/* tslint:disable */
/* eslint-disable */

/* auto-generated by NAPI-RS */

/**
 * Per-statement options for `Connection.executeStatement`.
 *
 * Mirrors the kernel `StatementSpec` knobs that are safe to thread
 * through napi without a kernel-side change. Today this covers:
 * - `statementConf` — per-statement Spark conf overlay
 *   (`StatementSpec.statement_conf` → SEA `parameters` /
 *   Thrift `confOverlay`)
 * - `queryTags` — convenience wrapper over `statementConf` with
 *   key `query_tags`; serialised to the same comma-separated
 *   `key:value` wire shape NodeJS Thrift's `serializeQueryTags`
 *   produces (`lib/utils/queryTags.ts`). Backslashes in keys are
 *   doubled; backslash/colon/comma in values are backslash-escaped.
 *
 * `rowLimit` (SEA `row_limit`) is exposed here and threaded onto the kernel
 * `StatementSpec`. `positionalParams` (`?`) and `namedParams` (`:name`)
 * carry bound query parameters, decoded via `params::parse_typed_value`.
 * (There is no `queryTimeoutSecs`: it abused the SEA `wait_timeout` inline-hold
 * window and was removed — a real per-statement timeout is `STATEMENT_TIMEOUT`.)
 *
 * **Tag-order caveat (M4 parity note).** The napi `queryTags` field
 * is a Rust `HashMap<String, String>` whose iteration order is
 * non-deterministic, so the serialised `query_tags` value may have
 * a different key order than Thrift's `serializeQueryTags` (which
 * iterates `Object.keys(...)` in insertion order) for the same
 * input. The SEA server is order-insensitive on conf values, so
 * the two are functionally equivalent. If a caller needs
 * byte-identical Thrift parity, the JS adapter pre-serialises via
 * `serializeQueryTags` and writes the result into
 * `statementConf["query_tags"]` directly — see
 * `KernelSessionBackend.executeStatement` in the NodeJS driver. This
 * path is the one the production code uses.
 */
export interface ExecuteOptions {
  /**
   * Per-statement Spark conf overlay. Merged on top of the
   * session-level `sessionConf` at execute time; this map wins
   * on key collisions. Unknown keys are rejected by the server.
   */
  statementConf?: Record<string, string>
  /**
   * Query tags as key→value pairs. Serialised to a comma-
   * separated `key:value` string (backslash-escaping `\`, `:`,
   * `,`) and placed into `statementConf["query_tags"]`, matching
   * NodeJS Thrift's `serializeQueryTags` wire shape. Passing
   * both `queryTags` AND a `query_tags` key in `statementConf`
   * raises `InvalidArgument` — the caller's intent is ambiguous
   * so we refuse to silently pick one over the other.
   *
   * A **`null`** value emits a **bare key** (no colon) — e.g.
   * `{ production: null }` → `"production"` — matching the
   * connectors' `key`-only tag form.
   *
   * See the struct-level "Tag-order caveat" for the
   * HashMap-iteration-order vs `Object.keys`-iteration-order
   * divergence and the byte-identical-Thrift-parity workaround.
   */
  queryTags?: Record<string, string | undefined | null>
  /**
   * Server-side cap on the number of rows this statement returns
   * (SEA `row_limit`), independent of any SQL `LIMIT`. Maps to
   * `StatementSpec.row_limit`. Omitted ⇒ no driver-imposed cap.
   */
  rowLimit?: number
  /**
   * Positional parameters, in 1-based wire order. Index `i` in this
   * Vec corresponds to the `i+1`-th `?` placeholder in the SQL.
   * Each entry is a `{ sqlType, value }` pair — `value` is the
   * string-encoded literal or `null` for SQL NULL. Mirrors
   * `StatementSpec::positional_params`; decoded via [`parse_typed_value`].
   */
  positionalParams?: Array<TypedValueInput>
  /**
   * Named parameters (`:name` placeholders). Each carries its `name`
   * alongside the `{ sqlType, value? }` pair. Mapped to a kernel
   * `TypedValue` via the same [`parse_typed_value`] codec and bound with
   * `StatementSpec::param_named`. Named is the SEA-spec-required public
   * param form (`StatementParameter.name` is `openapi_required`);
   * positional is the documented-undocumented variant. The two are
   * mutually exclusive at the SQL level (`?` vs `:name`).
   */
  namedParams?: Array<NamedTypedValueInput>
}
/**
 * A named bound parameter — a [`TypedValueInput`] plus its `:name`. Kept a
 * distinct napi object (rather than an optional `name` on `TypedValueInput`)
 * so the positional surface stays a clean ordered list with no name field.
 */
export interface NamedTypedValueInput {
  name: string
  sqlType: string
  value?: string
}
/**
 * Authentication mode selector crossing the napi boundary. The string
 * literals are what napi-rs emits from this `#[napi(string_enum)]` — the
 * NodeJS SEA adapter (`KernelAuth`) matches them verbatim (`'Pat'`,
 * `'OAuthM2m'`, `'OAuthU2m'`).
 *
 * Mirrors the kernel [`AuthConfig`] variants this binding supports.
 * `OAuthFederation` / `External` are intentionally not exposed yet — the
 * kernel marks federation as not-yet-implemented and `External` is a
 * Rust-trait escape hatch with no JS-callback bridge.
 */
export const enum AuthMode {
  /** Personal access token (`token`). */
  Pat = 'Pat',
  /** OAuth 2.0 machine-to-machine — `oauthClientId` + `oauthClientSecret`. */
  OAuthM2m = 'OAuthM2m',
  /**
   * OAuth 2.0 user-to-machine (browser flow) — optional `oauthClientId`
   * + `oauthRedirectPort`.
   */
  OAuthU2m = 'OAuthU2m'
}
/**
 * A single extra HTTP header as an explicit `{ name, value }` pair.
 *
 * An ordered list of these (`ConnectionOptions.custom_headers`) mirrors
 * the kernel core's `Vec<(String, String)>` and the pyo3 binding's
 * `http_headers`: order is preserved and duplicate `name`s are allowed.
