/**
 * Atomic shell tool primitives (E3 · T11406 · SG-PACKAGE-ARCH).
 *
 * The canonical `shell`-class implementations of the
 * `@cleocode/contracts/tools/atomic` contracts (T11403). `executeShell` runs a
 * single executable with explicit args/cwd/env/timeout (NEVER a shell string —
 * args are passed as an argv array, so there is no shell-injection surface) and
 * returns a captured `{ stdout, stderr, code }`. The executor is INJECTABLE so
 * unit tests (and future sandboxes) substitute the process layer without
 * spawning real subprocesses. `runGit` is a constrained wrapper.
 *
 * Pure function of input + executor — no session/loop/global coupling. The
 * forward-only consolidation TARGET for the ~60 ad-hoc `node:child_process`
 * call sites in core (migrated under T11410); this module adds the canonical
 * primitives only.
 *
 * @epic T11390
 * @task T11406
 * @saga T11387
 */
import type { ExecuteShellInput, ExecuteShellResult, RunGitInput } from '@cleocode/contracts/tools/atomic';
/**
 * The process layer behind {@link executeShell}. Injecting a custom executor in
 * tests removes the real-subprocess dependency; production uses
 * {@link defaultShellExecutor}.
 */
export type ShellExecutor = (input: ExecuteShellInput) => Promise<ExecuteShellResult>;
/**
 * Default executor: `spawn(command, args)` with no shell, capturing stdout +
 * stderr and resolving `{ stdout, stderr, code }`. A `timeoutMs` kills the
 * process (code resolves to `null` on signal/timeout). Never rejects on a
 * non-zero exit — the exit code is the result, not an error.
 *
 * ## Environment is SCRUBBED, never inherited (T11897 · security)
 *
 * The child runs under a MINIMAL, explicitly-constructed environment built by
 * {@link scrubSubprocessEnv} — it does NOT inherit the parent `process.env`.
 * This is load-bearing: the parent (the Cleo daemon) holds resolved provider
 * credentials (`ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`, vault material, OAuth headers); blindly
 * forwarding the full env into a child spawned on behalf of an in-process Pi
 * loop would let a single `env`/`printenv` exfiltrate them, and would forward a
 * Pi-poisoned `LD_PRELOAD`/`PATH`/`NODE_OPTIONS` into the loader. The
 * caller-supplied `input.env` is merged on top but itself scrubbed (forbidden
 * keys dropped, `PATH` pinned). Benign vars (locale/term/home) pass through.
 */
export declare const defaultShellExecutor: ShellExecutor;
/**
 * Run a single command (argv form — no shell interpolation).
 *
 * @param input - {@link ExecuteShellInput}.
 * @param executor - process layer; defaults to {@link defaultShellExecutor}.
 * @returns captured `{ stdout, stderr, code }` (`code` is `null` when killed).
 *
 * @example
 * ```ts
 * const { stdout, code } = await executeShell({ command: 'node', args: ['-v'] });
 * ```
 */
export declare function executeShell(input: ExecuteShellInput, executor?: ShellExecutor): Promise<ExecuteShellResult>;
/**
 * Run a `git` subcommand — a constrained {@link executeShell} with
 * `command: 'git'`.
 *
 * @param input - {@link RunGitInput} (git args + optional cwd/timeout).
 * @param executor - process layer; defaults to {@link defaultShellExecutor}.
 * @returns captured `{ stdout, stderr, code }`.
 *
 * @example
 * ```ts
 * const { stdout } = await runGit({ args: ['rev-parse', 'HEAD'], cwd: repo });
 * ```
 */
export declare function runGit(input: RunGitInput, executor?: ShellExecutor): Promise<ExecuteShellResult>;
//# sourceMappingURL=shell.d.ts.map