import type { PostureVerifyInput } from './posture-receipt.js';
export declare const PROFILE_ENFORCING_ATOMIC_V1: "ENFORCING_ATOMIC_V1";
/**
 * ENFORCING_ATOMIC_V2 (roadmap 1167) — V1 plus a VERIFIED credential boundary.
 *
 * WHY A NEW NAME RATHER THAN A STRICTER _V1. with-coderifts.ts:228 states the
 * rule this package learned from its own 10.0.0 and 12.0.0 releases: "The next
 * tightening MUST be `_V2`; adding a condition to `_V1` reintroduces the defect
 * this type exists to remove." A caller who wrote `_V1` keeps exactly the
 * contract they asked for; the stricter check costs them nothing.
 *
 * WHAT V2's credential_boundary PROVES:
 *   A signed `cr.posture.receipt.v1` verified against a caller-supplied key
 *   (registry or pinned PEM) asserts `verdict: 'PASS'` — the credential
 *   boundary was read back out of the live catalog at `measured_at`, that
 *   reading is inside the caller's freshness window, and the receipt is bound
 *   to this `deployment_id`.
 *
 * WHAT IT DOES NOT PROVE, and this list is the point rather than a caveat:
 *   · NOT a tuple the CALLER did not name. executor_id, adapter_id, target_uri
 *     and policy_hash ARE now bound (AUDIT P1 / RES-3) — but each only when the
 *     construction configures it. The earlier text here said the producer does
 *     not sign those fields; re-measured 2026-08-29 against capability-demo
 *     demo/src/posture.js, the issuer spreads them into the SIGNED canonical
 *     body whenever they carry real content, so binding them is backed by the
 *     producer rather than asserted over it. What has NOT changed is the rule
 *     underneath: a field nobody configured is reported in the verifier's
 *     `not_bound` list, never defaulted into looking checked.
 *   · NOT an expiry. The receipt carries `measured_at` and no `expires_at`, so
 *     the age check is a FRESHNESS window the CALLER supplies via `maxAgeMs`.
 *     A guard-side default would present our policy as the receipt's statement.
 *   · NOT executor behaviour. Same honest limit as every other invariant here:
 *     construction demands wiring, and a read-back at `measured_at` is a fact
 *     about that moment, not about the write that happens afterwards.
 */
export declare const PROFILE_ENFORCING_ATOMIC_V2: "ENFORCING_ATOMIC_V2";
/**
 * The unsuffixed wire value stays pinned to V1 FOREVER (with-coderifts.ts:231-233).
 * Re-pointing it at V2 would silently move every existing caller — the migration
 * the versioned names exist to refuse.
 */
export declare const GUARD_ATOMIC_WIRE_VALUE: "ENFORCING_ATOMIC";
export type AtomicProfileSpelling = 'ENFORCING_ATOMIC' | 'ENFORCING_ATOMIC_V1' | 'ENFORCING_ATOMIC_V2';
export declare const ATOMIC_PROFILE_UNSATISFIED: "ATOMIC_PROFILE_UNSATISFIED";
export type AtomicOutcome = 'AUTHORIZED_COMMITTED' | 'REFUSED' | 'INDETERMINATE';
/** Frozen invariant names — adding one is ATOMIC_V2, not an edit here. */
export declare const ATOMIC_INVARIANTS: readonly ["verified_receipt", "verified_grant_v2", "exact_executor", "exact_target", "after_payload_hash", "fresh_nonce", "nonce_consumed_once", "target_CAS", "read_back", "executor_attestation", "credential_boundary"];
export type MutatorRegister = {
    registerMutator: (name: string) => MutatorRegister;
    has: (name: string) => boolean;
    list: () => readonly string[];
};
export declare function createMutatorRegister(): MutatorRegister;
export declare function isEnforcingAtomic(profile: unknown): profile is AtomicProfileSpelling;
/** V2 only. The unsuffixed alias is V1 and must never answer true here. */
export declare function isEnforcingAtomicV2(profile: unknown): boolean;
export type AtomicConstructionInput = {
    executionGrant?: {
        enabled?: boolean;
        resolveStateNonce?: unknown;
        grantVersion?: string;
    } | null;
    executorId?: string;
    adapterId?: string;
    targetUri?: string;
    /**
     * MEASURED: executorId/adapterId/targetUri already existed here; policyHash
     * did not exist anywhere in this package — its only mention was the comment
     * above saying it was not bound. Added so the tuple can be STATED, not so it
     * can be assumed: leaving it unset binds nothing, and says so.