 * A struct (rather than a raw `[name, value]` tuple) because napi-rs
 * does not marshal Rust tuples through `#[napi(object)]` fields; the
 * struct is the idiomatic, self-documenting equivalent and maps to a JS
 * `{ name: string, value: string }`.
 */
export interface HeaderEntry {
  name: string
  value: string
}
/**
 * Programmatic HTTP/HTTPS proxy configuration, mirroring the kernel's
 * internal [`ProxyConfig`]. Supplied as a structured object rather than a
 * flattened URL so credentials never have to be percent-encoded into the URL
 * and the bypass-host list can be expressed.
 *
 * - `url` — proxy endpoint, e.g. `"http://proxy.corp.example.com:8080"`. Must
 *   use the `http://` or `https://` scheme.
 * - `username` / `password` — optional proxy basic-auth, applied via
 *   `reqwest`'s `Proxy::basic_auth` (not embedded in the URL).
 * - `bypassHosts` — optional comma-separated host/domain list that should
 *   bypass the proxy (e.g. `"localhost,*.internal.corp"`).
 */
export interface ProxyInput {
  url: string
  username?: string
  password?: string
  bypassHosts?: string
}
/**
 * JS-visible options for opening a Databricks SQL session.
 *
 * Authentication is selected by `authMode` (default [`AuthMode::Pat`]):
 * - `Pat` — `token` required.
 * - `OAuthM2m` — `oauthClientId` + `oauthClientSecret` required.
 * - `OAuthU2m` — `oauthClientId` / `oauthRedirectPort` optional
 *   (defaults to the `databricks-sql-connector` client on port 8020).
 *
 * Catalog / schema / sessionConf are applied once at session creation
 * and remain in effect for every statement run on the resulting
 * `Connection`. The SEA wire protocol carries them on
 * `CreateSession`, not on `ExecuteStatement` — so there is no
 * per-statement override path on this binding.
 */
export interface ConnectionOptions {
  /**
   * Workspace host, e.g. `adb-…azuredatabricks.net`. The kernel
   * normalises this — bare hostnames get `https://` prepended.
   */
  hostName: string
  /**
   * JDBC-style HTTP path, e.g. `/sql/1.0/warehouses/abc123`. The
   * kernel parses out the warehouse id.
   */
  httpPath: string
  /**
   * Authentication mode. Omitted ⇒ [`AuthMode::Pat`] (back-compat:
   * existing PAT callers pass only `token`).
   */
  authMode?: AuthMode
  /**
   * Personal access token. Required (and non-empty) for
   * [`AuthMode::Pat`]; ignored otherwise.
   */
  token?: string
  /**
   * OAuth client id. Required for [`AuthMode::OAuthM2m`]; optional for
   * [`AuthMode::OAuthU2m`] (defaults to `databricks-sql-connector`).
   */
  oauthClientId?: string
  /** OAuth client secret. Required for [`AuthMode::OAuthM2m`]. */
  oauthClientSecret?: string
  /**
   * Localhost callback port for the [`AuthMode::OAuthU2m`] browser
   * flow. Omitted ⇒ kernel default (8020).
   */
  oauthRedirectPort?: number
  /**
   * OAuth scopes override (M2M / U2M). Omitted ⇒ kernel defaults
   * (`["all-apis"]` for M2M; `["all-apis", "offline_access"]` for U2M).
   */
  oauthScopes?: Array<string>
  /**
   * Default catalog for statements executed on this session.
   * Routed through the kernel's `DefaultOpts` and onto the SEA
   * `CreateSession.catalog` wire field.
   */
  catalog?: string
  /**
   * Default schema for statements executed on this session.
   * Routed through the kernel's `DefaultOpts` and onto the SEA
   * `CreateSession.schema` wire field.
   */
  schema?: string
  /**
   * Server-bound session conf (Spark conf, `ANSI_MODE`, `TIMEZONE`,
   * query-tag presets, …). Forwarded verbatim to SEA
   * `session_confs`. Unknown keys are rejected server-side.
   */
  sessionConf?: Record<string, string>
  /**
   * Maximum number of pooled HTTP connections per host. Routes
   * through the kernel's [`HttpConfig::pool_max_idle_per_host`].
   * Tunes the underlying `reqwest` connection pool — higher values
   * reduce reconnect overhead when many statements run
   * concurrently against the same warehouse.
   *
   * When the JS caller does NOT provide `maxConnections`, the napi
   * binding applies a NodeJS-driver-appropriate default of
   * [`NAPI_DEFAULT_POOL_MAX_IDLE_PER_HOST`] (100) — chosen to match
   * the JDBC driver's `HttpConnectionPoolSize` default and to close
   * the throughput gap vs the NodeJS Thrift driver's
   * `maxSockets: Infinity` pool for bursty workloads. The kernel
   * core's [`HttpConfig::pool_max_idle_per_host`] default is also 100
   * (matching the same JDBC default), so napi pins its own copy rather
   * than inheriting it. Mirrors the Python connector's
   * `max_connections` kwarg on the SEA backend, which exposes the
   * knob but keeps its own urllib3-aligned default of 10.
   *
   * Napi-rs serialises `u32` as JS `number`; values up to
   * `2^32 - 1` round-trip safely (any reasonable pool size fits).
   */
  maxConnections?: number
  /**
   * Render `INTERVAL` / `DURATION` result columns as strings
   * (`ResultConfig.intervals_as_string`). The kernel default is
   * native Arrow `month_interval` / `duration[us]` types; the NodeJS
   * Thrift driver surfaces intervals as strings, so the SEA driver
   * sets this `true` for byte-compatible parity. Omitted ⇒ kernel
   * default (native Arrow interval types).
   */
  intervalsAsString?: boolean
  /**
   * Render complex (`ARRAY` / `MAP` / `STRUCT` / `VARIANT`) result
   * columns as JSON strings (`ResultConfig.complex_types_as_json`)
   * instead of native Arrow nested types. Omitted ⇒ kernel default
   * (native Arrow nested types, which the NodeJS Arrow decoder
   * already renders identically to the Thrift path).
   */
  complexTypesAsJson?: boolean
  /**
   * Whether to verify the server's TLS certificate.
