/**
 * The per-project owner override cap setting (T13787, owner decision
 * 2026-10-16): `evidence.overrideCapPerSession` replaces the fixed cap of 10
 * per session, and ONLY the owner may change it.
 *
 * ## Threat model
 *
 * An agent running as the same OS user can rewrite any local file, so no
 * local check is tamper-proof. The goal is narrower and achievable: an agent
 * cannot raise the cap through the supported path, and cannot raise it
 * silently. Tampering is detectable, not preventable.
 *
 * ## Enrollment (explicit, owner-only, anchored twice)
 *
 * `cleo config owner-enroll` (never a side effect of a set) derives an Ed25519
 * key from the owner-auth password (scrypt over a fresh per-project salt) and
 * records its public key in two places a single file edit cannot reset:
 *  - `.cleo/owner-settings.json`, which is tracked in git like
 *    `.cleo/project.json` (ADR-094), so a delete or forge shows in
 *    `git status` and PR diffs;
 *  - the global store (`<cleoHome>/owner-enrollments.json`), keyed by project
 *    id, with when, which session and which terminal enrolled it.
 * Re-enrolling over an existing record needs `--reset`, which is audited.
 * `cleo doctor` reports the enrollment and any mismatch.
 *
 * ## Who may enroll or set
 *
 * T1118 L4 as built: not a restricted agent role, stdin and stderr a TTY, and
 * the password typed now matching the bound session's owner-auth verifier
 * (`cleo session start --scope global --name owner --owner-auth`). A pty
 * (`script`) passes the TTY check, so an agent CAN enroll in a project that has
 * no enrollment yet — which is why enrollment is explicit, recorded with its
 * terminal, and shown by `cleo doctor` and git.
 *
 * ## Reading
 *
 * The cap is the sealed value only when the project file and the global record
 * agree on the key and the seal verifies. A missing or unreadable file with a
 * global record, a file with no global record, a key mismatch or a bad seal
 * each fall back to {@link DEFAULT_OVERRIDE_CAP_PER_SESSION}, with a warning and
 * an audit line in `.cleo/audit/force-bypass.jsonl`. Every set and every
 * refused attempt is audited there with the old and new value. Who may use
 * `CLEO_OWNER_OVERRIDE=1` at all is decided by `owner-override-authority.ts`
 * (T13790).
 *
 * @task T13787
 */
/** The explicit owner enrollment command, named in every refusal. */
export declare const OWNER_ENROLL_COMMAND = "cleo config owner-enroll";
/** What the override cap resolves to for a project. */
export interface OverrideCapResolution {
    /** The cap in force. */
    cap: number;
    /** Where it came from. */
    source: 'default' | 'owner-setting';
    /** Set when stored owner state was ignored (missing, unanchored, mismatched or unsealed). */
    warning?: string;
}
/** Outcome of an owner set. */
export type OverrideCapSetResult = {
    ok: true;
    /** The cap now in force. */
    value: number;
    /** The cap before the set. */
    previous: number;
    /** True when the requested value exceeded {@link MAX_OVERRIDE_CAP_PER_SESSION}. */
    clamped: boolean;
} | {
    ok: false;
    code: string;
    message: string;
};
/** Outcome of an owner enrollment. */
export type OwnerEnrollResult = {
    ok: true;
    fingerprint: string;
    reset: boolean;
} | {
    ok: false;
    code: string;
    message: string;
};
/** The owner caller: the password typed now and the bound session. */
export interface OwnerCaller {
    password: string;
    session: {
        id: string;
        name: string | null;
        token: string | null;
    } | null;
}
/** The enrollment state `cleo doctor` reports. */
export interface OwnerEnrollmentStatus {
    status: 'none' | 'enrolled' | 'unconfirmed' | 'tampered';
    message: string;
    fingerprint?: string;
    enrolledAt?: string;
    sessionId?: string | null;
    tty?: string | null;
    parent?: string | null;
    cap: number;
    /**
     * Why the owner should look (review-2253 round 2): a recent enrollment, a
     * pty-wrapper parent, or a project file git ignores or has not committed.
     */
    warnings: string[];
}
/**
 * The per-session override cap in force for a project: the owner's sealed
 * `evidence.overrideCapPerSession`, or {@link DEFAULT_OVERRIDE_CAP_PER_SESSION}.
 * Stored state that is missing, unanchored, mismatched or unsealed is ignored,
 * warned about and audited (see the module doc).
 *
 * @param projectRoot - Project root.
 * @returns The cap, its source, and a warning when stored state was ignored.
 * @task T13787
 */
export declare function resolveOverrideCap(projectRoot: string): Promise<OverrideCapResolution>;
/**
 * The project's owner enrollment for `cleo doctor`: none, enrolled (with
 * fingerprint, when, which session and terminal), or tampered (why).
 *
 * @param projectRoot - Project root.
 * @returns The status, with the cap in force.
 * @task T13787
 */
export declare function ownerEnrollmentStatus(projectRoot: string): Promise<OwnerEnrollmentStatus>;
/**
 * Refuse, and audit, a write of `evidence.overrideCapPerSession` that did not
 * come through {@link setOwnerOverrideCap} — a plain config write (T13787).
 *
 * @param projectRoot - Project root.
 * @param value - The value the write asked for.
 * @returns The refusal message, naming the owner command.
 * @task T13787
 */
export declare function refuseOverrideCapWrite(projectRoot: string, value: unknown): Promise<string>;
/**
 * Enroll the owner key for this project — explicitly, never as a side effect
 * of a set (T13787 review). Refused, and audited, unless the caller passes
 * T1118 L4; refused over an existing enrollment (project file or global
 * record) unless `reset`, which is audited loudly and drops the old seals.
 *
 * @param projectRoot - Project root.
 * @param caller - The password typed at the TTY and the bound session.
 * @param opts - `reset`: replace an existing enrollment.
 * @returns The new key's fingerprint, or why enrollment was refused.
 * @task T13787
 */
export declare function enrollOwner(projectRoot: string, caller: OwnerCaller, opts?: {
    reset?: boolean;
}): Promise<OwnerEnrollResult>;
/**
 * Confirm an enrollment that replaced another without proof of the previous
 * owner (review-2253 round 3): the owner proves the CURRENT key's password and
 * the `resetFrom` mark that makes `cleo doctor` FAIL is cleared, audited. An
 * agent that did the reset could confirm it too — visibility, not prevention.
 *
 * @param projectRoot - Project root.
 * @param caller - The password typed at the TTY and the bound session.
 * @returns The confirmed key's fingerprint, or why it was refused.
 * @task T13787
 */
export declare function confirmOwnerEnrollment(projectRoot: string, caller: OwnerCaller): Promise<OwnerEnrollResult>;
/**
 * Set `evidence.overrideCapPerSession` through the owner path: refused, and
 * audited, unless the caller passes T1118 L4, the project is enrolled with its
 * file and global record agreeing, and `password` derives the enrolled key.
 * Never enrolls. Values above {@link MAX_OVERRIDE_CAP_PER_SESSION} are clamped.
 *
 * @param projectRoot - Project root.
 * @param input - The requested value, the password typed at the TTY, and the
 *   bound session with its owner-auth verifier (null when it has none).
 * @returns The new and previous cap, or why the set was refused.
 * @task T13787
 */
export declare function setOwnerOverrideCap(projectRoot: string, input: OwnerCaller & {
    value: number;
}): Promise<OverrideCapSetResult>;
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