/**
 * Security Pattern Library
 * Single source of truth for all regex patterns used in security analysis
 *
 * Extracted from SecurityResponseAnalyzer.ts (Issue #53)
 * Consolidates 16 pattern collections, eliminates duplicates
 */
/**
 * Patterns to detect HTTP error responses (4xx/5xx)
 * Used by: isHttpErrorResponse(), analyzeComputedMathResult()
 */
export declare const HTTP_ERROR_PATTERNS: {
    /** Full pattern: status code + context (e.g., "404 not found") */
    readonly statusWithContext: RegExp;
    /** Simple pattern: status code at start (e.g., "404: ...") */
    readonly statusAtStart: RegExp;
    /** Short "not found" responses */
    readonly notFound: RegExp;
    /** JSON status field pattern */
    readonly jsonStatus: RegExp;
};
/**
 * Patterns for MCP protocol validation errors
 * These indicate proper input rejection (SAFE behavior)
 * Used by: isMCPValidationError()
 */
export declare const VALIDATION_ERROR_PATTERNS: readonly [RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp];
/**
 * Issue #146: Error context patterns indicating operation failure
 * Used to detect when payload appears in error message (likely false positive)
 * These patterns indicate the server rejected/failed the operation
 */
export declare const ERROR_CONTEXT_PATTERNS: readonly [RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp];
/**
 * Issue #146: Success context patterns indicating operation completion
 * Used to confirm operation actually executed (high confidence vulnerability)
 * These patterns indicate the server processed and returned results
 */
export declare const SUCCESS_CONTEXT_PATTERNS: readonly [RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp];
/**
 * Issue #146: Check if payload appears in error context (likely false positive)
 * @param responseText The full response text from the tool
 * @param payload The payload that was sent to the tool
 * @returns true if payload is reflected in an error context
 */
export declare function isPayloadInErrorContext(responseText: string, payload: string): boolean;
/**
 * Issue #201: Check if payload is partially echoed in response
 * Handles truncation and path prepending common in error messages
 *
 * False positives occur when servers echo payloads in error messages like:
 *   "File not found: /path/to/<?xml...xxe SYSTEM...>"
 *
 * The evidence regex matches the echoed payload, not actual exploitation.
 * This function detects partial echoes that the simple includes() check misses.
 *
 * @param responseText The full response text from the tool
 * @param payload The payload that was sent to the tool
 * @param minPrefixLength Minimum prefix length to check (default: 30)
 * @returns true if payload or significant portion is echoed in response
 */
export declare function isPayloadPartiallyEchoed(responseText: string, payload: string, minPrefixLength?: number): boolean;
/**
 * Issue #146: Check if response indicates successful operation (high confidence)
 * @param responseText The full response text from the tool
 * @returns true if response indicates operation succeeded
 */
export declare function hasSuccessContext(responseText: string): boolean;
/**
 * Issue #146: Check if response indicates failed operation (error context)
 * @param responseText The full response text from the tool
 * @returns true if response indicates operation failed
 */
export declare function hasErrorContext(responseText: string): boolean;
/**
 * Patterns indicating actual code/command execution
 * Used by: hasExecutionEvidence()
 */
export declare const EXECUTION_INDICATORS: readonly [RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp];
/**
 * Patterns for detecting execution artifacts in response
 * Used by: detectExecutionArtifacts()
 */
export declare const EXECUTION_ARTIFACT_PATTERNS: {
    /** Always indicates execution */
    readonly alwaysExecution: readonly [RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp];
    /** Context-sensitive - only count if no echoed payload */
    readonly contextSensitive: readonly [RegExp, RegExp, RegExp];
};
/**
 * Structured LLM injection marker with name metadata
 * Used by OutputInjectionAnalyzer for detailed reporting (Issue #191)
 */
export interface LLMInjectionMarker {
    pattern: RegExp;
    name: string;
    category: "xml_instruction" | "chat_format" | "template_injection" | "instruction_override";
}
/**
 * Patterns for detecting LLM prompt injection markers in tool output
 * These indicate potential indirect prompt injection (output injection)
 * Used by: hasLLMInjectionMarkers(), OutputInjectionAnalyzer
 *
 * When tool output contains these markers, it may flow to the orchestrating
 * LLM and influence its behavior - a security concern for MCP integrations.