   *
   * Omitted / `true` ⇒ strict validation against the system / Mozilla
   * trust store (full chain + expiry + hostname), matching JDBC / ODBC
   * and every modern HTTPS client. This is the **default** for the SEA
   * backend — secure by default.
   *
   * `false` ⇒ permissive: accept self-signed / untrusted / expired
   * certs AND skip the hostname-vs-SNI check. This is **insecure** (no
   * protection against active MITM); it exists only as an opt-out for
   * parity with the legacy NodeJS Thrift driver, which hard-codes
   * `rejectUnauthorized: false`. Prefer pairing strict checking with
   * `custom_ca_cert` over disabling verification entirely.
   *
   * This is the master verify toggle: `false` disables chain validation
   * (`TlsConfig::accept_self_signed`) **and** subsumes the hostname
   * check (`skip_hostname_verification`), regardless of
   * `check_server_certificate_hostname`.
   */
  checkServerCertificate?: boolean
  /**
   * Whether to verify that the server certificate matches the host
   * (hostname-vs-SNI check), **independently** of full chain validation.
   *
   * Omitted / `true` ⇒ the hostname check runs (the secure default).
   * `false` ⇒ skip only the hostname check while still validating the
   * chain + expiry against the trust store — for connecting via an IP
   * literal or a host the cert wasn't issued for, without dropping all
   * validation. Ignored (already implied) when
   * `check_server_certificate` is `false`, which disables everything.
   *
   * Mirrors the Python connector's `_tls_verify_hostname` knob and the
   * kernel's [`TlsConfig::skip_hostname_verification`] (= `!check`).
   */
  checkServerCertificateHostname?: boolean
  /**
   * PEM-encoded CA certificate bytes to add to the trust store on
   * top of the system roots. Use for corporate TLS-inspecting
   * proxies that re-sign TLS, or on-prem deployments with an
   * internal CA. Honoured regardless of `check_server_certificate`.
   * Maps onto the kernel [`TlsConfig::custom_ca_cert`].
   */
  customCaCert?: Buffer
  /**
   * PEM-encoded client certificate for mutual TLS (mTLS). Set this
   * together with `client_key_pem` when the server requires the
   * client to present a certificate. A PEM carrying a leaf cert
   * optionally followed by its intermediate chain is accepted.
   * Maps onto the kernel [`TlsConfig::client_cert_pem`].
   *
   * `client_cert_pem` and `client_key_pem` must be supplied together;
   * the kernel rejects setting only one at `open_session` with
   * `InvalidArgument`.
   */
  clientCertPem?: Buffer
  /**
   * PEM-encoded private key for the mTLS client certificate. Set this
   * together with `client_cert_pem`. For portability across the
   * kernel's TLS backends supply a PKCS#8 key (`BEGIN PRIVATE KEY`).
   * Maps onto the kernel [`TlsConfig::client_key_pem`].
   */
  clientKeyPem?: Buffer
  /**
   * Extra HTTP headers to send on every request — the route for
   * caller-supplied headers (the NodeJS driver's `customHeaders` and
   * the composed `User-Agent`). Maps onto the kernel
   * [`HttpConfig::custom_headers`].
   *
   * An **ordered list** of `(name, value)` pairs, mirroring the kernel
   * core's `Vec<(String, String)>` and the pyo3 binding's
   * `http_headers` — order is preserved and duplicate names are
   * allowed (the kernel emits each entry, and for `User-Agent` folds
   * the **last** one into its base UA).
   *
   * Three names are handled specially by the kernel:
   * - `Authorization` / `x-databricks-org-id` are **reserved** — a
   *   caller entry for either is silently dropped (skip-and-warn) so
   *   auth and multi-tenant routing can't be hijacked by a custom
   *   header. (The NodeJS driver also drops these before they cross
   *   the FFI, matching the Python connector's double-wall.)
   * - `User-Agent` is **appended** to the kernel base UA (rather than
   *   replacing it), preserving the `DatabricksJDBCDriverOSS/...`
   *   token the SEA server keys on while still surfacing the caller's
   *   identity. The NodeJS driver folds its `userAgentEntry` into a
   *   `User-Agent` entry here.
   */
  customHeaders?: Array<HeaderEntry>
  /**
   * Retry/backoff tuning — all optional. An unset field keeps the kernel's
   * built-in policy (1s/60s exponential backoff, 6 total attempts, 900s
   * budget). Mirrors the pyo3 binding's `retry_*` kwargs so the Node.js
   * driver can forward the same retry knobs the Python connector does.
   *
   * Lower bound of the exponential backoff (also clamps a server
   * `Retry-After`). Maps onto [`HttpConfig::retry_min_wait`].
   */
  retryMinWaitSecs?: number
  /**
   * Upper bound of the exponential backoff. Maps onto
   * [`HttpConfig::retry_max_wait`].
   */
  retryMaxWaitSecs?: number
  /**
   * **Total** number of attempts (matching the connector's
   * `_retry_stop_after_attempts_count` and JDBC count semantics). The
   * kernel's [`HttpConfig::retry_max_retries`] counts retries *after* the
   * first attempt, so this is converted with `max(0, attempts - 1)` in
   * [`build_http_config`] — `0` / `1` both mean a single attempt, no retry.
   */
  retryMaxAttempts?: number
  /**
   * Overall retry budget in whole seconds. Maps onto
   * [`HttpConfig::overall_timeout`].
   */
  retryOverallTimeoutSecs?: number
  /**
   * Programmatic HTTP/HTTPS proxy ([`ProxyInput`]) to route all kernel
   * traffic through. Carries the proxy `url`, optional basic-auth
   * `username` / `password`, and an optional `bypassHosts` list — mapped
   * field-for-field onto the kernel [`ProxyConfig`].
   *
   * Omitted ⇒ the kernel does NOT configure a proxy explicitly and
   * `reqwest`'s standard behaviour applies — the `HTTPS_PROXY` /
   * `HTTP_PROXY` / `NO_PROXY` environment variables are still honoured.
   * Setting this **overrides** those env vars. This complements the env-var
   * path: callers who cannot set process env vars (e.g. a long-lived Node
   * server) can now route a single connection through a proxy
   * programmatically.
