/**
 * In-memory {@link SkillPackStore} reference (plan `skill-pack-delivery-channel`).
 *
 * The interesting property is what `publish` refuses. This store cannot hash —
 * core has no crypto — so it is NOT the integrity authority for a pack, and it
 * does not pretend to be: the publisher mints the addresses and the installing
 * device re-derives and verifies every one of them. What this store CAN check
 * without crypto, it checks, and rejects rather than storing a pack whose
 * manifest and bytes already disagree at publish time: the declared path set
 * must be exactly the delivered path set, and every delivered file's UTF-8 byte
 * length must equal what its row declared.
 *
 * Storing that pair unchecked would be the worse failure mode by far — the
 * device would fetch, verify, reject, and have no way to tell a corrupt
 * publication from a tampered response.
 */
import { type SkillPackFileContent, type SkillPackListQuery, type SkillPackManifest, type SkillPackPublishInput, type SkillPackStore } from '../skill-pack';
import { type TenantId } from '../tenant';
export declare class InMemorySkillPackStore implements SkillPackStore {
    #private;
    publish(tenant: TenantId, input: SkillPackPublishInput): Promise<SkillPackManifest>;
    get(tenant: TenantId, name: string): Promise<SkillPackManifest | undefined>;
    list(tenant: TenantId, query: SkillPackListQuery): Promise<readonly SkillPackManifest[]>;
    readFile(tenant: TenantId, name: string, path: string): Promise<SkillPackFileContent | undefined>;
}