue } from '../types/data-contract.js';
/** The request `_meta` key a view's proof rides at. The value is one string. */
export declare const MCP_APP_AI_GGUI_VIEW_META_KEY: "ai.ggui/view";
/**
 * The longest proof a relay door admits, for every version. A v1 proof is
 * at most {@link VIEW_PROOF_V1_MAX_CHARS} characters; the rest is headroom.
 */
export declare const VIEW_PROOF_MAX_CHARS = 1024;
/**
 * The relay door shape, fixed for every version: ASCII, no escaping needed
 * in JSON, a URL, a header or a log line. A relay MAY check it and MAY log
 * the value; it MUST NOT alter, trim, case-fold, re-encode or truncate it.
 * The version tag and the fields belong to the verifier, not to this shape.
 */
export declare const VIEW_PROOF_RELAY_SHAPE: RegExp;
/** The v1 grammar: `v1.root.nonce.vtime.flags.argmac.callmac`. */
export declare const VIEW_PROOF_V1_PATTERN: RegExp;
/** The longest v1 proof: 2+1+768+1+22+1+15+1+2+1+43+1+43. */
export declare const VIEW_PROOF_V1_MAX_CHARS = 901;
/**
 * The longest root `P` (the ws envelope's payload segment) a proof can
 * carry. `P` grows with `sessionId` and `appId`, neither of which protocol
 * caps, so a minting door issues no view key for a longer `P`.
 */
export declare const VIEW_PROOF_ROOT_MAX_CHARS = 768;
/** Bit 0 of `flags`: the gesture carried transient user activation (dispatch). */
export declare const VIEW_PROOF_FLAG_USER_ACTIVATION = 1;
/** The label a view key is derived under: `HMAC(secret, label ‖ 0x00 ‖ P)`. */
export declare const VIEW_KEY_LABEL_V1 = "ai.ggui/view-key/v1";
/** The label a secret's default key id is derived under. */
export declare const VIEW_KID_LABEL_V1 = "ai.ggui/kid/v1";
/** The label the bound arguments are MACed under. */
export declare const VIEW_ARGS_LABEL_V1 = "ai.ggui/view-args/v1";
/** The label the call is MACed under. */
export declare const VIEW_CALL_LABEL_V1 = "ai.ggui/view-call/v1";
/**
 * The Plane-3 result code a runtime tool answers when a proof is required
 * and not valid (SPEC §7.9: a result field on the tool's closed output,
 * never thrown). Declared on `ggui_runtime_submit_action` and
 * `ggui_runtime_sync_context` one release before any server emits it. It
 * is not an auth-class refusal: the caller owns the session, and the
 * runtime acts on it by re-mounting.
 */
export declare const VIEW_ORIGIN_UNPROVEN: "VIEW_ORIGIN_UNPROVEN";
/**
 * The arguments each tool's proof binds, frozen for v1. `bound(tool, args)`
 * is the object of the listed keys that are present and not `undefined`.
 * Bound: every field the protocol forbids a relay to change. Left out:
 * `ggui_runtime_pull`'s `wait`, which a relay MUST clamp to its own
 * timeout. Changing a tool's row is a new label (`/v2`): its signed bytes
 * change. Adding a row for a NEW tool is not (ggui#1609): no earlier signer
 * sends that tool and no earlier verifier accepts it, so no existing proof's
 * bytes move and the known-answer vectors stand.
 */
export declare const VIEW_PROOF_V1_BOUND_ARGS: {
    readonly ggui_runtime_submit_action: readonly ["kind", "payload", "sessionId", "appId", "actionId", "firedAt"];
    readonly ggui_runtime_sync_context: readonly ["sessionId", "appId", "snapshot"];
    readonly ggui_runtime_pull: readonly ["sessionId", "sinceSequence", "limit"];
    readonly ggui_runtime_report_render_failure: readonly ["sessionId", "appId", "phase", "errorName", "catches"];
};
/** A tool whose calls carry a view proof. */
export type ViewProofTool = keyof typeof VIEW_PROOF_V1_BOUND_ARGS;
/** Whether `name` is a tool whose calls carry a view proof. */
export declare function isViewProofTool(name: string): name is ViewProofTool;
/** The bound arguments: the listed keys of `args` that are present and not `undefined`. */
export declare function viewProofBoundArgs(tool: ViewProofTool, args: JsonObject): JsonObject;
/**
 * The message a view key is the HMAC of: `label ‖ 0x00 ‖ P`, keyed by the
 * UTF-8 secret that signed `P`.
