/**
 * Security helpers for spawn operations
 *
 * Provides environment variable filtering and credential masking
 * to prevent command injection and credential leakage.
 */
/**
 * Environment variables that MUST NOT be passed from user input to spawned processes.
 * These can be exploited for:
 * - Code execution hijacking (PATH, NODE_OPTIONS)
 * - Dynamic linker injection (LD_PRELOAD, DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)
 * - Interpreter code injection (PYTHONPATH, RUBYLIB)
 * - Credential/identity hijacking (HOME, AWS_CONFIG_FILE)
 * - Shell injection (BASH_ENV, ENV)
 */
export declare const DANGEROUS_ENV_VARS: Set<string>;
/**
 * Filter dangerous environment variables from a record.
 * Returns a new object with only safe environment variables.
 */
export declare function filterDangerousEnvVars(env: Record<string, string | undefined>): Record<string, string | undefined>;
/**
 * Matches the FULL agent token: prefix (16 base32) + separator (.) + secret (40 base32),
 * for both scoped-family kinds — `fjall_ak_` (scoped) and `fjall_dk_` (deploy).
 * Base32 alphabet: A-Z2-7. The `.` separator MUST be included or the secret leaks unmasked.
 * Single source of truth — all masking call sites import this. Coupled to the prefix
 * SSoT `AGENT_TOKEN_PREFIXES` at webapp/app/.server/models/auth/agent-token-kind.ts —
 * a new token kind there MUST extend this alternation.
 *
 * Public form has NO `g` flag — `.test()` consumers must not share `lastIndex` across calls.
 * The global form lives in `SCOPED_TOKEN_GLOBAL_REGEX` below for the iteration site.
 */
export declare const SCOPED_TOKEN_REGEX: RegExp;
/**
 * Marker embedded in every maskSensitiveOutput replacement except the PEM
 * branch (which uses REDACTED_KEY_SENTINEL). Exported so display surfaces
 * that detect masked values (e.g. the webapp changeset preview) import the
 * marker rather than re-declaring the literal.
 */
export declare const MASKED_VALUE_MARKER = "***";
/**
 * Sentinel embedded in the PEM-branch replacement
 * (`-----BEGIN [REDACTED] PRIVATE KEY-----`). Exported for the same
 * detection consumers as MASKED_VALUE_MARKER.
 */
export declare const REDACTED_KEY_SENTINEL = "[REDACTED]";
/**
 * Mask sensitive information in output strings to prevent credential leakage.
 * Patterns: postgres://user:pass@host, password=xxx, secret=xxx, apikey=xxx,
 * GitHub tokens (ghu_/ghs_/ghp_/gho_/github_pat_), bare AWS access-key IDs
 * (AKIA-prefixed and ASIA-prefixed), AWS secret keys (env, INI, and JSON key
 * spellings), session tokens, agent tokens (`fjall_ak_` scoped, `fjall_dk_`
 * deploy), legacy personal API keys (`fj_<8 hex>_<48 hex>`).
 *
 * Single source of truth — consumer loggers (CLI, worker, webapp) MUST
 * NOT re-implement these patterns inline. See
 * the credential-masking standard, § "Masking Patterns Live in @fjall/util".
 */
export declare function maskSensitiveOutput(output: string): string;
/**
 * Parse a shell command string into an array of arguments.
 * Handles single quotes, double quotes, and escaped characters.
 * Throws on unbalanced quotes to prevent unexpected argument splitting.
 */
export declare function parseShellArgs(command: string): string[];