     */
    policyHash?: string;
    executorAttestation?: {
        registry?: unknown;
    } | null;
    mutatorRegister?: MutatorRegister | null;
    casAdapter?: unknown;
    readBack?: unknown;
    credentialBoundary?: unknown;
    /** V2 ONLY. Ignored on V1, whose credential_boundary check is frozen. */
    profile?: AtomicProfileSpelling;
};
/**
 * V2 caller-supplied freshness window must be finite, positive, and ≤ 24h.
 * A larger value is not a freshness check (the receipt has no expires_at).
 */
export declare const ATOMIC_V2_MAX_AGE_MS_CAP = 86400000;
/**
 * V2 credential_boundary input. A bare `true` is deliberately NOT assignable.
 */
export type VerifiedCredentialBoundary = {
    postureReceipt: string;
    registry?: PostureVerifyInput['registry'];
    pinnedKeyPem?: string;
    deploymentId?: string;
    maxAgeMs?: number;
    now?: () => number;
};
export declare const CREDENTIAL_BOUNDARY_BARE_REJECTED: string;
export declare function atomicConstructionProblems(input: AtomicConstructionInput): string[];
export declare function throwAtomicUnsatisfied(problems: string[]): never;
/**
 * Per-call outcome union. Host-claimed commit never AUTHORIZED_COMMITTED.
 *
 * Every required boolean below is supplied by the host. The guard classifies
 * the conjunction; it does not independently observe or attest the events.
 */
export declare function atomicOutcome(input: {
    /**
     * Supplied by the host. The guard classifies this assertion; it does not
     * independently observe or attest the underlying event.
     */
    receiptVerified: boolean;
    /**
     * Supplied by the host. The guard classifies this assertion; it does not
     * independently observe or attest the underlying event.
     */
    grantV2Valid: boolean;
    /**
     * Supplied by the host. The guard classifies this assertion; it does not
     * independently observe or attest the underlying event.
     */
    executorMatch: boolean;
    /**
     * Supplied by the host. The guard classifies this assertion; it does not
     * independently observe or attest the underlying event.
     */
    targetMatch: boolean;
    /**
     * Supplied by the host. The guard classifies this assertion; it does not
     * independently observe or attest the underlying event.
     */
    nonceFresh: boolean;
    /**
     * Supplied by the host. The guard classifies this assertion; it does not
     * independently observe or attest the underlying event.
     * The executor is a remote party; the guard never witnesses nonce consumption.
     */
    nonceConsumedOnce: boolean;
    /**
     * Supplied by the host. The guard classifies this assertion; it does not
     * independently observe or attest the underlying event.
     */
    casCommitted: boolean;
    /**
     * Supplied by the host. The guard classifies this assertion; it does not
     * independently observe or attest the underlying event.
     */
    readBackOk: boolean;
    /**
     * Supplied by the host. The guard classifies this assertion; it does not
     * independently observe or attest the underlying event.
     */
    executorAttested: boolean;
    /**
     * Supplied by the host. The guard classifies this assertion; it does not
     * independently observe or attest the underlying event.
     * Construction can inspect the mutator register; this classifier input is
     * still host-supplied, not re-read here.
     */
    mutatorRegistered: boolean;
    authUnavailable?: boolean;
    nonceStoreUnavailable?: boolean;
    readBackUnavailable?: boolean;
    signerUnavailableAfterCommit?: boolean;
}): AtomicOutcome;
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