 */
export declare function viewKeyInputBytes(root: string): Uint8Array;
/**
 * `A`, the bytes `argmac` MACs: `label ‖ LF ‖ JCS(bound(tool, args))`,
 * over the arguments' JSON values (RFC 8785 canonical JSON). A signer
 * normalizes first (`JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))`) and sends the
 * normalized arguments. Throws on a value JCS cannot encode.
 */
export declare function viewProofArgsBytes(tool: ViewProofTool, args: JsonObject): Uint8Array;
/** The fields of a call `callmac` covers, besides the tool name. */
export interface ViewProofCallFields {
    readonly toolName: string;
    readonly nonce: string;
    readonly vtime: string;
    readonly flags: string;
    readonly argmac: string;
}
/**
 * `M`, the bytes `callmac` MACs:
 * `label ‖ LF ‖ toolName ‖ LF ‖ nonce ‖ LF ‖ vtime ‖ LF ‖ flags ‖ LF ‖ argmac`.
 */
export declare function viewProofCallBytes(call: ViewProofCallFields): Uint8Array;
/**
 * The key-issuing doors a root can name in its `src` claim: `result` (a
 * render or update tool result) and `read` (a view's `resources/read`).
 * The only list of them. A closed set: a root naming any other value is
 * refused (`parseViewProof` reads it `malformed`, the ws token verifier
 * `malformed_claims`). So a new door's value is added here one release
 * BEFORE any door mints with it, and a door mints it only once no replica
 * that refuses it is left in the roll (VERSION-POLICY §3.6, the sender
 * obligation). Adding a value and minting with it in one release makes
 * every older replica in a roll refuse that door's tokens.
 */
export declare const VIEW_ROOT_SRC: readonly ["result", "read"];
export type ViewRootSrc = (typeof VIEW_ROOT_SRC)[number];
/** Whether a value is one of {@link VIEW_ROOT_SRC}. */
export declare function isViewRootSrc(value: unknown): value is ViewRootSrc;
/** The claims a proof's root `P` carries, as the verifier reads them. */
export interface ViewRootClaims {
    readonly sessionId: string;
    readonly appId: string;
    readonly kind: 'ws';
    readonly iat: number;
    readonly exp: number;
    readonly jti: string;
    readonly kid: string;
    /** The key-issuing door: one of {@link VIEW_ROOT_SRC}, a closed set (read its rule before widening it). */
    readonly src?: ViewRootSrc;
}
/** A parsed v1 proof: its fields, and the claims its root decodes to (not yet authenticated). */
export interface ParsedViewProofV1 {
    readonly version: 'v1';
    readonly root: string;
    readonly nonce: string;
    readonly vtime: string;
    readonly flags: string;
    readonly argmac: string;
    readonly callmac: string;
    readonly claims: ViewRootClaims;
}
/**
 * Why a proof could not be parsed. `malformed`: not a string, longer than
 * the door admits, off the door shape or the v1 grammar, or a root that is
 * not a claims object. `version_unknown`: door-shaped with a version tag
 * other than `v1`. `wrong_kind`: a root whose `kind` is not `ws`.
 */
export type ViewProofParseFailure = 'malformed' | 'version_unknown' | 'wrong_kind';
export type ViewProofParse = {
    readonly ok: true;
    readonly proof: ParsedViewProofV1;
} | {
    readonly ok: false;
    readonly reason: ViewProofParseFailure;
};
/**
 * Decode a root `P` to the claims it carries, unauthenticated: what
 * {@link parseViewProof} reads from a proof's root, and what a view reads
 * from its own root before it signs with it. `malformed`: not a root the v1
 * grammar can carry (base64url, 16 to {@link VIEW_PROOF_ROOT_MAX_CHARS}
 * characters), or not a claims object; `wrong_kind`: a root whose `kind`
 * is not `ws`. Never throws.