   */
  proxy?: ProxyInput
  /**
   * Per-connection socket read timeout, in milliseconds. Caps how
   * long a single HTTP round-trip may block waiting on the server
   * before the request errors out. Maps onto the kernel
   * [`HttpConfig::request_timeout`] (the internal reqwest
   * `Client::timeout`).
   *
   * Omitted ⇒ kernel default (120 000 ms / 120 s). Napi-rs
   * serialises `u32` as JS `number`; the largest representable value
   * (~49.7 days) far exceeds any sensible socket timeout.
   */
  socketTimeoutMs?: number
}
/**
 * Open a Databricks SQL session and return an opaque `Connection`
 * wrapping the kernel `Session`. Authentication is selected by
 * `options.auth_mode` (PAT / OAuth M2M / OAuth U2M) — see
 * [`build_auth_config`].
 *
 * The JS-visible name is `openSession` (napi-rs converts snake_case
 * to camelCase for free functions).
 */
export declare function openSession(options: ConnectionOptions): Promise<Connection>
/**
 * One kernel log event, as handed to JS. `level` is a lower-case string
 * (`error`/`warn`/`info`/`debug`/`trace`) the Node side maps onto its
 * `LogLevel`; `target` is the originating `tracing` target (e.g.
 * `databricks::sql::kernel`); `message` is the rendered event plus any
 * structured `key=value` fields.
 */
export interface LogRecord {
  level: string
  target: string
  message: string
}
/**
 * Install (idempotently) the kernel→JS log bridge and set its level.
 *
 * `callback` is invoked with **an array of [`LogRecord`]s** (`(err, records)`)
 * for each forwarded batch. `level` is one of
 * `off`/`error`/`warn`/`info`/`debug`/`trace` (case-insensitive); unknown
 * values fall back to `warn`.
 *
 * Safe to call more than once: the process-global subscriber is installed on
 * the first call only, while every call refreshes the sink + level (last
 * writer wins — see module docs).
 */
export declare function initKernelLogging(callback: (err: Error | null, arg: Array<LogRecord>) => any, level: string): void
/**
 * Snapshot of the bridge's runtime state for observability.
 *
 * `installed` is `true` only when the process-global subscriber was
 * successfully installed by *this* bridge (and the drain thread started);
 * `false` means another global subscriber was already set or the drain
 * thread could not be spawned, so kernel logs are NOT reaching the JS sink.
 * `dropped` is the cumulative count of records discarded because the
 * bounded channel was full during a burst (drop-newest) — a nonzero,
 * growing value signals the sink can't keep up.
 */
export interface KernelLoggingStats {
  installed: boolean
  dropped: number
}
/**
 * Return the bridge's [`KernelLoggingStats`]. Safe to call before
 * `initKernelLogging` (reports `installed: false`, `dropped: 0`).
 */
export declare function kernelLoggingStats(): KernelLoggingStats
/**
 * Live-retarget the bridge's level (one of
 * `off`/`error`/`warn`/`info`/`debug`/`trace`, case-insensitive).
 */
export declare function setKernelLogLevel(level: string): void
/**
 * JS-visible binding for a single positional parameter.
 *
 * Shape mirrors the `TSparkParameter` wire object the Thrift backend
 * already emits via `DBSQLParameter.toSparkParameter()` — `type` is the
 * canonical Databricks SQL type name (`"INT"`, `"STRING"`,
 * `"DECIMAL(10,2)"`, ...), `value` is the string-encoded literal or
 * `None` for SQL NULL.
 *
 * Why a string for `value` instead of a tagged JS union: round-tripping
 * arbitrary JS values across the FFI requires either (a) a custom
 * napi `FromNapiValue` per arm, or (b) a `serde_json::Value`-style
 * dynamic dispatch on the Rust side. The Node-driver adapter already
 * stringifies before calling the binding (see `DBSQLParameter` and the
 * existing pyo3 wrapper), so the string-in / string-parsed contract
 * adds no JS-side complexity and keeps the kernel-side validation in
 * one place.
 */
export interface TypedValueInput {
  /**
   * Canonical Databricks SQL type name. Case-insensitive for the
   * simple variants; for DECIMAL the parenthesised form
   * (`"DECIMAL(10,2)"`) is required so the kernel can extract
   * precision/scale.
   */
  sqlType: string
  /**
   * String-encoded value. `None` always produces `TypedValue::Null`
   * regardless of `sql_type` — matches the connector's
   * `VoidParameter` shape and the pyo3 binding's contract.
   */
  value?: string
}
/**
 * A single Arrow IPC stream payload encoding one record batch (plus
 * the schema header so the JS-side reader is stateless).
 */
export interface ArrowBatch {
  /**
   * Arrow IPC stream payload (schema header + 1 record-batch
   * message). Decode with `apache-arrow`'s `RecordBatchReader`.
   */
  ipcBytes: Buffer
}
/**
 * An Arrow IPC stream payload encoding just the result schema (no
 * record-batch messages). Returned by `Statement.schema()`.
 */
export interface ArrowSchema {
  /**
   * Arrow IPC stream payload (schema header only, no record-batch
   * messages). Decode with `apache-arrow`'s `RecordBatchReader` —
   * the reader will expose the schema and immediately end.
   */
  ipcBytes: Buffer
}
/**
 * Returns the native binding's crate version (`CARGO_PKG_VERSION`).
 *
 * Originally the round-1b smoke test; kept as a cheap "is the binding
 * loaded?" probe for the JS-side loader's structured diagnostics.
 */
export declare function version(): string
/**
 * Opaque async-statement handle.
 *
 * Returned by `Connection.submitStatement(...)` after the kernel
 * `Statement::submit()` returns (server sent `wait_timeout=0s`, so
 * the response carries a `statement_id` but the statement is still
 * `Pending`/`Running`). JS drives polling via `status()` /
 * `awaitResult()`.