 *
 * Consolidated from OutputInjectionAnalyzer.ts (Issue #191) - single source of truth
 */
export declare const LLM_INJECTION_MARKERS_WITH_METADATA: LLMInjectionMarker[];
/**
 * Legacy array of just patterns (for backward compatibility)
 * @deprecated Use LLM_INJECTION_MARKERS_WITH_METADATA for new code
 */
export declare const LLM_INJECTION_MARKERS: RegExp[];
/**
 * Patterns for detecting output injection vulnerability metadata
 * Tools that self-report vulnerability status
 */
export declare const OUTPUT_INJECTION_METADATA: {
    /** Tool reports it includes raw/unsanitized content */
    readonly rawContentIncluded: readonly [RegExp, RegExp, RegExp];
    /** Tool reports vulnerability in output handling */
    readonly vulnerableOutput: readonly [RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp];
};
/**
 * Patterns for connection/server errors
 * Used by: isConnectionError(), isConnectionErrorFromException()
 */
export declare const CONNECTION_ERROR_PATTERNS: {
    /** Unambiguous connection errors */
    readonly unambiguous: readonly [RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp];
    /** Only apply when response starts with MCP error prefix */
    readonly contextual: readonly [RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp];
    /** MCP error prefix pattern */
    readonly mcpPrefix: RegExp;
};
/**
 * Patterns for error classification
 * Used by: classifyError(), classifyErrorFromException()
 */
export declare const ERROR_CLASSIFICATION_PATTERNS: {
    readonly connection: RegExp;
    readonly server: RegExp;
    readonly protocol: RegExp;
};
/**
 * Transient error patterns that are worth retrying.
 * These indicate temporary network/server issues that may resolve.
 * Used by: isTransientError(), isTransientErrorFromException()
 *
 * @see https://github.com/triepod-ai/inspector-assessment/issues/157
 */
export declare const TRANSIENT_ERROR_PATTERNS: readonly [RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp];
/**
 * Permanent error patterns that should NOT be retried.
 * These indicate issues that will not resolve with retry.
 * Used by: isTransientError() to short-circuit retry logic
 *
 * @see https://github.com/triepod-ai/inspector-assessment/issues/157
 */
export declare const PERMANENT_ERROR_PATTERNS: readonly [RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp];
/**
 * Check if error text indicates a transient error worth retrying.
 * @param text Error message or response text
 * @returns true if error is transient and should be retried
 */
export declare function isTransientErrorPattern(text: string): boolean;
/**
 * Issue #175: AppleScript syntax error patterns to exclude from XXE detection
 *
 * AppleScript errors can trigger false positives when:
 * 1. The tool returns an AppleScript syntax error (e.g., -2750 duplicate parameter)
 * 2. The XXE payload is echoed back in the error message
 * 3. XXE evidence patterns match "parameter" + "entity" combination
 *
 * These patterns detect AppleScript-specific errors by:
 * - Error code ranges (-27xx, -25xx are AppleScript domain)
 * - AppleScript-specific syntax error messages
 * - Common AppleScript error patterns
 */
export declare const APPLESCRIPT_SYNTAX_ERROR_PATTERNS: RegExp[];
/**
 * Check if error text indicates an AppleScript syntax error (Issue #175)
 * @param text Error message or response text
 * @returns true if error is an AppleScript syntax error
 */
export declare function isAppleScriptSyntaxError(text: string): boolean;
/**
 * Issue #177: AppleScript injection SUCCESS patterns
 *
 * These patterns indicate that the injection payload SUCCESSFULLY escaped
 * the string context and reached the AppleScript interpreter. Even if the
 * script then fails (e.g., Word not running), the injection point was reached,
 * proving the vulnerability exists.
 *
 * Key insight: Distinguish between:
 * - Syntax error FROM the payload itself (malformed input → safe, payload rejected)
 * - Runtime error AFTER payload executed (injection succeeded → vulnerable!)
