/**
 * Stripe Checkout Session capture.
 *
 * WHY THIS EXISTS
 * syncStripePaymentLinks stamps `client_reference_id` onto buy.stripe.com
 * anchors, and deliberately never onto checkout.stripe.com — a Checkout Session
 * URL ignores the param because the session already exists server-side. That
 * leaves the single most common SaaS pattern uncovered: the merchant's backend
 * creates a Session and the browser is sent to checkout.stripe.com/c/pay/cs_...
 * The payment then reaches our webhook with no visitor at all.
 *
 * Measured 2026-07-25, 30d: of payers arriving via Stripe webhooks, 0.5% (one
 * tenant, 128/28,187) and 13.3% (another, 13/98) had ANY web pageview on the
 * same visitor. Not a misconfiguration — no tenant is wired, because being
 * wired currently requires the merchant to hand-write client_reference_id.
 *
 * WHAT THIS DOES
 * The session id must reach the browser for the redirect to happen at all, so
 * we observe it rather than trying to inject anything:
 *   1. fetch/XHR response bodies      — `{url}` or `{sessionId}` from the
 *                                       merchant's own create-session endpoint
 *   2. anchor clicks + window.open    — direct links to checkout.stripe.com
 * A server-side 302 straight to Stripe never exposes the id to JS and is NOT
 * covered here; that case falls back to the email bridge.
 *
 * WHY THIS IS SAFE TO DEFAULT ON, WHEN autoIdentifyAPI IS NOT
 * autoIdentifyAPI scans the same traffic for EMAILS, which is why it defaults
 * off: an admin viewing a customer record gets identified as that customer, and
 * a wrong email propagates into Meta advanced matching. A `cs_live_...` token is
 * unambiguous, belongs to exactly one checkout, and is not PII. There is no
 * mis-identification failure mode to guard against — only the wrapper itself,
 * which is why every hook below is transparent and failure-isolated.
 */
export type StripeSessionSink = (sessionId: string) => void;
export interface StripeSessionWatcherOptions {
    /** Emit at most this many distinct session ids per page. */
    maxSessions?: number;
    /** Test seam. */
    maxScanBytes?: number;
}
export declare function extractSessionId(text: string | null | undefined): string | null;
/**
 * True when `href` points at a Stripe-hosted checkout. Uses the URL API and
 * exact host equality — `a[href*="checkout.stripe.com"]` would match
 * `evil.com/checkout.stripe.com/x` and `checkout.stripe.com.evil.com`.
 */
export declare function isCheckoutUrl(href: string, base?: string): boolean;
export declare class StripeSessionWatcher {
    private sink?;
    private seen;
    private disposers;
    private started;
    private readonly maxSessions;
    private readonly maxScanBytes;
    constructor(options?: StripeSessionWatcherOptions);
    start(sink: StripeSessionSink): void;
    stop(): void;
    /** Report a session id at most once, and never more than maxSessions per page. */
    private emit;
    /**
     * Scan a Response WITHOUT disturbing the merchant's own read. `clone()` must
     * happen synchronously, before the caller can consume the body; the read of
     * the clone is deliberately not awaited by the caller.
     */
    private scanResponse;
    private hookFetch;
    private hookXhr;
    /**
     * Direct links to checkout.stripe.com. Capture phase so we still see the click
     * when the merchant's own handler calls stopPropagation().
     */
    private hookClicks;
    private hookWindowOpen;
}
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