 *
 * Concurrency shape: `status()`, `awaitResult()`, and `close()` take
 * `inner.lock()` and hold the guard across the kernel `.await` (tokio
 * `Mutex` is FIFO), so `status()` / `close()` queue behind any
 * in-flight `awaitResult()` until it returns naturally. `cancel()` is
 * the deliberate exception: it does **not** touch `inner` — it fires
 * through the detached `AsyncStatementCanceller` (session +
 * statement_id, captured at construction), so an explicit
 * `stmt.cancel()` interrupts an in-flight `awaitResult()` instead of
 * queueing behind it. The server-side cancel flips the statement
 * terminal, which the parked `awaitResult()` poll loop observes
 * (`Cancelled`) and returns on. The kernel's `AwaitResultCancelGuard`
 * still covers the drop-cancel case (Promise.race / timeout)
 * independently — see module docs.
 */
export declare class AsyncStatement {
  /**
   * Server-issued statement id. Cached at construction; readable
   * even after `close()` so JS-side log lines can correlate
   * against kernel / server logs which key on the same id.
   */
  get statementId(): string
  /**
   * One-shot status check. Returns a string enum matching the
   * kernel `StatementStatus` shape:
   * `'Pending' | 'Running' | 'Succeeded' | 'Failed' |
   * 'Cancelled' | 'Closed' | 'Unknown'`. (`'Unknown'` is the
   * `#[non_exhaustive]` forward-compat catch-all that
   * `StatementStatus::as_str` can return — consumers switching on
   * the state must handle it.) Returns
   * `KernelError(InvalidStatementHandle)` if the statement has
   * been explicitly `close()`d.
   *
   * The `Failed` variant collapses to the string `'Failed'` on
   * the JS side; the underlying error envelope (sql_state /
   * error_code / query_id) is surfaced by `awaitResult()`'s
   * rejection, which is where callers actually need the typed
   * error. `status()` is intended for polling progress UIs
   * that only need the state name.
   */
  status(): Promise<string>
  /** Rows modified by the statement (UPDATE / INSERT / DELETE / MERGE). */
  numModifiedRows(): Promise<number | null>
  /**
   * Server-supplied user-facing message (may contain SQL fragments —
   * redact before centralised logging).
   */
  displayMessage(): Promise<string | null>
  /** Server-supplied diagnostic detail. */
  diagnosticInfo(): Promise<string | null>
  /** Server-supplied structured error detail (JSON), when enabled. */
  errorDetailsJson(): Promise<string | null>
  /**
   * Block until the server reaches a terminal state, then return
   * an `AsyncResultHandle` that wraps the materialised result
   * stream. The handle exposes `fetchNextBatch()` / `schema()`
   * for consuming the result, plus `statementId` for log
   * correlation.
   *
   * Drop-cancel safety: kernel `await_result` installs
   * `AwaitResultCancelGuard` which fires a fire-and-forget
   * `cancel_statement` if the future is dropped mid-poll
   * (timeout, tokio::select! loser, JS-side `Promise.race`
   * loser). The `util::guarded` `catch_unwind` here covers the
   * V8-panic-across-boundary case on top. Returns
   * `KernelError(InvalidStatementHandle)` if the statement has
   * been explicitly `close()`d.
   */
  awaitResult(): Promise<AsyncResultHandle>
  /**
   * Server-side cancel. Returns
   * `KernelError(InvalidStatementHandle)` if the statement has
   * been explicitly `close()`d. Idempotent against a server
   * that already reached a terminal state — the kernel's
   * `cancel_statement` is a no-op there.
   *
   * **Lock-free by design.** Unlike `status()` / `awaitResult()` /
   * `close()`, this does not take `inner.lock()` — it fires through
   * the detached `AsyncStatementCanceller` captured at construction.
   * That lets `stmt.cancel()` interrupt an in-flight `awaitResult()`
   * (which holds the mutex for the whole poll) instead of queueing
   * behind it: the server-side cancel flips the statement terminal,
   * the parked `awaitResult()` poll loop observes `Cancelled` and
   * returns. The closed-state check reads a lock-free flag so a
   * cancel after an explicit `close()` still surfaces
   * `InvalidStatementHandle`.
   */
  cancel(): Promise<void>
  /**
   * Explicit close. Idempotent — a second call on an
   * already-closed handle returns `Ok(())`. On `Err`, the napi
   * inner is already `None`, so a JS-side retry sees the
   * closed-handle short-circuit and returns `Ok(())` without
   * re-attempting the wire call. The kernel's own `Drop`
   * fire-and-forget retry runs once in the background.
   */
  close(): Promise<void>
}
/**
 * Opaque result-fetch handle returned by
 * `AsyncStatement.awaitResult()`. Wraps a kernel `ResultStream`
 * directly; structurally analogous to the sync `Statement`'s
 * fetch-side surface (`fetchNextBatch` / `schema` /
 * `statementId`).
 *
 * `cancel()` / `close()` are not exposed: the parent
 * `AsyncStatement` owns server-side lifecycle. A `close()` here
 * would create dual-ownership of the same statement_id with
 * inconsistent close semantics. Callers `close()` the parent
 * `AsyncStatement` after they're done fetching.
 *
 * Schema is cached at construction so it survives the underlying
 * stream being drained; mirrors the sync `Statement.schema()`
 * post-close contract.
 */
export declare class AsyncResultHandle {
  /**
   * Server-issued statement id. Cached at construction; readable
   * for log correlation. Matches the parent `AsyncStatement`'s
   * `statementId`.
   */
  get statementId(): string
  /**
   * Pull the next batch of results. Returns `null` when the
   * stream is exhausted. The returned `ArrowBatch.ipcBytes` is a
   * complete Arrow IPC stream (schema header + 1 record-batch
   * message), suitable for handing to `apache-arrow`'s
   * `RecordBatchReader`. Byte-identical to the sync
   * `Statement.fetchNextBatch()` payload for the same query.
   */
  fetchNextBatch(): Promise<ArrowBatch | null>
  /**
   * Result schema as an Arrow IPC payload (schema header only,
   * no record-batch message). Available before any batches have
   * been fetched. Sync because the body has no `.await` —
   * `encode_ipc_stream` is pure CPU work over the cached
   * `Arc<Schema>`.
   */
  schema(): ArrowSchema
}
/**
 * Handle returned by `Connection.executeStatementCancellable`. Owns the
 * built-but-not-yet-executed kernel `Statement` plus a detached
 * [`StatementCanceller`] captured before dispatch, so JS can fire a
 * server-side cancel while the blocking `result()` is in flight.
