/**
 * Fail-closed secret redaction for imported session content (issue #3709).
 *
 * Every string that crosses the import boundary passes through
 * {@link redactImportedText}. Patterns are conservative: a false positive costs
 * one `[REDACTED]` span in reconstructed context, a false negative leaks a
 * credential into a new session transcript, so the balance favors redaction.
 */
export declare const IMPORT_REDACTED_PLACEHOLDER = "[REDACTED]";
/** Bumped when patterns change; persisted in import provenance. */
export declare const IMPORT_SANITIZER_VERSION = 2;
export interface ImportRedactionResult {
    value: string;
    redacted: number;
    kinds: string[];
}
/**
 * Redact every known credential shape from imported text. The same placeholder
 * is used for all kinds so a partial pattern overlap cannot leak fragments.
 */
export declare function redactImportedText(input: string): ImportRedactionResult;
/** Redact a string, returning only the sanitized value. */
export declare function sanitizeImportedString(input: string): string;