import { type LocalRunner, type AgentDefinition, type NetworkEgressSetting } from "./config.ts";
export { shellSingleQuote } from "./shell.ts";
/**
 * Return a copy of `definition` whose `cmd` has the agent's `resumeArgs`
 * appended, so `crew resume` relaunches the agent into its previous
 * conversation (e.g. `--continue` for Claude, `resume --last` for Codex).
 * Appending after the base `cmd` keeps the first token — which
 * `inferAgentCommandName` reads for the safehouse profile — and the trailing
 * `"$_p"` prompt positional the launch builders add both intact.
 */
export declare function withResumeArgs(definition: AgentDefinition, resumeArgs: string): AgentDefinition;
/**
 * Resolve the shipped Safehouse proxy wrapper inside `@clipboard-health/clearance`
 * via Node's module-resolution algorithm so the path works whether npm hoists
 * clearance as a sibling of groundcrew or nests it under
 * `groundcrew/node_modules/@clipboard-health/clearance`.
 *
 * @param baseUrl - **Test-only seam.** Production callers must omit this so the
 *   helper resolves from this module's URL. Tests pass an invalid value to
 *   exercise the catch branch.
 */
export declare function resolveSafehouseClearancePath(baseUrl?: string): string;
export declare function isEnvironmentAssignment(token: string): boolean;
/**
 * Infer the agent's command basename from a agent `cmd` (skipping a leading
 * `env`/`KEY=val` prefix). Safehouse uses it to pick the matching `.sb`
 * profile.
 */
export declare function inferAgentCommandName(agentCmd: string): string;
export type WorkerEnvironment = Readonly<{
    GROUNDCREW_TASK_ID: string;
    GROUNDCREW_COMPLETE?: string;
}>;
export declare function workerEnvironmentForTask(arguments_: {
    taskId: string;
    markDoneSupported: boolean;
}): WorkerEnvironment;
export interface SafehouseAgentIntegration {
    addDirsReadOnly: readonly string[];
    envPass: readonly string[];
    commandPreludes: readonly string[];
    /**
     * Extra, already-shell-safe argv tokens appended to the agent invocation
     * before the prompt positional (e.g. `--settings <quoted-json>` to inject
     * cmux activity-reporting hooks for a Claude agent).
     */
    agentArgs?: readonly string[];
    /**
     * Extra **writable** safehouse `--add-dirs` paths contributed by the
     * integration (e.g. codex's relocated `CODEX_HOME` under safehouse, which
     * the agent must read AND write session/state into — unlike
     * `addDirsReadOnly`). Merged into the agent wrap's `--add-dirs` alongside
     * `safehouseAgentAddDirs`; never granted to the repo-controlled
     * prepareWorktree wrap.
     */
    addDirs?: readonly string[];
    /**
     * Files copied from their staged sandbox location back to the source store
     * by the host after the agent exits. This keeps credential refreshes without
     * granting the sandbox write access to the source config home.
     */
    writeBackFiles?: readonly SafehouseAgentWriteBack[];
    /**
     * Extra paths torn down (`rm -rf`) once the agent wrap exits — success or
     * failure — folded into the same EXIT trap that already cleans up the
     * profile-shim dir. Empty/undefined for integrations that stage nothing
     * (Claude), which leaves the trap's shape unchanged.
     */
    teardownPaths?: readonly string[];
}
interface SafehouseAgentWriteBack {
    baselinePath: string;
    sourcePath: string;
    stagedPath: string;
}
interface LaunchCommandArguments {
    definition: AgentDefinition;
    promptFile: string;
    worktreeDir: string;
    /**
     * Directory the agent and prepareWorktree hook cwd into (the `cd`/`-w`
     * target). Equals `worktreeDir` unless the repo recipe sets a `workdir`, in
     * which case it is the subproject dir. The `{{worktree}}` template keeps using
     * `worktreeDir` (the whole checkout).
     */
    workingDir: string;
    /**
     * Optional path to a `KEY='value'` env file containing build-time
     * secrets (see `BUILD_SECRET_NAMES`). Sourced on the host shell before
     * prepareWorktree; for the sdx runner the names are propagated into the sandbox
     * via `sbx exec -e KEY`. Always unset before exec'ing the agent so the
     * agent process never inherits them.
