/**
 * Client-side receipt→envelope BINDING (P0 fix: receipt-substitution).
 *
 * A valid receipt authenticates a decision the SERVER signed — it does NOT authenticate whatever
 * envelope an attacker wraps around it. Before executing with enforced:true, the guard must bind the
 * receipt to THIS envelope by LOCALLY RECOMPUTING the canonical decision body hash and comparing it
 * to the receipt's SIGNED `bh` (never trusting the envelope's own claimed `decision_body_hash`, which
 * an attacker rewrites). This mirrors the server's §106 isCurrentlyAuthorized binding, applied in the
 * client — the guard is the component that authorizes execution, so the binding must live here too.
 *
 * The canonicalization is ported VERBATIM from the server's canonical-json.js + decision-result.js
 * computeBodyHash so the recomputed hash is byte-identical to the server's decision_body_hash.
 */
/**
 * RFC 8785 (JCS) canonical JSON for the envelope domain (ASCII keys, JSON-representable scalars).
 * Ported verbatim from the server canonicalizer so client + server hash identically.
 */
export declare function canonicalJson(value: unknown): string;
/**
 * decision_body_hash = 'sha256:' + sha256(canonicalJson(envelope MINUS receipt MINUS
 * decision_body_hash)). Recomputed LOCALLY from the presented envelope so a rewritten field can
 * never pass — identical algorithm to the server's decision-result.js computeBodyHash.
 */
export declare function computeBodyHash(envelope: Record<string, unknown>): string;
/** Minimal shape of the SDK verifyReceipt result the binding consumes. */
export interface VerifyReceiptResultLike {
    valid?: boolean;
    status?: string;
    reason?: string | null;
    payload?: Record<string, unknown>;
}
/** Host context the receipt scope must match (from GuardConfig). */
export interface BindContext {
    operation?: string;
    environment?: string;
    audience?: string;
}
export type BindCause = 'RECEIPT_UNVERIFIED' | 'RECEIPT_ENVELOPE_MISMATCH';
export interface BindResult {
    ok: boolean;
    cause?: BindCause;
    detail?: string;
}
/**
 * Bind a verified receipt to THIS envelope. Fail-closed on ANY mismatch. Ordered checks:
 *  1. valid === true                              (bad signature → RECEIPT_UNVERIFIED)
 *  2. status === 'VERIFIED_CURRENT'               (expired / superseded / wrong-audience / wrong-env
 *                                                  / scope-mismatch → RECEIPT_ENVELOPE_MISMATCH)
 *  3. signed bh === LOCALLY-recomputed body hash  (the anti-substitution anchor — binds the ENTIRE
 *                                                  decision body incl. decision/execution_action/fp)
 *  4. signed fp === envelope.fingerprint          (explicit fingerprint binding)
 *  5. operation / environment / audience scope    (when the AUTHENTICATED envelope carries them —
 *                                                  bh already binds their presence/value)
 *
 * @param envelope  the presented decision envelope (attacker-influenced; NOT trusted for bh/fp)
 * @param vr        the SDK verifyReceipt result ({ valid, status, payload:{ fp, bh, … } })
 * @param ctx       host operation/environment/audience the receipt must match
 */
export declare function bindReceiptToEnvelope(envelope: Record<string, unknown> | null | undefined, vr: VerifyReceiptResultLike | null | undefined, ctx?: BindContext): BindResult;
//# sourceMappingURL=receipt-binding.d.ts.map