 *
 * `pending` is `Arc<Mutex<Option<KernelStatement>>>` so `result()` can
 * `.take()` the statement (the kernel `execute()` borrows it `&mut`,
 * then it moves into the produced `Statement` wrapper to keep its
 * `ValidityFlag` set — see `statement.rs`). A second `result()` call
 * after the first resolved surfaces `InvalidStatementHandle`.
 */
export declare class CancellableExecution {
  /**
   * The server-issued statement id this execution targets, if the
   * server has issued one yet (`null` before the initial submit
   * round-trip publishes it mid-`result()`). Useful for log
   * correlation while the blocking drive is in flight.
   */
  get statementId(): string | null
  /**
   * Drive the blocking `execute()` and resolve to a `Statement`
   * (identical to what `executeStatement` returns) once the kernel
   * reaches a terminal state and the result stream is ready.
   *
   * Consumes the pending statement: a second `result()` call returns
   * `KernelError(InvalidStatementHandle)`. The future is
   * drop-cancel-safe — the kernel's per-execute `MidExecuteCancelState`
   * guard fires a fire-and-forget `cancel_statement` if this future is
   * dropped mid-flight (`Promise.race` / timeout loser), independently
   * of an explicit `cancel()`.
   *
   * On a server-side cancel the kernel's blocking `execute()` currently
   * surfaces `InvalidArgument` (a known kernel quirk — the async path
   * returns `Cancelled`). When this handle's `cancel()` actually dispatched a
   * server-side cancel, we normalise that into `Cancelled` here so JS callers
   * can rely on a single cancelled-status code regardless of execution path.
   *
   * Three outcomes can race the blocking drive: (1) a natural terminal state
   * → `Ok` or the genuine error; (2) an explicit `cancel()` that dispatched a
   * server cancel → this `result()` rejects with a `Cancelled`-coded error
   * (the normalisation above); (3) the future being **dropped** mid-flight
   * (`Promise.race`/timeout loser) → the kernel's `MidExecuteCancelState`
   * drop-guard fires a fire-and-forget `cancel_statement`, but there is no
   * `result()` left to observe a code. Only (2) yields a `Cancelled` error.
   */
  result(): Promise<Statement>
  /**
   * Server-side cancel of the in-flight statement.
   *
   * Lock-free: fires the detached `StatementCanceller` captured at
   * construction rather than taking the mutex `result()` holds, so it
   * interrupts a still-running blocking `result()` instead of queueing
   * behind it. No-op (returns `Ok`) if `result()` already finished
   * successfully, or if no statement id has been observed yet (query still
   * in its initial submit round-trip), and idempotent against a server
   * already in a terminal state.
   */
  cancel(): Promise<void>
}
/**
 * Opaque connection handle wrapping a kernel `Session`.
 *
 * `inner` is `Arc<Mutex<Option<Session>>>` so:
 * - the Drop impl can clone the `Arc` and `.take()` the session on a
 *   background tokio task without holding `&mut self` (which Drop is
 *   forbidden from doing across an `await`),
 * - `close()` can `.take()` the session to consume it for the kernel's
 *   move-by-value `Session::close(self)` signature.
 *
 * **Concurrency shape** — both `executeStatement` and
 * `submitStatement` build the kernel `Statement` under `inner.lock()`
 * and then RELEASE the guard before the wire call
 * (`stmt.execute().await` / `stmt.submit().await`). `Session::statement()`
 * is `&self`-callable and only clones the session's internal `Arc`, so
 * the built statement is independent of the guard. Concurrent
 * `Promise.all([executeStatement(q1), submitStatement(q2)])` therefore
 * serialise only for the microsecond statement-build, not the network
 * round-trip, and `close()` never blocks behind an in-flight execute or
 * submit. See
 * `sea-workflow/jira-candidates/2026-05-24-napi-cancel-during-fetch.md`.
 */
export declare class Connection {
  /**
   * Server-issued session id. Cached at construction; readable
   * even after `close()` so JS-side log lines can correlate
   * against kernel / server logs which key on the same id.
   */
  get sessionId(): string
  /**
   * Execute a SQL statement and return a Statement handle that
   * streams batches via `fetchNextBatch()`.
   *
   * Catalog / schema / sessionConf are session-level
   * (`openSession`). Per-statement options on `ExecuteOptions`:
   * - `statementConf` — per-statement Spark conf overlay
   * - `queryTags` — serialised to a comma-separated `key:value`
   *   string and placed in `statement_conf["query_tags"]`,
   *   matching NodeJS Thrift's `serializeQueryTags` wire shape
   *
   * `options` is omitted/`None` for the no-options path; passing
   * `{ statementConf: {} }` (an empty map) is treated the same as
   * omission to keep the wire shape stable for the common case.
   */
  executeStatement(sql: string, options?: ExecuteOptions | undefined | null): Promise<Statement>
  /**
   * directResults execute — the Thrift/JDBC model. Sends ExecuteStatement
   * with no `wait_timeout` field (server applies its ~10s default inline wait
   * and auto-closes on success) and returns WITHOUT polling past it:
   *
   * - a **`Statement`** (left arm) when the query finished within the inline
   *   wait — terminal, result ready inline, `close()` is a clean release;
   * - an **`AsyncStatement`** (right arm) when it did not — a poll/cancel
   *   handle the caller drives (`status()` / `awaitResult()` / `cancel()`).
   *
   * JS distinguishes the arms by feature-detecting `awaitResult` (present
   * only on `AsyncStatement`). This is the path that gives mid-run cancel for
   * long queries WITHOUT the eager-handle / close-drives workaround: the
   * returned handle always corresponds to a server-owned statement.
   *
   * **Load-bearing contract:** the kernel's `DirectStatement::{Completed,
   * Running}` discriminant cannot ride on these opaque `#[napi]` classes, so
   * consumers MUST feature-detect via `awaitResult` (the only member unique to
   * `AsyncStatement`). `Statement` (the Completed arm) MUST NOT gain an
   * `awaitResult` member, or every consumer silently misroutes. The pyo3
   * binding makes the same `await_result`-probe assumption.