     */
    secretsFile?: string | undefined;
    /**
     * Optional repo-preparation hook resolved by the caller from the freshly
     * created worktree's `.groundcrew/config.json`, falling back to
     * `defaults.hooks.prepareWorktree` from crew.config.ts.
     */
    prepareWorktreeCommand?: string | undefined;
    /**
     * Operator-only, per-repository setup command run on the HOST shell (never a
     * sandbox), before `prepareWorktreeCommand` and the agent. Resolved by the
     * caller from `knownRepositories[].unsandboxedHooks.prepareWorktree` in
     * crew.config.ts. Emitted for the safehouse and none runners; the sdx
     * runner rejects it (no host to run it on).
     */
    prepareWorktreeUnsandboxedCommand?: string | undefined;
    /**
     * Concrete local isolation backend chosen for this launch. Resolved
     * from `config.local.runner` via `resolveLocalRunner` before this
     * function is called — `auto` is never seen here.
     */
    runner: LocalRunner;
    /**
     * Network egress posture. The safehouse runner uses `"allowlisted"` for the
     * Clearance shim and `"open"` for bare `safehouse`; sdx/unwrapped paths
     * ignore it.
     */
    networkEgress: NetworkEgressSetting;
    /**
     * sbx sandbox name when `runner === "sdx"`. Derived by the caller from
     * `sandboxNameFor({ agent })`. Required for sdx; ignored otherwise.
     * Kept off the agent definition so a agent can launch under safehouse
     * on one host and sdx on another without config edits.
     */
    sandboxName?: string | undefined;
    /**
     * Extra filesystem paths granted read/write to the safehouse sandbox via
     * `--add-dirs`, beyond safehouse's automatic cwd grant. Resolved (and deduped)
     * by `composeAgentLaunch`'s `resolveSafehouseAddDirs` — see there for which
     * paths and why git needs them. Empty/undefined → no `--add-dirs` flag (the
     * pre-existing behavior). Only consumed by the safehouse wrap.
     */
    safehouseAddDirs?: readonly string[] | undefined;
    /**
     * Extra read/write paths granted only to the Safehouse agent wrap. These are
     * intentionally withheld from the repo-controlled prepareWorktree wrap.
     */
    safehouseAgentAddDirs?: readonly string[] | undefined;
    /**
     * Optional Safehouse integrations turned on for the agent wrap, emitted as
     * `--enable=<comma-list>` before the profile shim. Each name layers the
     * matching optional sandbox profile (e.g. `agent-browser`) on top of the
     * agent's deny-by-default policy. Withheld from the repo-controlled
     * prepareWorktree wrap, which never needs them. Empty/undefined → no
     * `--enable` flag.
     */
    safehouseEnableFeatures?: readonly string[] | undefined;
    /**
     * Extra read-only paths granted only to the Safehouse agent wrap via
     * `--add-dirs-ro` (host toolchains the Safehouse profile masks but doesn't
     * re-open). Read-only so the agent cannot mutate host toolchain state.
     */
    safehouseAgentAddDirsReadOnly?: readonly string[] | undefined;
    /**
     * Extra host-terminal integration surface granted only to the Safehouse agent
     * wrap. The agent may need to execute host shims and reach their sockets
     * while repo-controlled prepareWorktree hooks should not inherit those paths
     * or env vars.
     */
    safehouseAgentIntegration?: SafehouseAgentIntegration | undefined;
    /**
     * Groundcrew-managed task metadata exposed to the launched worker. Forwarded
     * to the agent process, not the prepareWorktree hook.
     */
    workerEnvironment?: WorkerEnvironment | undefined;
    /**
     * When set, the agent is exec'd with no trailing prompt positional so it opens
     * its interactive session and hands control to the user. The staged prompt is
     * still read into `$_p` (and the prompt dir cleaned up) for a uniform launch
     * chain; only the positional is dropped. Used by `crew open` when no
     * `--prompt`/`--prompt-file` is given.
     */
    omitPromptArgument?: boolean | undefined;
}
/**
 * Build the shell command that runs inside the workspace. The prompt is
 * staged in a temp file (so backticks/quotes/$ in the description survive),
 * read into `$_p`, the temp dir is removed, then the agent CLI is exec'd
 * with the prompt as its trailing positional argument. This removes the
 * need for a `readyMarker` poll because the agent starts up with the
 * prompt in hand.
 */
export declare function buildLaunchCommand(arguments_: LaunchCommandArguments): string;
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