/**
 * Progressive/Incremental authorization support.
 *
 * The set of app IDs a verified token may use lives in the `authorized_apps`
 * claim embedded by {@link LocalPrimaryAuth.signAccessToken}. That claim is ONLY
 * present when `incrementalAuth` is enabled for the scope — its ABSENCE is
 * meaningful: no app-level gating (the historical allow-all behavior is
 * preserved). When present, `checkToolAuthorization` enforces that the tool's
 * parent app is a member of the set, and an incremental authorize for a new app
 * mints a fresh token whose claim is the UNION of the prior apps plus the newly
 * authorized one.
 *
 * This mirrors the consent claim model (see `consent.utils.ts`): the grant is
 * carried in verified JWT claims and re-minted via the OAuth code exchange, so
 * it is genuinely enforced rather than tracked in dormant server state.
 */
/**
 * Minimal `authInfo` projection this helper reads from. The HTTP request flow
 * nests the verified user under `extra.user` (claims spread in via
 * `deriveTypedUser`, so `authorized_apps` is present there); other transports
 * may carry the user at the top level. The verified bearer `token` is the
 * last-resort source — decoding it requires NO re-verification because the
 * token already passed `session:verify` before any tool call runs.
 */
interface AuthorizedAppsAuthInfoLike {
    token?: string;
    user?: unknown;
    extra?: unknown;
}
/**
 * Extract the authorized-app-id set from a verified `authInfo`.
 *
 * Returns:
 * - a `Set<string>` of authorized app ids when the token carries an
 *   `authorized_apps` claim (the runtime enforcement set), or
 * - `undefined` when there is NO such claim — the caller MUST treat this as
 *   "allow" so the default (incremental-disabled) behavior is preserved.
 *
 * Resolution order (first hit wins): `extra.user.authorized_apps`
 * → `extra.authorized_apps` → `user.authorized_apps` → decode `token`. All
 * sources are equivalent (they derive from the same verified claims); the
 * fallbacks just make enforcement transport-agnostic.
 *
 * Security: this reads ALREADY-VERIFIED claims. The token decode path uses a
 * no-verify payload decode purely to recover the claim that some transports
 * drop from the projected `authInfo`; signature trust was established upstream
 * in `auth:verify` / `session:verify`.
 */
export declare function getAuthorizedAppIds(authInfo: AuthorizedAppsAuthInfoLike | undefined): Set<string> | undefined;
export {};
//# sourceMappingURL=authorized-apps.utils.d.ts.map