   */
  executeStatementDirect(sql: string, options?: ExecuteOptions | undefined | null): Promise<Statement | AsyncStatement>
  /**
   * Execute a SQL statement on the blocking (sync) path, but return a
   * `CancellableExecution` handle so a concurrent JS task can cancel
   * the query *while it is still running server-side*.
   *
   * `executeStatement` builds the kernel `Statement`, awaits the
   * blocking `execute()`, and only then hands JS a `Statement` — so a
   * query that runs for several seconds is uncancellable from JS on
   * that path (there is no handle until the blocking call resolves).
   * This method instead builds the statement, captures a detached
   * `StatementCanceller` **before** dispatching `execute()`, and hands
   * JS a `CancellableExecution` immediately. The caller drives the
   * blocking execution via `result()` (resolves to the same
   * `Statement` `executeStatement` returns) and can fire `cancel()`
   * concurrently to interrupt a still-running query mid-COMPUTE.
   *
   * Option semantics are identical to `executeStatement`.
   * Mirrors the pyo3 `Statement.canceller()` / `Statement.execute()`
   * split (PR #121): obtain the canceller before the blocking drive.
   */
  executeStatementCancellable(sql: string, options?: ExecuteOptions | undefined | null): Promise<CancellableExecution>
  /**
   * Submit a SQL statement and return immediately with an
   * `AsyncStatement` handle, without blocking until the query
   * finishes. The kernel's `Statement::submit()` sends
   * `wait_timeout=0s`, so the server responds as soon as it has a
   * `statement_id` (state `Pending`/`Running`); JS drives polling
   * via `AsyncStatement.status()` and materialises results with
   * `AsyncStatement.awaitResult()`.
   *
   * This is the async-execution path the Thrift backend always
   * uses (`runAsync: true`): the SEA backend submits, returns a
   * pending operation handle, and polls to terminal during
   * fetch. Option semantics (statementConf / queryTags /
   * rowLimit / positional + named params) match `executeStatement`.
   * Submit always sends `wait_timeout=0s` so the call returns
   * immediately; the caller drives completion via `status()` /
   * `awaitResult()`. Only the blocking-vs-pending return contract
   * differs from `executeStatement`.
   */
  submitStatement(sql: string, options?: ExecuteOptions | undefined | null): Promise<AsyncStatement>
  /**
   * Explicit close. Awaits the server-side `DeleteSession` so the
   * JS caller can observe failures (auth revoked mid-session,
   * warehouse stopped, network error). Idempotent — a second call
   * on an already-closed connection returns `Ok`.
   *
   * **Errors are terminal from the JS side.** The kernel session
   * handle is consumed (`take()`) BEFORE the wire `DeleteSession`
   * runs, because `Session::close` takes `self` by value. On `Err`,
   * the napi `inner` is already `None`, so a JS-side retry sees a
   * closed connection and returns `Ok(())` without re-attempting
   * the wire call. The kernel's own `Drop` fire-and-forget retry
   * runs once in the background — the JS caller can log the error
   * but cannot drive a retry. If you need retry-on-failure
   * semantics for `DeleteSession`, layer them above this method.
   */
  close(): Promise<void>
  /**
   * All catalogs visible to the session.
   *
   * JDBC `getCatalogs` shape: `TABLE_CAT: Utf8`.
   */
  listCatalogs(): Promise<Statement>
  /**
   * Schemas filtered by catalog (exact) and schema name pattern.
   *
   * JDBC `getSchemas` shape: `TABLE_SCHEM, TABLE_CATALOG`.
   */
  listSchemas(catalog?: string | undefined | null, schemaPattern?: string | undefined | null): Promise<Statement>
  /**
   * Tables filtered by catalog (exact), schema (pattern), table (pattern).
   *
   * JDBC `getTables` shape: 10 columns. `tableTypes`, when provided,
   * filters rows by `TABLE_TYPE` kernel-side.
   *
   * `tableTypes` is an advisory filter. Databricks `SHOW TABLES` does
   * NOT honour the table-type filter server-side; the kernel applies
   * it client-side after the result returns. Callers expecting
   * server-side rejection of off-type tables should not rely on this.
   */
  listTables(catalog?: string | undefined | null, schemaPattern?: string | undefined | null, tablePattern?: string | undefined | null, tableTypes?: Array<string> | undefined | null): Promise<Statement>
  /**
   * Columns of tables matching the filter.
   *
   * JDBC `getColumns` shape: 23 columns.
   */
  listColumns(catalog?: string | undefined | null, schemaPattern?: string | undefined | null, tablePattern?: string | undefined | null, columnPattern?: string | undefined | null): Promise<Statement>
  /**
   * Functions visible to the session. `catalog` is exact;
   * `schemaPattern` and `functionPattern` are SQL LIKE.
   */
  listFunctions(catalog?: string | undefined | null, schemaPattern?: string | undefined | null, functionPattern?: string | undefined | null): Promise<Statement>
  /**
   * Procedures visible to the session. `catalog` is exact;
   * `schemaPattern` and `procedurePattern` are SQL LIKE.
   */
  listProcedures(catalog?: string | undefined | null, schemaPattern?: string | undefined | null, procedurePattern?: string | undefined | null): Promise<Statement>
  /**
   * All table types (`TABLE`, `VIEW`, `SYSTEM TABLE`, …).
   * No wire call — static in-memory result.
   */
  listTableTypes(): Promise<Statement>
  /**
   * SQL data types supported by the workspace.
   * No wire call — static in-memory result.
   */
  listTypeInfo(): Promise<Statement>
  /**
   * Primary keys for the given table. All three identifiers are
   * exact — ODBC `SQLPrimaryKeys` does not support patterns.
   */
  getPrimaryKeys(catalog: string, schema: string, table: string): Promise<Statement>
  /**
   * Foreign-key relationships. The foreign side must be fully
   * specified (catalog + schema + table); the parent side is
   * optional. All identifiers are exact — no LIKE patterns.
   */
  getCrossReference(parentCatalog: string | undefined | null, parentSchema: string | undefined | null, parentTable: string | undefined | null, foreignCatalog: string, foreignSchema: string, foreignTable: string): Promise<Statement>
}
/**
 * Opaque executed-statement handle.