 *
 * H1 #3480575 scenario:
 *   Payload: " & do shell script "id" & "
 *   Response shows: if "" & do shell script "id" & "" is not "" then
 *   Error: -2710 (Word not running)
 *   This is INJECTION SUCCESS - payload escaped into executable code context
 */
export declare const APPLESCRIPT_INJECTION_SUCCESS_PATTERNS: RegExp[];
/**
 * Runtime error codes that occur AFTER AppleScript interpretation begins
 * These indicate the injection reached the execution stage
 *
 * -2710: "Can't make class" - object creation failed (app not running, but injection succeeded)
 * -2753: "Can't get" - property access failed (but script was parsed and executed)
 * -1708: "Application isn't running" - target app not available (injection reached tell block)
 * -10810: "Application launch failed" - tried to launch app (injection executed)
 */
export declare const APPLESCRIPT_RUNTIME_ERROR_CODES: RegExp[];
/**
 * Check if response shows AppleScript injection SUCCESS (Issue #177)
 * This takes PRECEDENCE over syntax error detection for injection payloads.
 *
 * @param text Response text to analyze
 * @param payload Optional - the injection payload that was sent (for context)
 * @returns true if injection appears to have succeeded (vulnerability EXISTS)
 */
export declare function isAppleScriptInjectionSuccess(text: string, payload?: string): boolean;
/**
 * Status patterns indicating safe response handling
 * Used by: isReflectionResponse()
 */
export declare const STATUS_PATTERNS: readonly [RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp];
/**
 * Reflection patterns indicating safe data handling
 * Used by: isReflectionResponse()
 */
export declare const REFLECTION_PATTERNS: readonly [RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp];
/**
 * Fail-open authentication patterns (VULNERABLE)
 * Used by: analyzeAuthBypassResponse()
 */
export declare const AUTH_FAIL_OPEN_PATTERNS: readonly [{
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "auth_type: fail-open (CVE-2025-52882)";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "auth_status: bypassed";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "access granted despite failure";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "authentication skipped";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "fail-open pattern detected";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "auth bypassed";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "authentication bypassed";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "vulnerable flag with auth context";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "auth succeeded with null token";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "granted without valid token";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "action performed indicator";
}];
/**
 * Fail-closed authentication patterns (SAFE)
 * Used by: analyzeAuthBypassResponse()
 */
export declare const AUTH_FAIL_CLOSED_PATTERNS: readonly [{
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "auth_type: fail-closed (secure)";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "auth_status: denied";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "access denied";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "authentication failed";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "fail-closed pattern detected";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "status: blocked";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "invalid token rejection";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "token required";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "unauthorized response";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "denial reason provided";
}];
/**
 * Patterns indicating vulnerable shared state authorization
 * Detects cross-tool privilege escalation via shared mutable state
 * Used by: analyzeStateBasedAuthBypass()
 */
export declare const STATE_AUTH_VULNERABLE_PATTERNS: readonly [{
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "admin_mode enabled in response";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "Tool hints at cross-tool state dependency";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "Explicit cross-tool state dependency";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "Cross-tool privilege escalation detected";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "Elevated privileges granted";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "Admin mode activated (state modifier)";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "Response hints at config_modifier for admin_mode";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "Tool depends on config_modifier for authorization";
}];
/**
 * Patterns indicating safe independent authorization
 * Detects tools that use per-request authentication (secure)
 * Used by: analyzeStateBasedAuthBypass()
 */
export declare const STATE_AUTH_SAFE_PATTERNS: readonly [{
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "Tool explicitly states it doesn't use shared state";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "Tool requires independent per-request auth";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "Independent authorization required";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "Tool confirms it does not use shared state";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "Request stored for admin review (no auto-execution)";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "Per-request authentication enforced";
}];
/**
 * Response pattern structure for chain exploitation analysis
 */
export interface ChainResponsePattern {
    pattern: RegExp;
    weight: number;
    category: string;
    description: string;
}
/**
 * Patterns indicating vulnerable chain execution behavior
 * - Arbitrary tool invocation without allowlist
 * - Output injection via template substitution
 * - Recursive/circular chain execution
 * - Missing depth limits
 * - State poisoning between steps
 *
 * Used by: analyzeChainExploitation()
 */
export declare const CHAIN_EXPLOIT_VULNERABLE_PATTERNS: ChainResponsePattern[];
/**
 * Patterns indicating safe/hardened chain handling
 * - Tool allowlist validation
 * - No execution (validation only)
 * - Depth limits enforced
 * - Output injection blocked
 *
 * Used by: analyzeChainExploitation()
 */
/**
 * Threshold for confirming vulnerable chain execution behavior.
