/**
 * `@coproduct_inc/verify` — offline, zero-trust verification for Nucleus.
 *
 * Two receipt families share one package. The headline is the
 * **capability-boundary in-bounds attestation** — see `./attestation`
 * (re-exported below): given an agent run's tool-call trace + a declared
 * capability boundary, emit and offline-verify an Ed25519-signed receipt
 * that the agent stayed within bounds, keyed on a cryptographic principal
 * rather than a mutable display name. The auction-receipt surface documented
 * here is the original use case and remains available.
 *
 * ---
 *
 * Auction receipts: the agent NEVER trusts the hub's clearing price.
 *
 * The agent NEVER trusts the hub's clearing price. This package's WASM
 * core (the SAME `nucleus-wasm` binary the browser demo runs) re-runs the
 * auction clearing locally from the SIGNED bid set and asserts the
 * recomputed price equals the price the receipt claims — on top of the
 * Ed25519 signature + BLAKE3 root-hash check.
 *
 * ```ts
 * import { verify } from "@coproduct_inc/verify";
 * const r = await verify(receiptJson, jwksJson);
 * if (!r.ok) throw new Error(r.reason ?? "receipt failed verification");
 * // r.ok === signature_ok && root_hash_ok && price_recomputed_ok
 * ```
 *
 * The Node target loads the wasm synchronously on first import; the
 * `verify` API is async-shaped so a future web/bundler entry can stream
 * the wasm without changing call sites.
 */
/** Which clearing rule the receipt commits to. */
export type RecomputePath = "vickrey" | "pigou-vcg";
/**
 * Full verification result. `ok` is the single boolean to gate on; the
 * component flags + recovered fields are for diagnostics / UI. All prices
 * are integer micro-USD that fit a JS `number` (the kernel's internal
 * u128 math never crosses this boundary).
 */
export interface FullVerifyReport {
    /** `signatureOk && rootHashOk && priceRecomputedOk`. */
    ok: boolean;
    /** Ed25519 signature verified under the JWKS key matched by `kid`. */
    signature_ok: boolean;
    /** BLAKE3 of the canonical envelope equals the receipt's root hash. */
    root_hash_ok: boolean;
    /** The locally recomputed clearing price equals the receipt's price. */
    price_recomputed_ok: boolean;
    /** Price the recompute produced (micro-USD). */
    recomputed_price_micro_usd: number;
    /** Price the receipt claims (micro-USD), or null. */
    signed_price_micro_usd: number | null;
    /** Clearing rule the receipt commits to (`"vickrey"` today). */
    path: RecomputePath;
    /** Theorem-backed Pigou-VCG cross-check clearing, if externality data
     *  was present (reported, not gated on). */
    pigou_vcg_clearing_micro_usd: number | null;
    /** First failing reason, or null when `ok`. */
    reason: string | null;
}
/** Recompute-only result (no signature check). */
export interface RecomputeReport {
    recomputed_price_micro_usd: number;
    receipt_price_micro_usd: number | null;
    matches_receipt: boolean;
    path: RecomputePath;
    recomputed_winner_spiffe_id: string | null;
    winner_matches: boolean;
    pigou_vcg_clearing_micro_usd: number | null;
    reason: string | null;
}
/**
 * Verify a signed auction receipt fully: signature + root hash + a LOCAL
 * recomputation of the clearing price from the signed bids.
 *
 * @param receiptJson the receipt as a JSON string (the hub's wire form).
 * @param jwksJson the pinned issuer JWKS document as a JSON string.
 * @returns the structured report; `ok === true` only when all three
 *   checks pass. Never throws on a bad receipt — failures surface as
 *   `ok: false` with a `reason`.
 */
export declare function verify(receiptJson: string, jwksJson: string): Promise<FullVerifyReport>;
/**
 * Recompute the clearing price from the signed bids WITHOUT checking the
 * signature. Use when you have already verified the signature separately,
 * or to inspect the recomputed-vs-claimed delta. Most callers want
 * {@link verify} instead.
 */
export declare function recomputeClearing(receiptJson: string): Promise<RecomputeReport>;
/**
 * Signature + root-hash check only (the pre-recompute verifier). Kept for
 * back-compat / when you only need authenticity, not price-correctness.
 */
export declare function verifySignature(receiptJson: string, jwksJson: string): Promise<unknown>;
/**
 * Result of verifying a Proof-Carrying-Authorization certificate. `ok` is the
 * single boolean to gate on; the rest is diagnostics. A policy *decision*
 * reports `kind: "decision"` + `decision: "allow"|"deny"`; a *governance*
 * amendment reports `kind: "governance"` + `monotone`; a *delegation* reports
 * `kind: "delegation"`.
 */
export interface PolicyCertReport {
    /** Signature + freshness + context + commitment + recompute all passed. */
    ok: boolean;
    /** The authority question answered: "decision" | "governance" | "delegation". */
    kind: string | null;
    /** For a decision cert: "allow" | "deny" (the recompute-confirmed verdict). */
    decision: string | null;
    /** For a governance cert: the amendment is non-weakening (true on success). */
    monotone: boolean | null;
    /** Issuer Ed25519 public key (hex), on success. */
    signer_pubkey_hex: string | null;
    /** First failing reason, or null when `ok`. */
    reason: string | null;
}
/**
 * Verify a Proof-Carrying-Authorization certificate offline, with ZERO trust in
 * the issuer. Runs the SAME `nucleus-policy-cert::verify` the runtime does —
 * the Ed25519 signature over the cert's signing message, then the verbatim
 * recompute (`decide` / `governance_monotone`) against the carried policy, plus
 * freshness and (when `expectedContextHex` is given) the context binding. A
 * wrong decision (or mis-stated amendment) is structurally uncertifiable.
 *
 * `ok` means the certificate VALIDLY CERTIFIES its stated outcome — **not** that
 * the request is allowed. A validly-signed `Deny` cert returns `{ ok: true,
 * decision: "deny" }`. To gate an authorization use `ok && decision === "allow"`;
 * to gate a governance update use `ok && monotone === true`.
 *
 * @param certJson the certificate as a JSON string.
 * @param nowUnix current time (unix SECONDS) for the freshness check. A float
 *   (e.g. `Date.now() / 1000`) is floored — pass whole seconds to be explicit.
 * @param expectedContextHex optional 64-hex-char context the cert must be bound
 *   to (e.g. a lineage-edge / request hash). **Omit only when you intend NO
 *   binding** — passing `undefined` from a missing variable silently skips the
 *   splice/replay check (fail-open). Pass the hash explicitly whenever the cert
 *   carries a `bound_context_hash`.
 */
export declare function verifyPolicyCertificate(certJson: string, nowUnix: number | bigint, expectedContextHex?: string): Promise<PolicyCertReport>;
export * from "./attestation.js";
export * from "./toolproxy.js";
export * from "./cage.js";
export * from "./ifc-decide.js";
export * from "./ifc.js";
export * from "./workflow.js";
export * from "./license.js";
export * from "./claim.js";