/* tslint:disable */
/* eslint-disable */

/**
 * **Day 3-4 export**: run the selective-recomputation analyzer.
 *
 * Takes the JSONL chain + a JSON-serialized [`CorrectionEvent`].
 * Returns a [`RecomputationPlan`] serialized as a `JsValue`. The
 * browser orchestrator renders the partition + lets the visitor
 * expand any decision to see its `PreservationProof` or
 * `RecomputationProof` inline.
 */
export function analyze_correction_event(chain_jsonl: string, correction_json: string): any;

/**
 * **Day 3-4 export**: build the dependency graph from a JSONL chain.
 *
 * Returns a [`DependencyGraph`] serialized as a `JsValue` — the JS
 * side gets a plain object with `nodes: Vec<StepNode>` it can
 * visualize without further parsing.
 */
export function compute_dependency_graph(chain_jsonl: string): any;

/**
 * **Day 10 export**: compute the typed savings summary from a
 * recomputation plan + a per-step cost map.
 *
 * `plan_json` is a serialized [`RecomputationPlan`]; `cost_map_json` is
 * `{ step_id: cost_micro_usd, ... }`. Returns:
 * ```json
 * {
 *   "total_steps": N,
 *   "preserved_steps": M,
 *   "recomputed_steps": K,
 *   "preservation_ratio": 0.0..=1.0,
 *   "baseline_cost_micro_usd": sum-of-all-step-costs,
 *   "selective_cost_micro_usd": sum-of-recompute-step-costs,
 *   "naive_restart_cost_micro_usd": 2 × baseline (the modeled "start over" worst case),
 *   "savings_vs_naive_ratio": 1 - selective / naive_restart
 * }
 * ```
 *
 * Costs are integer micro-USD (per workspace f64-discipline rule —
 * money math stays in integers). The ratio is computed as `f64` only
 * because it's a display-layer value (the page renders `XX.X%`).
 *
 * Steps absent from `cost_map` contribute zero — the JS side should
 * pre-populate every step_id; the missing-key case is a no-op rather
 * than a hard error so a malformed cost map doesn't blow up the
 * browser tab.
 */
export function compute_savings_summary(plan_json: string, cost_map_json: string): any;

/**
 * **The ONE proven IFC decision, surfaced to JS.** Recomputes the
 * `FlowDeclaration → IfcVerdict` decision over the Denning lattice from
 * `nucleus-ifc` (whose lattice laws are Lean-proven in `portcullis-core`) — the
 * SAME `decide()` the production gate runs. `@coproduct_inc/verify`'s DAG-cage
 * flow check delegates here instead of a TS mirror, so there is one model.
 *
 * `input_tokens_json` is a JSON array of declared-input tokens — one of:
 * `user_prompt`, `web_content`, `tool_response`, `file_read`, `env_var`,
 * `secret`, `database_row`, `memory_read`, `http_response`. `requires_authority`
 * = the action needs directive authority; `sink_public` = the sink is publicly
 * visible. Returns the recomputable `IfcVerdict` (allow/deny + reason).
 */
export function ifc_decide(input_tokens_json: string, requires_authority: boolean, sink_public: boolean): any;

/**
 * Install a browser-friendly panic hook. The hook routes any wasm-side
 * `panic!` into `console.error`, which means failed assertions in the
 * dependency analysis or signature verification path become visible in
 * the visitor's DevTools instead of an opaque `RuntimeError: unreachable`.
 *
 * Idempotent — calling it more than once is harmless. Browsers should
 * invoke this once on module load.
 */
export function init(): void;

/**
 * **Day 10 export**: parse a raw Claude Code session JSONL (the format
 * Claude Code writes under `~/.claude/projects/.../<UUID>.jsonl`) into
 * a renderable step list.
 *
 * This is the drag-and-drop path: the visitor's browser receives a
 * session log it didn't sign and runs the dependency analyzer against
 * it locally. The mapper produces unsigned [`nucleus_lineage::LineageEdge`]s;
 * `signed = false` is set on the returned [`RenderableChain`] so the UI
 * can label the source ("unsigned — your local session" vs. "signed
 * corpus from coproduct-opensource/nucleus-recompute-corpus").
 *
 * Source-of-truth: the parse + map logic lives in `claude-code-capture`
 * (the same code the server-side capture binary uses). One canonical
 * implementation, shared between native + wasm.
 */
export function parse_claude_code_session(session_jsonl: string): any;

/**
 * **Day 10 export**: parse a JSONL chain of signed lineage edges into
 * a renderable step list (one [`RenderableStep`] per edge in chain
 * order). The orchestrator on the JS side consumes this directly to
 * render the dependency graph + per-step drawer.
 *
 * Wire format: `chain_jsonl` is one `LineageEdge` per line (the same
 * format `verify_chain_signatures` expects). Signature verification is
 * NOT performed here — call `verify_chain_signatures` first if the
 * chain's provenance matters.
 */
export function parse_lineage_chain(chain_jsonl: string): any;