 */
export declare function decodeViewRootClaims(root: string): ViewRootClaims | ViewProofParseFailure;
/**
 * Parse a proof value without authenticating it. The root's claims are
 * decoded only so a verifier can pick a secret and name a reason; nothing
 * here is trusted until `callmac` checks.
 */
export declare function parseViewProof(value: JsonValue | undefined): ViewProofParse;
/** Assemble a v1 proof string from its fields. */
export declare function formatViewProofV1(fields: Omit<ParsedViewProofV1, 'version' | 'claims'>): string;
/**
 * Known-answer vectors for v1, derived with `node:crypto` from the byte
 * builders above. A signer and a verifier each reproduce them: the key,
 * both tags and the proof.
 */
export declare const VIEW_PROOF_V1_VECTORS: readonly [{
    readonly name: "submit_action dispatch, render_<uuid> session";
    readonly secret: "test-secret-do-not-use";
    readonly kid: "a_lK9Gzz";
    readonly root: "eyJzZXNzaW9uSWQiOiJyZW5kZXJfM2YyYTljMWUtN2I0ZC00ZThhLTljMmYtMGQxZTJmM2E0YjVjIiwiYXBwSWQiOiJhcHBfZGVtbyIsImtpbmQiOiJ3cyIsImlhdCI6MTc5MDAwMDAwMCwiZXhwIjoxNzkwMDAwMTgwLCJqdGkiOiJBQUVDQXdRRkJnY0lDUW9MIiwia2lkIjoiYV9sSzlHenoiLCJzcmMiOiJyZXN1bHQifQ";
    readonly toolName: "ggui_runtime_submit_action";
    readonly args: {
        readonly kind: "dispatch";
        readonly payload: {
            readonly intent: "submit";
            readonly actionData: {
                readonly answer: "yes";
            };
            readonly uiContext: {
                readonly draft: "";
            };
        };
        readonly sessionId: "render_3f2a9c1e-7b4d-4e8a-9c2f-0d1e2f3a4b5c";
        readonly appId: "app_demo";
        readonly actionId: "a3f2b1d4";
        readonly firedAt: "2026-09-28T10:00:00.000Z";
    };
    readonly canonicalArgs: "{\"actionId\":\"a3f2b1d4\",\"appId\":\"app_demo\",\"firedAt\":\"2026-09-28T10:00:00.000Z\",\"kind\":\"dispatch\",\"payload\":{\"actionData\":{\"answer\":\"yes\"},\"intent\":\"submit\",\"uiContext\":{\"draft\":\"\"}},\"sessionId\":\"render_3f2a9c1e-7b4d-4e8a-9c2f-0d1e2f3a4b5c\"}";
    readonly nonce: "AAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODw";
    readonly vtime: "1790000123456";
    readonly flags: "1";
    readonly viewKey: "K-7dUBMeCtprxv4DED-VUuAjEBHGqoaWA-hHgh5t12A";
    readonly argmac: "UfHB9A4ceFnIrNTe9E7ZS8rMsbyxreQ2RpNLAyWFJeI";
    readonly callmac: "_6gyTylA8UEEKcv6e9DYZKKwtUf_0GDJ0NyEYu5hqkE";
    readonly proof: "v1.eyJzZXNzaW9uSWQiOiJyZW5kZXJfM2YyYTljMWUtN2I0ZC00ZThhLTljMmYtMGQxZTJmM2E0YjVjIiwiYXBwSWQiOiJhcHBfZGVtbyIsImtpbmQiOiJ3cyIsImlhdCI6MTc5MDAwMDAwMCwiZXhwIjoxNzkwMDAwMTgwLCJqdGkiOiJBQUVDQXdRRkJnY0lDUW9MIiwia2lkIjoiYV9sSzlHenoiLCJzcmMiOiJyZXN1bHQifQ.AAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODw.1790000123456.1.UfHB9A4ceFnIrNTe9E7ZS8rMsbyxreQ2RpNLAyWFJeI._6gyTylA8UEEKcv6e9DYZKKwtUf_0GDJ0NyEYu5hqkE";
}];
//# sourceMappingURL=view-proof.d.ts.map