 * Value of 1.5 requires ~2 weighted pattern matches to confirm vulnerability.
 *
 * Derived from A/B testing against vulnerable-mcp/hardened-mcp testbed:
 * - vulnerable-mcp: typical scores 2.0-4.0 for vulnerable chains
 * - hardened-mcp: typical scores 0.0-0.8 for safe chains
 *
 * Setting at 1.5 provides margin against false positives while
 * maintaining detection of genuine vulnerabilities.
 */
export declare const CHAIN_VULNERABLE_THRESHOLD = 1.5;
/**
 * Threshold for confirming safe/hardened chain behavior.
 * Value of 1.0 requires 1+ weighted safe pattern matches.
 *
 * Derived from A/B testing:
 * - hardened-mcp: typical scores 1.5-3.0 for safe chains
 * - vulnerable-mcp: typical scores 0.0-0.5 for safe patterns
 */
export declare const CHAIN_SAFE_THRESHOLD = 1;
/**
 * Maps vulnerability categories to detection patterns.
 * Used by analyzeChainExploitation() for category classification.
 *
 * Extracted from inline patterns to maintain single source of truth.
 */
export declare const CHAIN_CATEGORY_PATTERNS: Record<string, {
    pattern: RegExp;
    category: string;
}[]>;
/**
 * Detect vulnerability categories from response text.
 * Returns array of detected category names.
 */
export declare function detectVulnerabilityCategories(responseText: string): string[];
export declare const CHAIN_EXPLOIT_SAFE_PATTERNS: ChainResponsePattern[];
/**
 * Patterns indicating search result responses
 * Used by: isSearchResultResponse()
 */
export declare const SEARCH_RESULT_PATTERNS: readonly [RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp];
/**
 * Patterns indicating creation/modification responses
 * Used by: isCreationResponse()
 */
export declare const CREATION_PATTERNS: readonly [RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp];
/**
 * Patterns for echoed injection payloads
 * Used by: containsEchoedInjectionPayload()
 */
export declare const ECHOED_PAYLOAD_PATTERNS: readonly [RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp];
/**
 * Fallback execution detection patterns
 * Used by: analyzeInjectionResponse()
 */
export declare const FALLBACK_EXECUTION_PATTERNS: readonly [RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp];
/**
 * Text-based validation rejection patterns
 * Used by: isValidationRejection()
 */
export declare const TEXT_REJECTION_PATTERNS: readonly [RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp];
/**
 * Result field rejection patterns (for JSON responses)
 * Used by: isValidationRejection()
 */
export declare const RESULT_REJECTION_PATTERNS: readonly [RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp];
/**
 * Ambiguous validation pattern strings (for confidence calculation)
 * Used by: isValidationPattern()
 */
export declare const AMBIGUOUS_VALIDATION_PATTERNS: readonly ["type.*error", "invalid.*type", "error", "invalid", "failed", "negative.*not.*allowed", "must.*be.*positive", "invalid.*value", "overflow", "out.*of.*range"];
/**
 * Patterns for identifying structured data tools
 * Used by: isStructuredDataTool()
 */
export declare const DATA_TOOL_PATTERNS: readonly [RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp];
/**
 * Read-only tool name patterns
 * Used by: analyzeComputedMathResult()
 */
export declare const READ_ONLY_TOOL_NAME_PATTERN: RegExp;
/**
 * Simple math expression pattern
 * Used by: isComputedMathResult(), analyzeComputedMathResult()
 */
export declare const SIMPLE_MATH_PATTERN: RegExp;
/**
 * Computational language indicators
 * Used by: analyzeComputedMathResult()
 */
export declare const COMPUTATIONAL_INDICATORS: readonly [RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp];
/**
 * Common data field names that often contain numeric values
 * Used by: isCoincidentalNumericInStructuredData()
 */
export declare const STRUCTURED_DATA_FIELD_NAMES: readonly ["count", "total", "records", "page", "limit", "offset", "id", "status", "code", "version", "index", "size", "employees", "items", "results", "entries", "length", "pages", "rows", "columns", "width", "height", "timestamp", "duration", "amount", "price", "quantity"];
/**
 * Structured data indicators for confidence calculation
 * Used by: calculateConfidence()
 */
export declare const STRUCTURED_DATA_INDICATORS: {
    readonly fieldPatterns: RegExp;
    readonly bulletPattern: RegExp;
    readonly jsonPattern: RegExp;
    readonly numericMetadataPattern: RegExp;
};
/**