/**
 * **Offline auction-receipt verifier — the "verify this receipt"
 * button.** Given a signed `AuctionReceipt` JSON + a pinned JWKS
 * document, re-build the canonical envelope, re-hash it (BLAKE3), and
 * Ed25519-verify the signature against the issuer key matched by `kid`
 * — all in the visitor's tab, with zero hub access.
 *
 * Returns a [`ReceiptVerifyReport`] serialized as a `JsValue`:
 * ```json
 * {
 *   "ok": true,
 *   "reason": null,
 *   "auction_id": "...", "issuer_kid": "...", "root_hash_hex": "...",
 *   "issued_at_micros": 1717…, "winner_spiffe_id": "spiffe://…",
 *   "clearing_price_micro_usd": 250000, "bid_count": 3
 * }
 * ```
 *
 * Never throws on a bad receipt — `ok = false` with a `reason` string
 * is the FAIL path (so the page renders PASS/FAIL rather than a thrown
 * error). A `JsValue` error is only returned if the report itself
 * can't be serialized, which shouldn't happen.
 */
export function verify_auction_receipt(receipt_json: string, jwks_json: string): any;

/**
 * **Bet C — the full offline verifier.** Combines the signature +
 * root-hash check ([`verify_auction_receipt`]) with the local
 * clearing-price recomputation ([`verify_clearing_recompute`]) into a
 * single call, so an agent NEVER trusts the hub's price: the wasm
 * recomputes it locally from the signed bids and asserts equality.
 *
 * The drop-in story (`@nucleus/verify`):
 * ```js
 * import { verify } from '@nucleus/verify';
 * const r = await verify(receiptJson, jwksJson);
 * if (!r.ok) throw new Error(r.reason);
 * // r.ok === signature_ok && root_hash_ok && price_recomputed_ok
 * ```
 *
 * Returns a [`FullVerifyReport`] as a `JsValue`. All prices are `u64`
 * micro-USD (fit JS `Number` / Python `int`); the kernel's internal
 * `u128` math never crosses this boundary.
 */
export function verify_auction_receipt_full(receipt_json: string, jwks_json: string): any;

/**
 * Day-1 entry point. Parses a JSONL chain + a JWKS document and runs
 * per-edge Ed25519 signature verification.
 *
 * Wire format:
 * - `chain_jsonl`: one signed [`nucleus_lineage::LineageEdge`] per line.
 * - `jwks_json`: a JSON document with a top-level `{ "keys": [...] }` array,
 *   each entry an Ed25519 JWK.
 *
 * Returns a [`VerifyReport`] serialized as a `JsValue` (so the JS side
 * gets a plain object, not a string it has to re-parse). Errors are
 * surfaced as `JsValue` strings — wrap with `wasm_bindgen::throw_str`
 * downstream if richer error types are needed.
 */
export function verify_chain_signatures(chain_jsonl: string, jwks_json: string): any;

/**
 * **Bet C moat-closer — recompute-only export.** Re-runs the auction
 * clearing locally from the receipt's signed bid set and reports whether
 * the recomputed price matches the receipt's claimed price. Does NOT
 * check the signature — pair with [`verify_auction_receipt`] (or use
 * [`verify_auction_receipt_full`], which does both).
 *
 * Returns a [`recompute::RecomputeReport`] as a `JsValue`:
 * ```json
 * {
 *   "recomputed_price_micro_usd": 400000,
 *   "receipt_price_micro_usd": 400000,
 *   "matches_receipt": true,
 *   "path": "vickrey",
 *   "recomputed_winner_spiffe_id": "spiffe://…",
 *   "winner_matches": true,
 *   "pigou_vcg_clearing_micro_usd": null,
 *   "reason": null
 * }
 * ```
 */
export function verify_clearing_recompute(receipt_json: string): any;

/**
 * **R6 — verify a Proof-Carrying-Authorization certificate in the browser.**
 * Runs the FULL [`nucleus_policy_cert::verify`]: the Ed25519 signature over the
 * cert's signing message, then the verbatim recompute (`decide` /
 * `governance_monotone`) against the carried witness, plus freshness and — when
 * `expected_context_hex` is supplied — the context binding. No network, no
 * trust in the emitter; the same check anyone runs offline.
 *
 * `cert_json` is a serialized `Certificate`; `now_unix` is the current time for
 * the freshness check; `expected_context_hex` (optional, 64 hex chars) binds
 * the cert to a specific context (e.g. a lineage-edge / request hash).
 *
 * **`ok` means the certificate VALIDLY CERTIFIES ITS STATED OUTCOME — not that
 * the request is allowed.** A validly-signed cert for a `Deny` decision returns
 * `ok:true` with `decision:"deny"`. To gate an *authorization*, check
 * `ok && decision === "allow"`; to gate a governance *update*, check
 * `ok && monotone === true`.
 *
 * Returns a [`PolicyCertReport`] as a `JsValue`. `Option` fields are serialized
 * as JS `null` (not `undefined`) so they match the published TS typings.
 */
export function verify_policy_certificate(cert_json: string, now_unix: bigint, expected_context_hex?: string | null): any;

/**
 * **Day 3-4 export**: independently verify a single
 * [`PreservationProof`].
 *
 * The browser surfaces this on the demo's "expand any preserved step
 * to see its proof" affordance. The proof is JSON-serializable; the
 * WASM call re-runs the structural check and returns `null` on
 * success or an error string on falsification.
 */
export function verify_preservation(proof_json: string): void;

/**
 * **Day 3-4 export**: independently verify a single
 * [`RecomputationProof`].
 *
 * Same shape as [`verify_preservation`] — re-runs the witness-hash
 * check, returns a `JsValue` error on falsification.
 */
export function verify_recomputation_necessity(proof_json: string): void;