 *
 * **Current concurrency shape** — every method takes `inner.lock()`
 * and holds the guard across the kernel `.await`. tokio `Mutex` is
 * FIFO, so cancel/close queue behind any in-flight `fetchNextBatch`
 * until it returns naturally. This is a known limitation that exists
 * because the napi shape has not yet been split into an
 * `Arc<dyn ExecutedStatementHandle>` (for cancel/close, which the
 * kernel exposes as `&self`-callable) plus a `Mutex<Option<…>>` only
 * for the borrowed-mut fetch path. The lock-shape refactor needs a
 * small kernel-side accessor and lands in a follow-up PR — see
 * `sea-workflow/jira-candidates/2026-05-24-napi-cancel-during-fetch.md`.
 *
 * `schema` and `statement_id` are cached at construction so they
 * survive `close()` — JS callers building error reports against a
 * disposed statement can still read them.
 */
export declare class Statement {
  /**
   * Server-issued statement id. Cached at construction; readable
   * even after `close()` so JS-side log lines can correlate against
   * kernel / server logs which key on the same id.
   */
  get statementId(): string
  /**
   * Number of rows modified by the statement (UPDATE / INSERT /
   * DELETE / MERGE). `null` for SELECT and on warehouses that don't
   * surface the counter. Mirrors Thrift's
   * `TGetOperationStatusResp.numModifiedRows`.
   */
  numModifiedRows(): Promise<number | null>
  /**
   * Server-supplied user-facing message. Mirrors Thrift's
   * `TGetOperationStatusResp.displayMessage`. **PII / sensitive-
   * data note:** may contain SQL fragments or parameter values —
   * redact before centralised logging.
   *
   * Populated on `Succeeded` / `Closed` paths (incl. an empty `Closed`).
   * On terminal-error states (`Failed` / `Cancelled`) the kernel returns
   * an Error instead of a `Statement`, and the same field rides on the JS
   * Error envelope under the same `displayMessage` key.
   */
  displayMessage(): Promise<string | null>
  /**
   * Server-supplied diagnostic detail — multi-line operator /
   * stack context. Mirrors Thrift's
   * `TGetOperationStatusResp.diagnosticInfo`. For support surfaces,
   * not user-facing. Same reachability + PII caveats as
   * `displayMessage`.
   */
  diagnosticInfo(): Promise<string | null>
  /**
   * Server-supplied JSON blob with extended error details. Mirrors
   * Thrift's `TGetOperationStatusResp.errorDetailsJson`.
   * Pass-through string — JS callers parse with `JSON.parse` if
   * they need structured access.
   *
   * **Server-side gating:** populated only when the workspace has
   * `spark.databricks.sql.errorDetailsJson.enabled = true` on the
   * underlying SQL cluster. The flag is internal-only / default-
   * false in the Databricks runtime, so for most JS callers this
   * will return `null`. Admin-enabled workspaces return content
   * shaped like `{"errorClass": "...", "messageTemplate": "..."}`.
   *
   * **Unbounded:** when populated, server can return a multi-MB
   * blob; size before logging.
   */
  errorDetailsJson(): Promise<string | null>
  /**
   * Pull the next batch of results. Returns `null` when the stream
   * is exhausted. The returned `ArrowBatch.ipcBytes` is a complete
   * Arrow IPC stream (schema header + 1 record-batch message)
   * suitable for handing to `apache-arrow`'s `RecordBatchReader`.
   *
   * On `Err`, the stream is in an unspecified state — call
   * `close()` and discard the `Statement`. Subsequent
   * `fetchNextBatch()` calls after an error are not guaranteed to
   * succeed or fail consistently.
   */
  fetchNextBatch(): Promise<ArrowBatch | null>
  /**
   * Result schema as an Arrow IPC payload (schema header only, no
   * record-batch message). Available before any batches have been
   * fetched, and remains available after `close()` — the kernel
   * materialises the schema eagerly so JS callers can build error
   * reports against a disposed statement.
   *
   * Sync because the body has no `.await` — `encode_ipc_stream` is
   * pure CPU work over an `Arc<Schema>` already cached on the
   * wrapper. Mirrors `pyo3/src/statement.rs::arrow_schema` (sync).
   * napi-rs converts a panic in a sync `#[napi]` entry point into a
   * thrown JS error via its own macro-expanded boundary, so the
   * `util::guarded` `catch_unwind` wrapper that the `async fn`
   * entry points use is not required for this method.
   */
  schema(): ArrowSchema
  /**
   * Server-side cancel.
   *
   * For executed statements: short-circuits to `Ok(())` if
   * `fetchNextBatch` has already returned `null` (stream
   * naturally exhausted) — matches the JDBC `Statement.cancel()`
   * no-op-after-completion contract, so JS callers can fire cancel
   * defensively without distinguishing "real cancel" from "raced
   * with natural completion."
   *
   * For metadata streams: no-op (the kernel has no in-flight
   * cancellation surface for metadata calls today).
   *
   * Returns `KernelError(InvalidStatementHandle)` if the statement
   * has been explicitly `close()`d.
   */
  cancel(): Promise<void>
  /**
   * Explicit close.
   *
   * For executed statements: awaits the server-side `CloseStatement`
   * so the JS caller can observe failures (auth revoked mid-session,
   * network error, server-side error). Idempotent — a second call
   * on an already-closed statement returns `Ok`.
   *
   * **Errors are terminal from the JS side.** The kernel executed
   * handle is taken out of `inner` BEFORE the wire `CloseStatement`
   * runs (so `Drop` knows there's nothing left to clean up). On
   * `Err`, the napi `inner` is already `None`, so a JS-side retry
   * sees a closed statement and returns `Ok(())` without re-
   * attempting the wire call. The kernel-level `ExecutedStatement`
   * has been consumed at that point and the value is dropped on
   * the way out of the closure — the kernel's `ExecutedStatement::
   * Drop` then fires-and-forgets a single retry on the captured
   * runtime. The JS caller can log the error but cannot drive a
   * further retry. If you need retry-on-failure semantics for
   * `CloseStatement`, layer them above this method.
   *
   * For metadata streams: drops the stream (no server round-trip
   * needed — metadata results have no in-flight server-side
   * resource to release).
   */
  close(): Promise<void>
}