 * Patterns for detecting secret/credential leakage in tool responses
 * Used by: checkSecretLeakage()
 */
export declare const SECRET_LEAKAGE_PATTERNS: {
    /** Well-known API key formats */
    readonly apiKeys: readonly [RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp];
    /** Database connection strings with credentials */
    readonly connectionStrings: readonly [RegExp];
    /** Environment variable patterns with values */
    readonly envVars: readonly [RegExp];
    /** Partial key exposure patterns */
    readonly partialKeys: readonly [RegExp];
    /** Generic credential assignment patterns */
    readonly credentialAssignment: readonly [RegExp];
};
/**
 * Patterns for detecting tool output injection vulnerabilities
 * Detects when user content is echoed unsanitized in tool output
 * Used by: analyzeOutputInjection()
 */
export declare const OUTPUT_INJECTION_PATTERNS: {
    /** LLM control patterns that should be sanitized */
    readonly llmControl: readonly [RegExp, RegExp, RegExp, RegExp];
    /** Canary markers for echo detection */
    readonly canaryMarkers: readonly [RegExp];
};
/**
 * Patterns indicating scope violation in tool response
 * Detects when tools exceed their declared annotations at runtime
 * CWE-250: Execution with Unnecessary Privileges
 * CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management
 */
export declare const SCOPE_VIOLATION_PATTERNS: readonly [{
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "scope_violation: true (tool exceeded declared scope)";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "scope_escalation: true (privilege escalation via input)";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "actual_scope indicates privileged operation";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "privileged_data exposed in response";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "system_secrets leaked in response";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "Admin mode activated via keyword trigger";
}];
/**
 * Patterns indicating safe scope enforcement (hardened behavior)
 * Used to confirm tools properly reject privileged actions
 */
export declare const SCOPE_ENFORCED_PATTERNS: readonly [{
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "scope_enforced: true (safe)";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "Action blocked by allowlist";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "Allowlist enforcement";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "Explicit rejection: action not in allowlist";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "No escalation attempted (safe)";
}, {
    readonly pattern: RegExp;
    readonly evidence: "Allowlist defined and enforced";
}];
/**
 * Privileged actions that should be blocked by readOnlyHint=True tools
 */
export declare const PRIVILEGED_ACTIONS: readonly ["write", "write_file", "delete", "delete_data", "execute", "execute_command", "network", "network_request", "modify", "modify_config", "admin", "environment_access"];
/**
 * Escalation keywords that may trigger hidden privilege escalation
 */
export declare const ESCALATION_KEYWORDS: readonly ["admin", "sudo", "elevate", "root", "superuser", "privilege"];
/**
 * Check if response contains scope violation indicators (Issue #144)
 */
export declare function hasScopeViolation(text: string): boolean;
/**
 * Check if response contains scope enforcement indicators (Issue #144)
 */
export declare function hasScopeEnforcement(text: string): boolean;
/**
 * Check if any pattern in array matches text
 */
export declare function matchesAny(patterns: readonly RegExp[], text: string): boolean;
/**
 * Check if HTTP error pattern matches
 */
export declare function isHttpError(text: string): boolean;
/**
 * Check if response has MCP error prefix
 */
export declare function hasMcpErrorPrefix(text: string): boolean;
/**
 * Check if text contains LLM injection markers (Issue #110, Challenge #8)
 * Detects XML-style tags, chat format markers, and instruction overrides
 */
export declare function hasLLMInjectionMarkers(text: string): boolean;
/**
 * Check if response indicates output injection vulnerability (Issue #110, Challenge #8)
 * Detects tools that self-report including raw/unsanitized content
 */
export declare function hasOutputInjectionVulnerability(text: string): boolean;
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